Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Police officers were dispatched in response to reports of an armed subject pointing a rifle at several people from the window of a light beige or tan vehicle. After Defendant Leticia T. (Child) and children passengers were removed and detained, the officers conducted a warrantless search of the interior and trunk of the vehicle. The district court held that the warrantless search was justified by exigent circumstances. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, ruling that the possibility of a person hiding in the trunk of a vehicle did not constitute exigency. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court centered on the Court of Appeals' reversal. The Supreme Court conclude after a review of the district court record was that when police officers have probable cause and exigent circumstances to believe that an armed subject pointed a rifle at other individuals from a vehicle, officers may search the cab and the trunk of that same vehicle for the rifle. View "New Mexico v. Leticia T." on Justia Law

Defendant Gregg Crocco appealed his conviction for aggravated driving while under the influence of alcohol (aggravated DWI), claiming that his previous attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a motion to suppress evidence resulting from a warrantless police entry into the house of an absent third party, which Defendant had entered shortly before his arrest. Upon review of the particular facts of this case, the Supreme Court denied Defendant’s claim because the record failed to establish a prima facie showing that the police entry into another person’s house violated Defendant’s own reasonable expectation of privacy. View "New Mexico v. Crocco" on Justia Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified a question of New Mexico Law to the New Mexico Supreme Court: "[i]f an otherwise-qualified person has completed a deferred sentence for a felony offense, is that person barred from holding public office without a pardon or certificate from the governor [. . .] or is that person’s right to hold office automatically restored [by the New Mexico Constitution]?" The New Mexico Court, in answering the question, held that after satisfactory completion of all conditions for a deferred sentence and the resulting dismissal of all charges, New Mexico restores a person’s civil rights, including the right to hold public office, by operation of law. James Reese entered a no contest plea to one felony of tampering with evidence, which was connected to aggravated assault charges. Reese was charged with tampering for hiding a knife. As a result of the plea, the State dismissed the aggravated assault charges, leaving only the evidence tampering charge. "The New Mexico Legislature established the deferred sentence as a means of judicial clemency. As such, dismissal of the criminal charges upon satisfaction of the conditions of deferment automatically restores a convicted felon’s civil rights by operation of law." View "United States of America v. Reese" on Justia Law

James Olsson was charged with sixty counts of possession of child pornography based on photographs of minors found in three binders seized from Olsson and images found on his computer. Olsson filed a motion for merger of counts asking the trial court to determine the proper unit of prosecution for those charged with possession under Section 30-6A-3(A). Olsson argued that he should only be charged with one unitary act of possession. Similarly, William Ballard was charged with twenty-five counts of possession based on an external computer hard drive containing still images and videos of minors. The trial court denied Olsson's motion, ruling that if Olsson’s reading of the statute were to be accepted, the language would become meaningless and an offender would be free to acquire unlimited child pornography without additional counts being charged. The State then amended the criminal information, adding additional counts of possession of child pornography for a total of 152 counts based on more images found on Olsson’s computer. By this opinion the Supreme Court decided the correct unit of prosecution for possession of child pornography under NMSA 1978, Section 30-6A-3(A) (2007), part of the Sexual Exploitation of Children Act, NMSA 1978, sections 30-6A-1 to -4 (1984, as amended through 2007), when various media are used to store one or countless images. Upon review, the Court held that the Legislature did not clearly define the unit of prosecution for possession of child pornography because the language was ambiguous and the history and purpose do not offer any further clarity. Furthermore, the Court held that the "Herron" indicia of distinctness test was not applicable in cases of possession. Therefore, the Court resorted to the rule of lenity and held that Olsson and Ballard could each only be charged with one count of possession of child pornography. View "New Mexico v. Olsson" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on defendant Lisa Stevens' convictions for second-degree criminal sexual penetration during the commission of a felony, child abuse, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The convictions were based on two separate incidents in which defendant directed her thirteen-year-old daughter to perform oral sex on defendant’s twenty-four-year-old boyfriend after the three injected methamphetamine together. The Court used the opportunity of this case to clarify that simply causing another person to engage in otherwise lawful sexual intercourse at the same time a felony was being committed did not constitute the crime of criminal sexual penetration during the commission of a felony. While the Court also held that the jury should be instructed that the crime of criminal sexual penetration during the commission of a felony requires the commission of unlawful sexual activity with the victim of the felony, the Court concluded that the unobjected-to deficiency in the instructions did not constitute fundamental error in this case case when Defendant’s guilt was clear. Finding no other reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "New Mexico v. Stevens" on Justia Law

