Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Franklin Begaye was convicted of nonresidential burglary and breaking and entering. He contended these convictions violated his right to be free from double jeopardy. The district court determined that the nonresidential burglary and breaking and entering charges did not violate double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that its guidance in New Mexico v. Porter, 476 P.3d 1201, resolved the issue, this appeal indicated that confusion persisted within the Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence warranting further clarification. The Court concluded here that Defendant’s right to be free from double jeopardy was violated when he was convicted for both breaking and entering and nonresidential burglary because the underlying conduct was unitary and, under the State’s theory, the burglary offense subsumed the breaking and entering offense. “[I]f we determine that one of the offenses subsumes the other offense, the double jeopardy prohibition is violated, and punishment cannot be had for both.” Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "New Mexico v. Begaye" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Petitioner Mario Rudolfo of first-degree murder under a general verdict. The jury instructions contained two alternative theories for the jury to use as a basis for the first-degree murder conviction: (1) felony murder predicated on shooting at or from a motor vehicle and (2) willful and deliberate murder. Twelve years after Petitioner’s conviction, the New Mexico Supreme Court issued New Mexico v. Marquez, 376 P.3d 815, holding that “the crime of shooting at or from a motor vehicle may not serve as the predicate felony in support of a felony murder charge.” Appealing, Petitioner argued the Marquez holding applied retroactively and argued his conviction had to be vacated. The NEw Mexico Supreme Court held that Marquez announced a new substantive rule which applied retroactively. As a result, the Court set aside the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus, vacated Petitioner’s first-degree murder conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial on first-degree murder. View "Rudolfo v. Steward" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Romero alleged that his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury was violated because one of his jurors revealed during voir dire that he knew the investigator in the case. Defendant did not inquire into the juror’s potential bias during jury selection, did not challenge the juror for cause, did not use an available peremptory challenge on the juror, and did not otherwise object to the juror during jury selection. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that the juror’s statements did not violate Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, and that Defendant both failed to preserve and waived any objection to the juror’s alleged bias. View "New Mexico v. Romero" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Rodriguez pleaded guilty to felony offenses committed when he was sixteen years old under a plea and disposition agreement, and following an amenability hearing, the district court imposed an adult sentence. Defendant appealed the amenability determination, and on its own motion, the Court of Appeals held that under the plea and disposition agreement, Defendant waived his right to appeal. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a juvenile waives the right to appeal an amenability determination by entering into a plea and disposition agreement. To this, the Court held that the right was not waived, reversed the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to decide Defendant’s appeal on the merits. View "New Mexico v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The New Mexico Supreme Court addressed whether the tolling provision contained in Rule 7-506.1(D) NMRA of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Metropolitan Courts applied to cases dismissed without prejudice by the court in addition to cases voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution. In 2018, Defendant Tito Lope was arraigned in the metropolitan court on charges including aggravated driving while intoxicated (DWI) and reckless driving. Rule 7-506(B) required Defendant’s trial to commence within 182 days of arraignment (July 20, 2018), assuming that no extensions of time were granted under Rule 7-506(C) and that no tolling was warranted under Rule 7-506.1(D). The case was initially set for trial on April 30, 2018, but continued to June 4, 2018. The arresting officer did not appear on June 4, and the State could not explain his absence. The State requested a continuance; Defendant moved to dismiss. The metropolitan court dismissed the case without prejudice because the State was not prepared for trial. On June 14, 2018, the State filed a notice of refiling of the dismissed complaint. Several days later, the metropolitan court sent a notice setting trial for July 18, 2018, but on the following day issued sua sponte a new notice to the parties resetting trial for July 24, 2018. One day before the scheduled trial date, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice for failure to prosecute under Rule 7-506(B), arguing that the State’s deadline to try Defendant was July 20. At the July 24 trial setting, Defendant arguing the tolling provision of Rule 7-506.1(D) applied only to voluntary dismissals, and that to apply the tolling provision in circumstances where the court dismisses a case as a sanction against the State would allow the State to benefit from its own mistake. The metropolitan court agreed with the State and concluded that the 182-day rule was tolled for ten days under Rule 7-506.1(D), extending deadline to bring Defendant to trial to July 30, 2018. After review, the Supreme Court held the tolling provision applied with equal force to cases dismissed by the court and to cases voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution and conclude that, with the benefit of the tolling provision here, the time for the State to bring Defendant to trial did not expire before Defendant entered into his conditional plea agreement. The Court therefore affirmed Defendant’s conviction. View "New Mexico v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant Albert Fernandez appealed his conviction for battery upon a peace officer. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted Defendant’s petition for certiorari review to determine whether: (1) the district court incorrectly admitted Defendant’s prior conviction for battery upon a peace officer; (2) cumulative error deprived Defendant of a fair trial; and (3) the Court of Appeals improperly decided Defendant’s appeal without considering his reconstructed testimony. After such review, the Supreme Court found that the district court abused its discretion in admitting Defendant’s prior conviction for battery upon a peace officer. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for a new trial. In light of its reversal, the Supreme Court concluded it was unnecessary to address the merits of Defendant’s claim of cumulative error. Finally, the Court concluded Defendant’s request to supplement the record with his reconstructed testimony was resolved by the Court of Appeals and was therefore moot. View "New Mexico v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

