Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

While on routine patrol in San Juan County, New Mexico State Police Officer James Rempe entered the license plate number of the vehicle Defendant Joann Yazzie was driving into his patrol car’s mobile data terminal (MDT). The query returned a result indicating that the compliance status of the vehicle was “unknown.” Upon receiving the report of “unknown” compliance status (compliance with the New Mexico Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act), Officer Rempe activated his emergency lights and pulled over Defendant’s vehicle to investigate further. The “unknown” query return was the only basis for the traffic stop. Based on further information the officer acquired as a result of the stop, Defendant was arrested and charged in magistrate court with driving while under the influence of alcohol and failure to maintain insurance. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained during the course of the stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop and thereby violated her right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. The ultimate question this case posed for the Supreme Court's review was whether the "unknown" status could serve as the basis for the traffic stop. The Supreme Court held that an officer learning of a vehicle's "unknown" compliance status in MVD records has constitutionally reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and investigate further. The Court reversed the appellate court's holding to the contrary. View "New Mexico v. Yazzie" on Justia Law

In 2010, Guadalupe Ashford’s body was found partially hidden behind a trash can at the edge of a small parking lot. Drag marks and blood spatter indicated that Ashford had initially been assaulted in the lot and then dragged a short distance to its edge where her body was found. An Albuquerque Police Department (APD) forensic scientist analyst performed DNA measurements of samples collected from Ashford’s body and from a six-inch by six-inch bloodied brick described as “paver stone” and believed to be the murder weapon, generating DNA profiles of Ashford and of the presumed perpetrator. Unidentified DNA was also discovered on the paver stone, though in smaller amounts than the DNA evidence matching either of the full profiles. The forensic analyst entered the presumed perpetrator’s profile into the CODIS database, which resulted in a match to Defendant Truett Thomas. Defendant was arrested and charged on the basis of this DNA evidence, but he denied ever having met Ashford. Defendant was held in pretrial custody for twenty-two months before he moved to dismiss the charges for violation of his right to a speedy trial. The district court denied the motion and set the trial to begin approximately twenty-six months after Defendant’s arrest. By the time the case came to trial, the State’s forensic analyst had moved out of New Mexico. At a hearing two weeks before trial, the prosecutor expressed concerns about securing the presence of that forensic analyst at trial and suggested that she be allowed to testify over the live, two-way audio-video communications application Skype as an alternative. At another pretrial hearing in the following week, the court asked if there were “any other matters” that needed to be addressed before trial. In response, defense counsel expressed hesitation at the use of Skype testimony. The prosecutor replied that the State had not sought an enforceable subpoena for the witness in reliance on defense counsel’s statement a week earlier that Skype would “work.” The district court judge took the position that Defendant had waived any objection to the use of two-way video by defense counsel’s initial informal acquiescence. Defendant appealed after he was convicted for first-degree deliberate murder and first-degree kidnapping on multiple grounds, including an asserted violation of the Confrontation Clause through the admission of Skype testimony of the DNA analyst. After review, the Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions on this basis but remanded for a new trial on the murder charge only, having concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the kidnapping conviction. View "New Mexico v.Thomas" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Armijo was convicted for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The district court affirmed his conviction, but the Court of Appeal reversed. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the State’s arguments that the Court of Appeals lacked appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s decision in an on-record appeal from metropolitan court, and that a defendant had no right to that secondary record review. Addressing only these two issues and declining to conduct a third appellate review of the underlying merits of this case, the Supreme Court held that the Legislature vested the Court of Appeals with appellate jurisdiction over a district court’s on-record appellate review of a metropolitan court proceeding and has provided an aggrieved party the right to such an appeal. View "New Mexico v. Armijo" on Justia Law

Defendant Muziwokuthula Madonda was interrogated after he was arrested for the deaths of two men in Tucumcari. At the outset, law enforcement officers advised Defendant of his Miranda rights, and he unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. However, the officers continued to interrogate Defendant, and Defendant eventually made incriminating statements. Defendant then moved pretrial to have the statements suppressed, arguing that they were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress the statements, and the State, in turn, filed this interlocutory appeal. Finding no reversible error in the suppression order, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Mexico v. Madonda" on Justia Law

On petition for a writ of superintending control, the issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review was an order issued by the Twelfth Judicial District Court in the criminal prosecutions against Santiago Carrillo. The district court’s order held that the flat-fee rates paid to indigent defense contract counsel by the Law Office of the Public Defender (LOPD) contravened the right to counsel and nullified the Legislature’s prohibition of the payment of hourly rates to contract counsel. The district court also issued a remedial order directing the LOPD to pay every contract attorney no less than $85 per hour and the State to provide the funding necessary for the LOPD to render such compensation. The Supreme Court held that the General Appropriations Act of 2015, Chapter 101, Section 4(C) of New Mexico Laws of 2015, did not violate the right to the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution. "We do not presume that the flat-fee rates paid to Carrillo’s contract attorney violate his right to counsel." Accordingly, the Court granted the writ of superintending control, vacated the district court’s orders, and remanded to the district court with instructions to proceed with the State’s prosecutions against Carrillo. View "Kerr v. Parsons" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Tufts, a man in his late thirties, filmed himself masturbating, saved the electronic image on a secure digital (SD) memory card, inserted the card into a cell phone, handed the cell phone to a fifteen-year-old girl (Child) with whom he had developed an intimate but non-sexual relationship, and told her there was a surprise on the phone for her. Defendant was convicted of criminal sexual communication with a child. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that “ ‘to send[,]’ when used to describe the act of causing another person to receive a physical object[,] evoke[d] the notion of a third-party carrier,” and therefore, when Defendant hand-delivered obscene electronic images to Child, he did not “send” the images to her by means of an electronic communication device. The New Mexico Supreme Court construed "sending" as used by the applicable statute, to give effect to the Legislature's objective and purpose, and found that defendant effectively "sent" the offending images to the child, in violation of Section 30-37-3.3(A). The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals' determination and remanded the case back for further consideration of defendant's other arguments on appeal. View "New Mexico v. Tufts" on Justia Law

