Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a Court of Appeals opinion that overturned the district court's denial of a motion to suppress drug evidence discovered during a traffic stop of Defendant Gunnar Olson. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the valid traffic stop to an investigation of prostitution solicitation and that Defendant's subsequent consent to a protective search of his fanny pack was not a fruit of a prior unlawful search or seizure. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress.

In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court concerned the use of multiple levels of anonymous hearsay reports in the probable cause portion of a search warrant affidavit. The Court granted Defendant David Haidle’s application for interlocutory appeal to review the district court’s partial denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained at his home through execution of a magistrate court search warrant. The district court found that the warrant was issued without constitutionally adequate probable cause but refused to suppress pieces of blood-stained carpet on the theory that the carpet inevitably would have been discovered in a potential future search. Upon review, the Court affirmed the district court’s determination that the search warrant was invalid, but reversed the ruling that the inevitable discovery doctrine would make the unlawfully seized carpet evidence admissible.

Defendant Paul Wayne Lovett was charged with murdering two women in two separate, unrelated incidents as well as criminal sexual penetration with respect to one of the victims. Pursuant to Rule 5-203(A) NMRA the two murder charges were joined in one complaint, indictment or information with the intent to try the two murder charges together in one trial. Pursuant to Rule 5-203(C) NMRA Defendant moved to sever the two murder charges into two separate trials. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to sever, and Defendant was subsequently convicted of both counts of first-degree murder in one joint trial. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it failed to sever the murder charges into separate trials. Because the error constituted reversible, non-harmless error in relation to one of the murder convictions, the Court vacated that conviction while upholding the other first-degree murder conviction as well as the conviction for criminal sexual penetration.

The City of Santa Fe (City) charged Julio Marquez with two violations of the Santa Fe City Code (SFCC), including Operating a Motor Vehicle Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor or Drugs (DWI). After the City rested its case at trial, the district court sua sponte ruled that the arresting officer's DWI investigation was unlawful and on that basis entered an order suppressing all evidence from the investigation, therefore dismissing the DWI charge against Marquez. The City appealed. Under New Mexico law statutes, constitutional double jeopardy principles bar the City from retrying Marquez and therefore the appeal should have been dismissed. The Court nonetheless wrote to cast light on the unintended consequences that could follow (and, in this case, did follow) from waiting until trial to consider suppression issues; to clarify that the Rules of Criminal Procedure require a motion to suppress evidence to be made within twenty days of entry of a defendant's plea, absent good cause shown; and to expand the applicable rule to require district courts to adjudicate the suppression of possibly illegally obtained evidence prior to trial, unless good cause exists for delaying such rulings until trial.

Two cases were consolidated for the purposes of this opinion. In the first, Defendant Abdul Muqqddin was charged with five separate counts when a police officer discovered him lying under a car in an attempt to drain the gas tank: auto burglary; criminal damage to property; possession of burglary tools; larceny; and concealing identity. A jury trial was held. At the close of the State’s case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on all charges. The district court granted the motion in regard to the possession of burglary tools charge, but denied the motion in regard to the other charges. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all the remaining charges, including auto burglary. Before his trial, Defendant Edgar Dominguez-Meraz filed a motion to dismiss the burglary charge filed against him. He was charged with burglary for allegedly removing the two rear wheels of a vehicle and the lug nuts of the front wheels. The motion acknowledged that Defendant Dominguez-Meraz was one of two individuals apprehended near a vehicle missing two rear tires and lug nuts from the front wheels. He argued, however, even if those facts were true, as a matter of law he could not be convicted of burglary for those actions because there was no entry as required by the statute. The district court agreed with Defendant Dominguez-Meraz and ordered the burglary charge dismissed. The issue presented before the Supreme Court by these cases concerned the "outer limits" of New Mexico’s burglary statute. In more than 40 years, the Court issued only one burglary opinion. Over that same time, the Court of Appeals has issued numerous opinions that significantly expanded the reach of the statute without any parallel change in the statute itself. The Court took the opportunity to review "the unprecedented scope of that expansion." Ultimately, the Court concluded that New Mexico case law had "gone astray." The Court reversed the two cases upon which these appeals relied as authority, vacated Muqqddin's conviction and affirmed the dismissal of the burglary charge against Domminquez-Meraz.

