Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants Christopher Gurule and Linda Davis were charged with criminal sexual penetration of a minor, criminal sexual contact of a minor, kidnapping and sexual exploitation of a minor in 2007. A special agent with the Attorney General's Office's Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force applied for a search warrant believing that she uncovered fifty-eight files made available on a peer-to-peer network from an IP address associated with defendants. Defendants objected to the search and seizure of a digital camera, admission of the testimony of the mother of the alleged victim, and testimony of defendant Davis' son, who prepared to testify he saw his mother viewing child pornography on her computer. The district court granted suppression of the challenged evidence. The State filed an interlocutory appeal to challenge those evidentiary rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed with respect to testimony of defendant Davis' son, but affirmed the district court in all other respects. View "New Mexico v. Gurule" on Justia Law

Defendants Lester and Carol Boyse were charged with fifty-two counts of cruelty to animals. They sought to suppress evidence discovered by investigators because the warrant was approved by a magistrate judge via telephone and not in person. The district court denied their motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court analyzed the practice of telephonic approval of search warrants against the strictures of the state constitution. Upon review, the Court concluded that a "showing" to a magistrate can be made through audible or other sensory means, in addition to being made in person. Therefore, the Court held that as a matter of law, telephonic approval of search warrants was constitutional, and affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' motion to suppress evidence. View "New Mexico v. Boyse" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether an out-of-state internet retailer, Barnesandnoble.com LLC (bn.com), which has no physical presence in New Mexico other than through stores owned by a sister corporation, Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc., is subject to New Mexico gross receipts tax on its sales to New Mexico residents without offending the federal Commerce Clause. The answer to this question depended on whether Booksellers engaged in activities in New Mexico on behalf of bn.com that were significantly associated with bn.com's ability to establish and maintain a market for its sales in New Mexico, thus creating a substantial nexus between bn.com and New Mexico. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Booksellers did engage in such activities, which included: (1) Booksellers' promotion of bn.com through sales of gift cards redeemable at bn.com and bearing bn.com's name; (2) Booksellers' policy of sharing customers' email addresses with bn.com; (3) Booksellers' implicit endorsement of bn.com through the companies' shared loyalty program and Booksellers' return policy; and (4) Booksellers' in-state use of Barnes & Noble logos and trademarks, which bn.com also used. Therefore, the Court held that Booksellers' in-state activities were sufficient to create a substantial nexus between bn.com and New Mexico, so that the state could tax bn.com's sales to customers in New Mexico without offending the federal Commerce Clause. View "N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't. v. Barnesandnoble.com, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant Halliburton Energy Services hired Plaintiff Edward Flemma to work as a cement equipment operator in Houma, Louisiana, in January of 1982. During his twenty-six years of employment with Halliburton, Flemma was promoted several times and worked for the company in Louisiana, Texas, Angola, and New Mexico. The last position he held was as district manager in Farmington, New Mexico, where he worked from 2006 until the time of his termination in 2008.The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a conflict of laws issue that requires the Court to determine whether enforcement of an arbitration agreement, formed in the State of Texas, would offend New Mexico public policy to overcome our traditional choice of law rule. Upon review, the Court concluded that the agreement formed in Texas would be unconscionable under New Mexico law, and it therefore violated New Mexico public policy. Thus, the Court applied New Mexico law and concluded that no valid agreement to arbitrate existed between the parties because Halliburton's promise to arbitrate was illusory. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Flemma v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc." on Justia Law

On the evening of July 15, 2007, Defendant Benjamin Montoya, his girlfriend, his seventeen-year-old brother, and several companions were gathered in the front yard of Defendant's family home. A group of young men in a Cadillac drove by, honking, yelling, and displaying gang signs. At least some of Defendant's group belonged to a rival gang. A few minutes later, the Cadillac returned and, along with a Ford Expedition and a third car, stopped at a nearby vacant lot. When the occupants continued yelling and called Defendant's group over, Defendant and his friends started walking toward the vacant lot to confront approximately fifteen people who got out of the three stopped cars. Guns were pulled on both sides, and Defendant's brother was severely wounded by gunshots to his leg and abdomen. Defendant and his friends retreated to his home, dragging Defendant's brother to their driveway. The Cadillac group briefly chased Defendant and his friends before going back to their cars. The three cars initially left the area, but the Expedition turned around and came back toward Defendant's house, gunfire coming out of the car. Defendant returned fire using an AK-47 rifle. While his friends were trying to help his brother in the driveway and stop the bleeding from the gunshot wounds, Defendant ran outside and began shooting at the Expedition. The driver, victim Diego Delgado, was shot seven times and died of multiple gunshot wounds, including one shot to the back of the head. One of the issues raised on appeal of the subsequent prosecutions and convictions of those involved "the theoretically separate offenses of causing great bodily harm to a person by shooting at a motor vehicle and the homicide resulting from the penetration of the same bullet into the same person." The Supreme Court held that current New Mexico jurisprudence precluded cumulative punishment for both crimes, and it therefore overruled "New Mexico v. Gonzales" (824 P.2d 1023 (1992)), and the cases that followed it. In addition, the Court held that in a felony murder prosecution where the evidence will support a conviction for either second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, it is fundamental error for the felony murder essential elements jury instruction to omit the defining requirement that the accused did not act in the heat of passion as a result of the legally adequate provocation that would reduce murder to manslaughter. View "New Mexico v. Montoya" on Justia Law

