Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Fernanda Cobrera was charged with criminal damage to property having a value greater than $1,000, resulting from her alleged destruction of household goods located in the home of her estranged husband. The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the prosecution had to present evidence of the property's age and condition in order to satisfy its burden of proving the monetary value of the property. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that that in cases where common household items have been irreparably damaged, it is sufficient for the State to introduce evidence of the items' purchase price. View "New Mexico v. Cobrera" on Justia Law

The questions certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 34-5-14(C) (1972), required the Court to determine whether the primary or the secondary underinsured motorist (UIM) insurer, if either, should be given the statutory offset for the tortfeasor’s liability coverage. "[T]he short answer to the certified question is that neither the primary nor the secondary insurers are directly awarded the offset because under existing case law, the offset is applied before any UIM insurer is required to pay UIM benefits." View "State Farm v. Safeco Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2004, Amelia Martinez and Donald Espinoza were driving west on NM 502 toward Los Alamos to buy a car. Amelia, eight and a half months pregnant at the time, was driving and Donald was in the passenger seat. Tragically, they did not make it to Los Alamos. The New Mexico Department of Transportation (DOT), which has legal responsibility to maintain NM 502, was sued for negligently failing to remedy a dangerous condition when it chose not to replace the open center lane with crossover barriers on the road, after it was allegedly put on notice of that risk by post-construction accidents and other events. The Court of Appeals held as a matter of law that DOT was immune from suit for such negligence, a decision which the Supreme Court reversed "as being at odds with our jurisprudence." The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Martinez v. N.M. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether "Crawford v. Washington" (541 U.S. 36 (2004)) and subsequent related case law precluded a forensic pathologist from relating subjective observations recorded in an autopsy report as a basis for the pathologist's trial opinions, when the pathologist neither participated in nor observed the autopsy performed on the decedent. The Court answered this question affirmatively and concluded that there was a Confrontation Clause violation because: (1) the autopsy report contained statements that were made with the primary intention of establishing facts that the declarant understood might be used in a criminal prosecution; (2) the statements in the report were related to the jury as the basis for the pathologist's opinions and were therefore offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted; and (3) the pathologist who recorded her subjective observations in the report did not testify at trial and Defendant Arnoldo Navarette did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine her. The Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The Court did not address remaining issues raised by defendant as without merit. View "New Mexico v. Navarette" on Justia Law

Defendant Bruce Hall was convicted of a sex crime in California pursuant to a plea agreement. He then moved to New Mexico and was charged with the fourth-degree felony of failing to register as a sex offender. The New Mexico Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) requires a person convicted of any of twelve enumerated sex offenses, or who is convicted of an sheriff for the New Mexico county in which that person resides. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was what constituted an equivalent offense and how a court makes that determination. Upon review, the Court held that an offense is "equivalent" to a New Mexico offense for purposes of SORNA, is if the defendant's actual conduct that gave rise to the out-of-state conviction would have constituted one of the twelve enumerated offenses requiring registration. View "New Mexico v. Hall" on Justia Law

