Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This case presented the Supreme Court with an issue of first impression: whether the New Mexico Emancipation of Minors Act authorizes a district court to declare a minor emancipated for some rather than all enumerated purposes contained in the Act. Petitioner Jhette Diamond (Daughter), then sixteen years old, petitioned the district court in for a declaration of emancipation pursuant to the Act. Daughter left the home of her mother Adrienne Diamond (Mother) at age thirteen and had been living with several different households. Mother did not appear at the hearing or otherwise oppose the petition. Daughter, represented by counsel, told the district court that she had moved out of Mother’s home due to domestic violence and substance abuse issues. Daughter had no intention of returning to live with Mother, who maintained a relationship with the man whose violent behavior and substance abuse had contributed to Daughter's decision to leave. The district court issued a "Declaration of Emancipation of Minor" in March 2007, finding that Daughter had been living independently and managing her own financial affairs without support from Mother, determining that emancipation would be in Daughter’s best interest, and declaring Daughter "an emancipated minor in all respects, except that she shall retain the right to support from [Mother]" pursuant to the Act. Mother, represented by counsel, objected to child support to an emancipated minor. Agreeing with Mother, the Court of Appeals held that "New Mexico law does not permit a minor emancipated pursuant to [the Act] to collect child support payments," and does not permit “an emancipating court to pick and choose the purposes for which a child is emancipated." Upon review of the legislative history of the Act, the Supreme Court concluded that the Act's directive that emancipation may be declared for "one or more purposes" expressly authorized partial emancipation. Furthermore, the Court did not find "management of one's financial affairs" and entitlement to support as inherently contradictory. In response to Mother's argument that Daughter receiving public welfare benefits was not "managing her affairs" in the same manner as receiving child support is not managing one's affairs, the Court found that Mother did not offer an explanation for why the source of the support should be determinative of Daughter's ability to manage her affairs. In rendering its judgment, the district court "faithfully followed the procedural requirements of the Act and reached a result consistent with the Act's plain language." Because the Court of Appeals failed to give effect to that language, the Supreme Court reversed that court's decision.

This case concerned the scope of absolute privilege that grants immunity to litigants and their attorneys from being sued for defamation based on public statements they make about a judicial proceedings either before or after the proceeding is filed. Specifically, the issues before the Supreme Court in this case were: (1) whether pre-litigation statements made by an attorney to prospective clients in the presence of the press regarding a potential mass-tort lawsuit; and (2) whether statements made directly to the press by an attorney or party after such lawsuit was filed, are absolutely privileged, thus barring any lawsuit for defamation. The district court found in the affirmative on these issues and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed that decision, finding that absolute privilege did not apply to statements made before or after a complaint was filed when the statements were made before the press. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that absolute privilege indeed does apply to pre-litigation statements made by attorneys in the presence of the press if (1) the speaker is seriously and in good faith contemplating a lawsuit at the time the statement was made; (2) the statement is reasonably related to the proposed litigation; (3) the attorney has a client or identifiable prospective clients at the time the statement was made; and (4) the statement is made while the attorney is acting in the capacity of counsel or prospective counsel.

This case presented an issue of first impression for the Supreme Court: whether executive privilege in the context of a public records request presented a conflict with the public's right to access information concerning the "inner workings of its government." Petitioners Republican Party of New Mexico and Lyn Ott, individually and as Director of the Help America Vote Act for the Republican Party requested certain government documents. Respondents New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department, Motor Vehicle Divison, and the Custodial of Records withheld some of those documents on several grounds including executive privilege. "To protect the people's vital right to access information about the workings of government, [the Supreme Court held] that executive privilege must be confined to the constitutional limits." The Court found that the documents in question did not qualify for the privilege, and reversed the district court's judgment classifying the documents in question as "privileged."