Anthony Holt had partially removed a window screen from a residential dwelling when he the homeowner detected him. He fled. In the process of removing the screen, he placed his fingers behind the screen and inside the outer boundary of the home. Holt was subsequently arrested and charged with breaking and entering. An “unauthorized entry” was an essential element of the offense, and the issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review was whether Holt’s conduct constituted an “entry.” It did. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Holt’s conviction. View "New Mexico v. Holt" on Justia Law

In 2011, Norman Benally was driving a black Cadillac Escalade with a nonoperating headlight. A police officer stopped Benally, and during the stop, he smelled marijuana. The officer asked for consent to search the vehicle, but Benally declined. Officer Largo called for the assistance of the K-9 patrol unit. (NM)K-9 Tiko alerted the officers to the presence of controlled substances. Shortly thereafter, Danielle Benally, who was the registered owner of the vehicle, arrived at the scene. She also refused consent to the officers’ search of the vehicle. The vehicle was then seized and towed to the Police Department’s gated and locked impound lot. There, evidence tape was placed on the vehicle and sealed so that no one but the police officers could enter it. Thereafter, the State sought a warrant to search the vehicle for drugs, drug paraphernalia, and money linked to drug transactions. A warrant was issued, and the following day, law enforcement agents searched the vehicle. They found close to 600 grams of marijuana; a digital scale; Benally’s wallet (with money in it), his driver’s license, and his social security cards; and Danielle Benally’s wallet (which also had money in it), credit cards, and EBT cards. In total, law enforcement officials discovered $1295 during the search of the vehicle. The State ultimately filed a criminal complaint against Benally, charging him with distribution of marijuana, conspiracy to distribute marijuana, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. At the same time, the State filed a complaint for the forfeiture of the $1295, alleged to be drug proceeds. Benally moved to dismiss the forfeiture complaint as untimely, arguing that the forfeiture complaint was filed more than thirty days after police officers seized and sealed the vehicle containing the currency. The trial court held a hearing on the motion and later dismissed the forfeiture complaint as untimely. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed: because the 2002-version of the applicable seizure statute controlled, and because the officers “ma[de] a seizure” of the money when they seized the vehicle, it was error for the trial court to dismiss as untimely. View "New Mexico v. Benally" on Justia Law

Defendant Dorall Smith appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and criminal damage to property. Defendant raised ten issues as grounds for appeal: (1) there was insufficient evidence of deliberate intent to support a conviction for first-degree murder; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to use recalculated DNA results that were not disclosed to Defendant until the eve of trial, necessitating that defense counsel retain its own expert in the middle of trial to analyze the DNA evidence; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering defense counsel to obtain a DNA expert midtrial, and then requiring that expert to expedite his analysis; (4) the trial court improperly admitted autopsy photographs and the testimony of a supervising pathologist in violation of the constitutional right to confrontation; (5) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing evidence of prior bad acts contrary to its previous order in limine; (6) the trial court abused its discretion by joining Defendant’s two cases; (7) a three-year delay amounted to a violation of Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial; (8) Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel; (9) the trial court abused its discretion by denying Defendant’s motions for mistrial; and (10) his convictions should be reversed based on a theory of cumulative error in light of the all the issues he raises. The Supreme Court, after review, rejected all of defendant's claims on appeal and affirmed his convictions. View "New Mexico v. Smith" on Justia Law

There was only one judge on the Tenth Judicial District Court which had jurisdiction over the counties of Quay, DeBaca, and Harding. In 2008, Albert J. Mitchell, Jr. won a contested election for Tenth Judicial District judge against Judge Donald Schutte. Pursuant to 19 Article VI, Section 33 of the New Mexico Constitution, Judge Mitchell ran for retention in the 2014 general election. Prior to the retention election, the Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission evaluated Judge Mitchell and recommended that voters retain him in the general election. Despite the Commission’s recommendation, Judge Mitchell was not retained, failing to garner at least fifty-seven percent of the votes. A district court judges nominating committee was convened to solicit and evaluate applicants to fill Judge Mitchell’s impending vacancy. Before the nominating committee could meet, Petitioner Pamela Clark unsuccessfully tried to prevent to nominating committee from considering Judge Mitchell's application by petitioning the New Mexico Supreme Court. The nominating committee ultimately submitted the names of both applicants to the governor for consideration. Governor Susana Martinez appointed Judge Mitchell to the vacancy. This case called upon the New Mexico Supreme Court to interpret the 1988 amendments to the New Mexico Constitution governing judicial selection. The question before the Court was whether Article VI, Section 33 prohibited a district judge who lost a nonpartisan retention election from being appointed to fill the resulting vacancy created by that judge’s nonretention. The Court held that the New Mexico Constitution did not prohibit a judicial nominating commission from considering and nominating, or the governor from appointing, an otherwise qualified judicial applicant to fill a vacant judicial office based on the judicial applicant’s nonretention in the immediately preceding election. "We recognize that our holding may seem counterintuitive at first glance. However, our holding is governed by our Constitution’s provisions governing judicial succession, not retention." View "Clark v. Mitchell" on Justia Law