While aimlessly driving around Roswell in 2008, Defendant Julian Tafoya shot and killed Andrea Larez, and shot and injured Crystal Brady. Larez and Brady were sitting in the front of the car and Defendant and his girlfriend, Kaprice Conde, were sitting in back. Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder with the predicate felony of "shooting at or from a motor vehicle," attempted first degree murder, and tampering with evidence. The trial court also found Defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm after the jury issued a special verdict finding that Defendant committed the above crimes with a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus seventeen and one-half years. Defendant appealed his convictions to the Supreme Court. Principal among Defendant's contentions on appeal, he argued: (1) that his felony murder conviction should have been reversed because shooting entirely within a motor vehicle is neither shooting "at" nor "from" a motor vehicle and therefore cannot serve as the predicate felony for his felony murder conviction; (2) that shooting at or from a motor vehicle cannot serve as the requisite collateral felony for a felony murder conviction; (3) that there was insufficient evidence of deliberation to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder. Upon review, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to vacate the felony murder conviction and enter judgment for second degree murder. The Court did not reach Defendant's second argument on appeal. Furthermore, the Court found sufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempted murder.

Defendant Luciano Guerra was convicted of first-degree murder and tampering with evidence in the fatal stabbing of Andrew Gama during a fight in March 2010. In his direct appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for tampering with evidence; (2) the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial when two defense exhibits left on counsel table after closing arguments were not included with other exhibits provided to the jury during deliberation; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to ensure the return of the two exhibits for delivery to the jury room; (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the first-degree murder conviction; and (5) through various other claimed errors the district court denied him due process of law. The Supreme Court used this opinion to clarify the standard for sufficiency of evidence to support tampering-with-evidence convictions and reversed Defendant's tampering conviction. The Court rejected the remainder of Defendant’s claims and upheld his first-degree murder conviction.

Eric Schuster appealed a decision of the Taxation and Revenue Department, Motor Vehicle Division (MVD) to revoke his driver's license pursuant to the Implied Consent Act. The primary issue arising from this case was whether MVD must find that the arrest of a driver charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) was constitutional as one of the prerequisites to revoking the driver's license. Upon review, the Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative and overruled "Glynn v. State, Taxation & Revenue Dep't," (252 P.3d 742) to the extent the Glynn court held that the constitutionality of the arrest need not be decided in DWI license revocation hearings. The secondary issues concerned: (1) the district court's jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an MVD license revocation hearing regarding the constitutionality of an arrest; and (2) whether the district court erred in affirming both MVD's revocation of Schuster's driver's license and MVD's finding that the arrest of Schuster was constitutional. The Court held that: (1) the district court's review of constitutional issues in a license revocation hearing is conducted under its appellate jurisdiction and not under its original jurisdiction; and (2) the district court did not err in affirming MVD's revocation of Schuster's driver's license because Schuster's was constitutional.

"Speedy trial analysis under the United States Constitution requires a balancing and weighing of several factors, including the length of delay, the cause of the delay, timely assertion of the right, and prejudice to the accused." In this case, one of those factors (the cause of the delay) weighed heavily against the State based on its own dilatory and deceptive conduct in prosecuting the case. The district court dismissed the charges even though the remaining factors favor the accused only slightly. The Court of Appeals reversed, due to the lack of perceived prejudice to the accused. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's conclusion and reversed, remanding the case to the district court for a new speedy trial hearing.

Defendant Jose Ordunez pled guilty to a 2004 fourth-offense aggravated DWI. He was incarcerated for six months and then served a lengthy probationary period. In 2007, Defendant was arrested for another DWI in violation of his 2004 probation conditions, but a probation revocation hearing was not held before the probationary term from the 2004 DWI had expired. The district court concluded that the applicable New Mexico statutes precluded revocation of Defendant's probation after his probationary term had expired and granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals opinion affirming the district court's dismissal of the case. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the conclusions of the district court and the Court of Appeals that Defendant's probation could not be revoked after it had expired.