Bani Chatterjee and Taya King are two women who were in a committed, long-term domestic relationship when they agreed to bring a child into their relationship. King adopted a child from Russia. Chatterjee supported King and Child financially, lived in the family home, and co parented Child for a number of years before their commitment to each other foundered and they dissolved their relationship. Chatterjee never adopted Child. After they ended their relationship, King moved to Colorado and sought to prevent Chatterjee from having any contact with Child. Chatterjee filed a petition in the district court to establish parentage and determine custody and timesharing. Chatterjee alleged that she was a presumed natural parent under the former codification of the New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act, (NMSA), and was the equitable or de facto parent of Child, and as such, was entitled to relief. In response to Chatterjee’s Petition, King filed a motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed the Petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Chatterjee then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court. The Court of Appeals held that Chatterjee did not have standing to seek joint custody absent a showing of King’s unfitness because she is neither the biological nor the adoptive mother of Child. The Court further held that presumptions establishing a father and child relationship cannot be applied to women, and a mother and child relationship can only be established through biology or adoption. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Chatterjee pleaded sufficient facts in her Petition to give her standing to pursue joint custody of Child under the Dissolution of Marriage Act. The Court concluded based on the facts and circumstances of this case, that the facts pleaded by Chatterjee were sufficient to confer standing on her as a natural mother because: (1) the plain language of the UPA instructs courts to apply criteria for establishing a presumption that a man is a natural parent, to women because it is practicable for a woman to hold a child out as her own by, among other things, providing full-time emotional and financial support for the child; (2) commentary by the drafters of the UPA supports application of the provisions related to determining paternity to the determination of maternity; (3) the approach in this opinion is consistent with how courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted their UPAs, which contain language similar to the New Mexico UPA; and (4) New Mexico’s public policy is to encourage the support of children, financial and otherwise, by providers willing and able to care for the child.

On the morning of January 21, 2006, Defendant-Petitioner Michael Swick, along with his cousin, Benito Lopez, and the victim, Alex Ogle, began a day of cruising and drinking alcohol in a borrowed Jeep. Late in the afternoon, Defendant and his cousin also consumed cocaine. After getting a jacket from the Jeep, Lopez walked back toward the place where he had left Defendant and Ogle. When he arrived, he found Defendant standing, holding a large 15-pound rock, with Ogle lying on the ground beneath him. Defendant had stabbed Ogle and bludgeoned him on the head with the rock. Defendant and his cousin walked from the crime scene and had agreed to steal a car as they approached the home of Carlos and Rita Atencio. Mrs. Atencio answered the door, and they told her that their Jeep was stuck. She let them in so that they could use the telephone. When they entered the house, Defendant stabbed Mrs. Atencio, and both men continued to beat, stab, and slash her and her husband. Defendant and his cousin left with $14.00 and a van owned by the Atencios. Defendant was indicted with first-degree murder for Ogle’s killing. The indictment also charged him with 25 additional counts for the offenses at the Atencio home. The jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree murder of Ogle and guilty of all of the remaining charges against him related to the Atencios. Defendant appealed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, raising issues regarding double jeopardy, jury instructions, and challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial. The Court of Appeals upheld all of his convictions. Upon its review of the case, the Supreme Court :(1) vacated both of Defendant's convictions for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and his two convictions for aggravated burglary based on battery because these convictions violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy; (2) remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial on the second-degree murder conviction because the instruction regarding second-degree murder was erroneous; (3) affirmed the trial court’s rejection of the self-defense jury instruction; and (4) affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion for a mistrial.

Defendant-Petitioner Laybe Torres was convicted by a jury of Driving While Intoxicated (seventh or subsequent offense). While Defendant was initially pulled over for not wearing a seatbelt during a routine seatbelt enforcement operation, the arresting officer subsequently initiated a DWI investigation after smelling alcohol, observing Defendant’s bloodshot eyes, and noting Defendant’s slurred speech. In his rebuttal closing, the prosecutor told the jury that defense counsel had lied when commenting on the absence of a seatbelt citation during his closing argument, implying that a citation did in fact exist. The prosecutor also waved around what appeared to be a copy of the seatbelt violation, which had not been introduced into evidence, in front of the jury while accusing defense counsel of lying. Defense counsel promptly moved for mistrial, and the trial court, after excusing the jury from the courtroom and discussing the issue with counsel, instructed the jury to "disregard the statement of the prosecution as to opposing counsel lying." Defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because the prosecutor's improper actions were limited in scope and duration, and because the seatbelt violation issue was peripheral to the evidence presented and the elements of the crime for which Defendant was on trial, the trial court's prompt offering of a curative instruction was a sufficient response. The trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion for mistrial and therefore the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals.