Petitioner Clifton Skidgel had been trying for over thirty years to get the attention of the state courts to correct his parole eligibility for the life sentences imposed on him after he pled guilty to four counts of first-degree murder in 1980. He sought certiorari from the Supreme Court to review the district court's summary dismissal of his most recent petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court granted certiorari on the issue of the district court's order that Petitioner must serve thirty instead of ten years before consideration for parole, which the court ordered in reliance on our opinion in "Quintana v. New Mexico Department of Corrections," (668 P.2d 1101 (1983)); and denied certiorari on all remaining issues. After review, the Court expressly overruled Quintana to the extent that it was inconsistent with "Devine v. New Mexico Department of Corrections," (866 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1989)), reversed the district court on Petitioner's parole eligibility, and ordered the district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus providing that Petitioner shall become eligible for parole consideration upon the completion of ten years of imprisonment on the life sentence he was then serving. View "Skidgel v. Hatch" on Justia Law

The Public Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Moongate Water Company (Moongate) a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CCN) authorizing Moongate, as a public utility, to provide water to an area located outside the city limits of Las Cruces (the "certificated area.") Las Cruces later annexed three undeveloped tracts of land within Moongate's certificated area, and Las Cruces committed itself to provide water to this area despite Moongate's CCN. The Supreme Court addressed two questions in this appeal: (1) did Moongate have a right to provide water within the certificated area to the exclusion of Las Cruces?; and (2) did Las Cruces engage in an unlawful taking of Moongate's property entitling Moongate to just compensation when Las Cruces chose to provide water within the certificated area? The Court answered both questions in the negative: (1) because Las Cruces was not subject to the Public Utilities Act (the PUA); and (2) because on the record before the Court, Moongate did not prove that it had established infrastructure and was already serving customers in the annexed area. "Absent such proof of a tangible loss, a public utility is not entitled to just compensation when a municipality lawfully exercises its right to serve in the public utility's certificated area." The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals and reversed the district court. View "Moongate Water Co., Inc. v. City of Las Cruces" on Justia Law

A fire destroyed a hydroponic tomato facility belonging to a new business, Sunnyland Farms, Inc. The day before the fire, Sunnyland's electricity had been shut off by its local utility, the Central New Mexico Electrical Cooperative (CNMEC), for nonpayment. Sunnyland's water pumps were powered by electricity, and without power, Sunnyland's facility had no water. Sunnyland sued CNMEC, alleging both that CNMEC had wrongfully suspended service, and if its electrical service had been in place, firefighters and Sunnyland employees would have been able to stop the fire from consuming the facility. After a bench trial, the court found CNMEC liable for negligence and breach of contract. The trial court awarded damages, including lost profits, of over $21 million in contract and tort, but reduced the tort damages by 80% for Sunnyland's comparative fault. It also awarded $100,000 in punitive damages. The parties cross-appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the contract judgment, vacated the punitive damages, held that the lost profit damages were not supported by sufficient evidence, affirmed the trial court's offset of damages based on CNMEC's purchase of a subrogation lien, and affirmed the trial court's rulings on pre- and post-judgment interest. Sunnyland appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals regarding the contract judgment, punitive damages, and interest, and reversed on the lost profit damages and the offset. The Court also took the opportunity of this case to re-examine the standard for consequential contract damages in New Mexico. View "Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Central N.M. Electric Cooperative, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellee Donovan King was suspected of aggravated battery. In an interrogation room at the Farmington Police Department, a detective advised King of his rights and asked if he understood them. King replied, "Yeah." The detective then asked him if King wished to answer any questions. King answered, "Not at the moment. Kind of intoxicated." After telling King that intoxication was not a reason that King could not talk to him, the detective placed a waiver of rights form in front of King, tossed a pen in King's direction, and said, "Sign this for me if you wish to answer questions," indicating where King should sign. King responded, "Like I said[,] not at the moment." Undeterred, the detective repeated that intoxication was not a reason for not giving a statement, persisted in questioning King, and eventually elicited an incriminating statement from him. The district court granted King's motion to suppress the statement because King had twice unambiguously invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Because King was ultimately charged with an open count of first-degree murder, the State appealed the district court's ruling to the Supreme Court. Finding no error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Mexico v. King" on Justia Law

In 2002, Pojoaque Tribal Police Officer Kevin Schultz drowned while rescuing a twelve-year-old boy from the Rio Grande near Pilar. On the day of the accident, he had taken the day off from work to chaperone a group of children from his church on a recreational outing. This case arose when Schultz's widow, Cheryl, filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits resulting from her husband's death, but only after the statute of limitations had expired. Notwithstanding the late filing, Mrs. Schultz contended that the conduct of the Pojoaque Tribal Police Department caused her to file after the deadline, and thus, the Supreme Court should consider her complaint timely filed. Both the Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) and the Court of Appeals decided that Mrs. Schultz's complaint was not timely filed. However, upon review, the Supreme Court found that based on the fact of this case, the statute was tolled. Therefore the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Department" on Justia Law