In 2007, two bills addressing the monitoring and parole of convicted sex offenders passed within days of each other and were signed into law on the same day. Defendant Anthony Sena, who pleaded no contest to the offense of child solicitation by electronic communication device, asked the New Mexico Supreme Court to hold these laws irreconcilable. Consequently, he sought application of the preexisting standard parole term to his sentence and not the extended parole term enacted in the 2007 legislation. To this, the Court disagreed that the bills were irreconcilable and concluded that the extended parole term applied to those convicted of this crime. In this opinion, the Court reaffirmed that its role was to read statutes harmoniously if possible and that the proper test for a court to apply when reconciling legislation and discerning legislative intent in these circumstances was that of New Mexico v. Smith, 98 P.3d 1022. The Court of Appeals opinion was reversed and the Court affirmed the district court’s imposition of the extended parole term on Defendant’s crime. View "New Mexico v. Sena" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellee Derrick Romero pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual penetration (CSP). In the first judgment and sentence, the district court erred in ordering that Appellee serve two years of parole, resulting in an unlawfully short period of mandatory parole. Thirteen days later, the district court ostensibly corrected the sentencing error by entering a second amended judgment, which replaced Appellee’s parole period of two years with five-to-twenty years. Both of these parole periods were illegal sentences, as NMSA 1978, Section 31-21-10.1(A)(2) (2007), required a sex offender convicted of CSP in the second degree to serve an “indeterminate period of supervised parole for . . . not less than five years and up to the natural life of the sex offender.” Appellee challenged the revised parole period of five-to-twenty years in an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The district court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to correct the illegal parole sentence in the first judgment and accordingly granted Appellee’s habeas petition, vacating the second amended judgment and reinstating the original two-year parole period. The State appealed the grant of habeas relief. The Supreme Court held that historical changes leading to Rule 5-801 (2009) (former Rule 5- 801) did not remove a district court’s common law jurisdictional authority to correct an illegal sentence. Thus, the Court overruled New Mexiso v. Torres, 272 P.3d 689 in that regard. Under this holding, the Court reversed the district court’s grant of the writ of habeas corpus and remanded to the district court to impose the statutorily required parole sentence. The Court further directed the Rules of Criminal Procedure for State Courts Committee to clarify the length of time in which a district court retains the relevant jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence in accordance with the Court's opinion here. Finally, under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and Rule 5-303 NMRA, the Court held that Appellee was entitled to an opportunity for plea withdrawal. View "New Mexico v. Romero" on Justia Law

A constitutional amendment proposed by the Legislature and approved by the electorate in the 2020 general election made a number of changes governing the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (Commission or PRC). Those changes included alterations to the selection, qualifications, and terms of Commission members, and revision to the PRC’s constitutionally assigned responsibilities. Petitioners were three nonprofit organizations who represented the rights of Native Americans. Petitioners asked the New Mexico Supreme Court to declare the ratification of the constitutional amendment a nullity and to issue a writ of mandamus directing Respondent Advisory Committee of the New Mexico Compilation Commission (Advisory Committee) to remove the amendment from the Constitution. The Advisory Committee responded that Petitioners’ challenge was untimely and improperly raised against the committee through a petition for writ of mandamus, but took no position on the merits. Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham, who was granted leave to intervene in these proceedings, joined the Advisory Committee’s timeliness arguments and additionally argued that the amendment was constitutional. After hearing oral arguments, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the petition was timely, but that the amendment did not violate Article XIX, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution. View "Indigenous Lifeways v. N.M. Compilation Comm'n Advisory Comm." on Justia Law

Defendant Christina Banghart-Portillo pleaded guilty to tampering with evidence, and conspiracy to commit tampering with evidence, contrary to (Count 1 and Count 2, respectively), each of which was a fourth-degree felony offense, under a written plea agreement. Because Defendant had a prior felony conviction, each sentence was enhanced at her initial sentencing by one year under New Mexico’s habitual offender statute. Defendant also admitted her identity in a second prior felony at the time of her sentencing, yet the district court imposed no additional enhancement at that time. The district court imposed consecutive sentences. The central issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review was whether Defendant had a reasonable expectation of finality for Count 1 such that the district court no longer had jurisdiction when it applied the habitual offender enhancement to that Count. Defendant argued on appeal that the district court’s enhancement of the Count 1 sentence resulted in a double jeopardy violation because the court had lost jurisdiction by the time of the enhancement. The Court of Appeals held that the district court retained jurisdiction to apply a habitual offender enhancement to Count 1. The Supreme Court concluded Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of finality in Count 1 at the time that the district court enhanced Defendant’s sentence because the district court had previously informed her of the consequences she faced if she violated probation. Therefore, it affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that the district court properly retained jurisdiction to apply a habitual offender enhancement to Count 1. View "New Mexico v. Banghart-Portillo" on Justia Law