This case required the New Mexico Supreme Court to apply the context-specific inquirt established by the federal Supreme Court in "Michigan v. Bryant" (131 S.Ct. 1143 (2011)) to evaluate whether an out-of-court statement was testimonial. Defendant Harrison Largo's main issues concerned the admission into evidence out-of-court statements by victim Freida Smith: portions of the 911 tape in which she communicated to the operator that Defendant shot her, and a sheriff's deputy's testimony that the victim identified Defendant as the one who shot her. Upon review, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that Defendant's confrontation rights were not violated by the admission of the victim's out-of-court statements that identified him as her shooter. The Court concluded those statements in this instance were not testimonial. Additionally, the Court concluded that the victim's statements were properly admitted as a dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, the Court found sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction on first-degree murder charges, and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

A jury found Defendant Graciela Guerra guilty of first-degree murder for the stabbing death of her daughter-in-law, Brenda Guerra, in an Alamogordo motel room. The district court sentenced Defendant to a mandatory term of life imprisonment, giving the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction to hear her direct appeal. The Court addressed Defendant’s arguments that the district court: (1) erred by denying Defendant’s self-defense instruction; (2) abused its discretion when it excluded, for lack of notice under Rule 5-602(F) NMRA, expert testimony about Defendant’s incapacity to form specific intent; (3) abused its discretion when it excluded expert testimony related to whether the victim’s wounds would have been fatal if treated; (4) abused its discretion when it excluded letters Defendant wrote while in prison; (5) and abused its discretion when it denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial. Defendant also made a claim of cumulative error. Finding no error in the district court's ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.

Defendant Angel Arrendondo testified during his trial that he shot and killed Alfego "Ace" Aragon in self-defense. Defendant claimed that Aragon shot at him numerous times, wounding him once in the shoulder. Witnesses testified that Aragon did not own a gun and was not armed. The jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit a violent felony, negligent child abuse, tampering with evidence, and shooting at a dwelling. Defendant raised several issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Defendant a fifth continuance requested one week before trial to allow defense counsel an opportunity to examine an unidentified hard fragment found in the lining of the jacket Defendant wore on the day of the shooting; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to prove Defendant's convictions for assault with intent to commit a violent felony against Nicole Rael, Aragon’s daughter, negligent child abuse, tampering with evidence, and shooting at a dwelling; (3) whether defense counsel ineffective because she failed to timely investigate the unidentified hard fragment in the jacket, and because she did not pursue a defense that Defendant was so intoxicated by heroin use that he could not form the specific intent to commit first-degree murder; (4) whether Defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a claim he raised for the first time on appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction for negligent child abuse and his conviction for tampering with evidence, the Court reversed those convictions. Furthermore, the Court reversed his conviction for assault with intent to commit a felony and remanded the case for a new trial on that issue. The Court affirmed Defendant's remaining convictions.

Defendant-Appellee the Village of Angel Fire (the Village) held an election to determine whether a public improvement district (PID) should be formed within its boundaries, after supporters of the PID petitioned the Village to do so. The requisite majority of eligible voters approved formation of the PID. Plaintiffs-Appellants Ron Glaser and his wife, Theresa Cull, Cheryl Host and several others, owners of real property located in Angel Fire, filed suit in district court, seeking a declaration that the PID formation election was procedurally defective and therefore void, that the PID lacked legal existence, and that a special levy approved and assessed by the PID was invalid. The district court dismissed Appellants' complaint as untimely, and Appellants sought review by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals determined that Appellants’ complaint presented an election contest, which was subject to a thirty-day statute of limitations under the Election Code. The Court further determined that because Appellants waited more than one year to file suit, their complaint was time-barred. After thoroughly analyzing these issues, however, the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court, pursuant to the Election Code’s directive that appeals in election contest proceedings should be made directly to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court adopted the appellate court's reasoning for dismissing Appellants' case.