The question before the Supreme Court in these appeals was: what happens when the prosecutor files an interlocutory appeal yet neglects to make a timely certification to the district court or fails to attach a copy of the certification to its notice of appeal? What should happen is the imposition of sanctions upon any attorney who fails to read the law and follow the rules of Court, something that did not occur in the two cases consolidated in this opinion. "What should not happen is outright dismissal of the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, something that did occur in these cases." Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed those dismissals and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "New Mexico v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Freddie Montoya passed a vehicle in which a single female was driving, and positioned his truck across the roadway to block her path. He and his passenger got out of the truck, forcibly entered the victim’s vehicle, and raped her. Among other crimes, Montoya was convicted of first-degree kidnapping and second-degree criminal sexual penetration (CSP II). Montoya was required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), due exclusively to the CSP II conviction. However, the CSP II conviction was vacated because Montoya’s actions supported his convictions for both first-degree kidnapping and CSP II, which could have resulted in double punishment for the same conduct, in violation of the Double Jeopardy. Montoya argued that he was no longer required to register under SORNA because the CSP II conviction was vacated. The Supreme Court disagreed: "registration under SORNA is not considered punishment in New Mexico. . . . Montoya’s conviction of a qualifying sex offense remains valid for purposes of SORNA because the CSP II conviction is what elevated the kidnapping to a first-degree felony." View "Montoya v. Driggers" on Justia Law

In 2006, Joseph and Mary Romero signed a mortgage contract with the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as nominee for Equity One, Inc. They pledged their home as collateral for the loan. The Romeros alleged that Equity One urged them to refinance their home for access to the home's equity. The terms of the new loan were not an improvement over their then-current loan: the interest rate was higher and the loan amount due was higher. Despite that, the Romeros would receive a net cash payout they planned to use to pay other debts. The Romeros later became delinquent on their increased loan payments. A third party, Bank of New York (BONY), identified itself as a trustee for Popular Financial Services Mortgage, filed suit to foreclose on the Romeros' home. BONY claimed to hold the Romeros' note and mortgage with the right of enforcement. The Romeros defended by arguing that BONY lacked standing to foreclose because nothing in the complaint established how BONY held their note and mortgage, and that the contracts they signed were with Equity One. The district court found that BONY had established itself as holder of the Romeros' mortgage, and that the bank had standing to foreclose. That decision was appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in finding BONY's evidence demonstrated that it had standing to foreclose. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bank of New York v. Romero" on Justia Law

The New Mexico Cultural Properties Review Committee recognized approximately 400,000 acres of public land on Mount Taylor as a registered cultural property under the New Mexico Cultural Properties Act. One month after the Committee issued its final order, Rayellen Resources, Inc., and numerous other parties including the Cebolleta Land Grant (the Rayellen parties) appealed that decision. The Pueblo of Acoma, which joined the Committee in defending the listing, challenged whether the Rayellen parties who are private landowners had standing to appeal because they were explicitly excluded from the listing. In reaching the merits of the case, the district court found that the listing did not violate constitutional protections against the establishment of religion and that the Committee did not violate due process guarantees by following federal guidelines for the listing. The district court reversed the listing nevertheless on the grounds that personal notice of the permanent listing’s public comment period was not provided to all affected property owners, including mineral rights holders, in violation of due process guarantees, and that both the mountain’s sheer size and the private property exclusions made it impracticable to comply with provisions in the Cultural Properties Act relating to integrity of place, required inspections, and required maintenance. The district court also reversed the inclusion of the 19,000 acres of Cebolleta Land Grant common lands in the listing because land grant common lands are not subject to regulation as state land under the Cultural Properties Act. Acoma Pueblo petitioned for certiorari in the Court of Appeals on the three listing issues which the district court reversed, and the Rayellen parties cross-petitioned on other issues as to which they had not prevailed in the district court. The Court of Appeals granted those petitions as well as motions to intervene from Laguna Pueblo and the Committee. Without deciding any of the issues, the Court of Appeals then certified the entire case to the Supreme Court. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part the Committee’s decision and held that the Mount Taylor listing was lawful under the Cultural Properties Act and that the proceedings before the Committee did not violate the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. The Court reversed the Committee’s inclusion of 19,000 acres of Cebolleta Land Grant property and held that land grant property is not state land as defined in the Cultural Properties Act. View "Rayellen Resources, Inc. v. Lyons" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a motion to quash his indictment, arguing that the district court improperly enlisted the aid of the district attorney’s office in the selection of the grand jury panel that indicted Petitioner. Agreeing that the integrity of the grand jury process was undermined by the manner in which grand jurors had been selected, the Supreme Court issued a writ of superintending control directing the district court to quash the indictment without prejudice to the State’s right to reinstate new criminal proceedings against Petitioner. Upon further review, the Supreme Court issued this opinion to explain the reasons for its decision to quash the indictment. View "de Leon v. Hartley" on Justia Law