Petitioner Joseph C. Perry, Petitioner, was a prison inmate at the Penitentiary of New Mexico serving sentence at the Lea County Correctional Facility for battery against a household member as well as for a parole violation for fraud over $2,500. In 2006, Petitioner was transported to the Otero County Detention Center for an arraignment relating to the fraud charge. While at the Otero Center, Petitioner raped inmate Joshua Sommer. Upon discovering Petitioner’s pending criminal charge for rape in Otero County District Court, the New Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD) pursued disciplinary action against him for the same rape incident. A disciplinary hearing was scheduled at the Lea County Facility. A hearing officer conducted the hearing, documenting the proceedings and the evidence in a form entitled "Disciplinary Summary of Evidence and Proceeding," the tape of which was lost. The hearing officer ultimately concluded that Petitioner committed rape and threats to other inmates. NMCD forfeited Petitioner’s earned good time (69 days) and placed him in Level VI Disciplinary Segregation at a maximum security facility for a period of 455 days. In 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus at the Santa Fe District Court, asserting five grounds for habeas relief. Just over three weeks later, Petitioner was convicted in Otero County on second-degree felony of criminal sexual penetration and the third-degree felony of bribery or intimidation of a witness, based on the same rape incident. Approximately a year later, the State filed an amended response to an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus and attached the judgment and sentence from Otero County. The central issue at the evidentiary hearing was whether NMCD had violated Petitioner’s due process rights by denying him an opportunity to call witnesses or otherwise elicit written testimony at his prison disciplinary hearing. At the conclusion of the habeas hearing, the district court agreed with Petitioner’s contentions and issued an order granting remedies with respect to its earlier findings of due process violations. Notwithstanding Petitioner’s intervening criminal convictions for rape and witness intimidation, the district court ordered NMCD to (1) restore Petitioner’s good-time credits, (2) remove the disciplinary hearing findings from Petitioner’s record, (3) never use findings of the disciplinary hearing against Petitioner in any way, including in present and future decisions relating to classification and placement within the prison system, and (4) never pursue the same factual allegations that were the subject of the disciplinary hearing in later proceedings against Petitioner. The NMCD appealed; the Supreme Court reversed: "In focusing on Petitioner’s procedural due process rights, the district court appears to have lost sight of the reason for such a hearing. The court failed to appreciate the significance of the intervening criminal convictions - not to whether due process was violated - but, pivotally, to what remedy was appropriate under the circumstances." View "Perry v. Moya" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether NMSA 1978, Section 72-2-9.1 (2003), provided a constitutional delegation of authority for the Office of the State Engineer to adopt new regulations to administer water resources according to administrative interim priority determinations based on a number of factors. The district court and Court of Appeals concluded that it did not and that the State Engineer’s lawful authority to supervise water allocations could be exercised only on the basis of licenses issued by the State Engineer and adjudications in court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the Legislature delegated lawful authority to the State Engineer to promulgate the challenged water administration regulations. Furthermore, the Court held that the regulations were not unconstitutional on separation of powers, due process, or vagueness grounds. View "Tri-State Generation & Transmission Assn., Inc. v. D'Antonio" on Justia Law

In this first-degree murder case, the State improperly admitted into evidence a diary of the decedent which was inadmissible hearsay. Because the diary was important to the State's case, and the State repeatedly relied upon its contents throughout the trial, the Supreme Court concluded that the error was not harmless and the convictions should have been reversed. View "New Mexico v. Leyba" on Justia Law

By the time Defendant Wayne Bent was indicted, the grand jury allegedly had exceeded its statutory term of service. Having been convicted subsequently of most of the charges in the indictment, Defendant appealed on the basis of that untimely indictment. He claimed that the untimely indictment deprived the grand jury of jurisdiction and that the Supreme Court should overturn the subsequent jury verdict against him. Persuaded by this argument, the Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that statutory challenges to the indictment like those presented by this case must be adjudicated before trial and before a verdict issues on those same charges. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that court for consideration of all other issues raised but not yet decided in Defendant's appeal. View "New Mexico v. Bent" on Justia Law

Defendant Julian Tafoya shot and killed Andrea Larez, and shot and injured Crystal Brady. Larez and Brady were sitting in the front of a car and Defendant and his girlfriend, Kaprice Conde, were sitting in back. Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder with the predicate felony of "shooting at or from a motor vehicle," attempted first degree murder, and tampering with evidence. The trial court also found Defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm after the jury issued a special verdict finding that Defendant committed his crimes with a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus seventeen and one-half years. Defendant appealed his convictions to the Supreme Court. Defendant argued: (1) his felony murder conviction should be reversed because shooting entirely within a motor vehicle is neither shooting "at" nor "from" a motor vehicle pursuant to statute, and therefore cannot serve as the predicate felony for his felony murder conviction; (2) there was insufficient evidence of deliberation to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Defendant on both arguments raised, and reversed his first degree murder conviction for entry of second degree murder. View "New Mexico v. Tafoya" on Justia Law