Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Before the 2010 primary election, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether Appellant Dennis Montoya, a candidate for a Court of Appeals judgeship, was properly disqualified by the Secretary of State (the Secretary) from receiving public campaign funding under the New Mexico Voter Action Act (the Act). This case gave the Court its first opportunity to construe the Act, explain its previous oral ruling affirming the Secretary, and to address Appellant’s constitutional challenges to the Act as well as the civil penalty the Secretary imposed upon him. The dispute in this case centered on the provision in Section 1-19A-5(A), that "[a]n applicant candidate may contribute an amount of seed money from the applicant candidate's own funds up to" the $5000 limit. Appellant argues that his "general" contributions were intended to cover other kinds of expenses such as the costs of seeking his party's support at local preprimary convention gatherings leading up to the state preprimary convention. As such, these contributions were not intended to pay for the kinds of expenses that seed money is intended to cover and to limit. The Supreme Court concluded that when Appellant contributed more than $8000 of his own money to the campaign, while simultaneously applying for public funds, he violated the Act. Under the law, the Secretary had no choice but to disqualify him from public financing, and she did so. Furthermore, the Court concluded Appellant "misplaced" his reliance on "a number of federal cases to suggest that a civil penalty cannot be imposed on him for voluntarily exercising his First Amendment right to free speech." The Court affirmed the district court's judgment in this case.

Defendant Steve Tollardo was convicted by a jury of being an accessory to first-degree murder, being an accessory to kidnapping, conspiracy to commit murder, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. He was acquitted of being an accessory to aggravated arson and conspiracy to commit aggravated arson. The Supreme Court addressed only one of the issues Defendant raised on appeal: whether the district court erred in advising the jury that two other individuals were convicted of conspiracy to commit second-degree murder in connection with the same homicide underlying the charges against Defendant. The Court concluded that the district court did err in mentioning the coconspirators' convictions, and that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case to the district court for a new trial. In reaching this holding, the Court reexamined its harmless error analysis and clarified that a review of the particular circumstances in each case, rather than mechanical application of a multi-factor test, must guide the inquiry into whether a given trial error requires reversal.

In June 2005, the New Mexico Department of Corrections (DOC) adopted an Employee DWI Policy. The DOC hired Respondent Rudy Sais in April 2006 as a Correctional Officer I. Respondent reviewed the Policy and signed a DWI acknowledgment form, noting that he received a copy of the Policy and he understood its requirements. In 2006, Respondent was arrested on suspicion of aggravated DWI. Respondent received a seven-day suspension as a result of the arrest. The criminal charges against Respondent were ultimately dismissed without an adjudication of guilt or innocence. In 2008, Respondent was again arrested on suspicion of DWI. The criminal charges against Respondent were once again dismissed. After a DOC investigation, Respondent was dismissed based on a second offense under the Policy. Respondent appealed his termination to the State Personnel Board and a hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ). At the hearing, Respondent claimed that he was treated differently than other employees under the Policy. After the hearing, the ALJ submitted an extensive recommended decision to the Personnel Board that supported Respondent’s termination. The Personnel Board adopted the ALJ’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in their entirety and upheld Respondent’s termination. The district court reversed the Personnel Board, finding that "[t]he termination of [Respondent] was arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law" because "he was not treated in a similar fashion to several other officers in similar circumstances." The DOC then petitioned for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, which denied the petition. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to address the important policy issues implicated "when DWI and public employment intersect, especially in light of [the] Court’s precedent on the same subject." After review, the Supreme Court reversed: "[w]hen the district court concluded that Respondent 'was not treated in a similar fashion to several other officers in similar circumstances,' the court was simply incorrect based upon the record before it."

This issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the appointment of the New Mexico House of Representatives following the 2010 federal census. It was undisputed that the House was unconstitutionally apportioned. The Legislature then passed House Bill 39 to reapportion the House during a 2011 Special Session. The Governor vetoed the bill. Because lawmakers failed to create constitutionally-acceptable districts, the burden fell on the courts to draw a reapportionment map for the House. The Court appointed a retired district judge to oversee the judiciary's process. Petitioners filed petitions for a writ of superintending control to ask the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction over the case, and to reverse the district court to adopt an alternative plan or remand the case with instructions regarding the legal standard that should be applied. After reading the parties' briefs and listening to oral argument, the Court entered an order articulating the legal principles that should govern redistricting litigation in New Mexico and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

Defendant Curtis Harper was indicted on fifteen counts of criminal sexual penetration of a child under the age of thirteen. During a docket call, the district court learned for the first time that not all witness interviews had been conducted, including those of the alleged victim and the doctor who examined her. The district court rescheduled the trial and verbally instructed the attorneys to complete the witness interviews. During a subsequent hearing, because neither the victim nor the doctor were interviewed before the court-imposed deadline, the district court prohibited the State from calling either of them as witnesses. The State agreed with Defendant that it could not make a prima facie case against him if these two witnesses were not allowed to testify. The State appealed the district court's exclusion of the two witnesses. The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the district court regarding the victim, concluding that the State made efforts to comply with the district court's request and Defendant was not prejudiced by the State's failure to make the victim available for an interview within the time frame established by the district court. Because exclusion of witnesses requires an intentional violation of a court order, prejudice to the opposing party, and consideration of less severe sanctions, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals with respect to the victim and reversed with respect to the doctor. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court’s order precluding the victim and the doctor from testifying at trial and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant directly appealed her conviction for intentional child abuse that resulted in the death of her eight-year-old daughter. On appeal, she argued that: (1) the jury was improperly instructed as to the elements of intentional child abuse; (2) the State failed to present sufficient evidence from which the jury could have convicted her beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the testimony of the supervising pathologist regarding the child's autopsy violated the Confrontation Clause; and (4) the prosecutor engaged in multiple incidents of prosecutorial misconduct. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the jury was indeed improperly instructed and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction. The Court found that Defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct were not preserved for appeal. The Court reversed Defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

Defendant Debbie Cruz was convicted of issuing payroll checks with insufficient funds to cover them.  Defendant was charged with four counts of issuing worthless checks, pursuant to the "Worthless Check Act."  Convicted on each count, Defendant argued on appeal, among other issues, the lack of sufficient evidence to prove that she had issued a check "in exchange for anything of value." Because the worthless checks were issued a week after the last day of the pay period, the Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, relying on previous opinions of the Supreme Court to conclude that the Act applied only to a "contemporaneous exchange" and not to pre-existing or antecedent debts.  Upon its review, the Supreme Court rejected that distinction as inconsistent with the clear legislative intent and purpose of the Act.  Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

Defendant Ramon Lopez was convicted by a jury of multiple crimes, including first-degree felony murder. The Supreme Court addressed two of the issues Defendant raised on appeal:  whether Defendant's right to confront witnesses who testified against him was violated by the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness, and whether the district court erred in allowing the State to impeach its own witness with otherwise inadmissible hearsay.  Upon review, the Court concluded that the district court committed reversible error by allowing hearsay to be admitted under the auspices of the State's impeachment of the preliminary hearing testimony of the unavailable witness. The Court did not reach Defendantâs remaining issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

This case came before the Supreme Court on a petition invoking its emergency original jurisdiction to review the indefinite detention of thirty-two courtroom spectators (Petitioners) who had all been summarily ordered to jail for contempt of court by Respondent Judge Sam Sanchez after a contentious hearing evolved into a courtroom disruption created by some, but not all, of the Petitioners. The events that took place immediately after Respondent recessed the court were preserved in a digital audio recording. The noise level in the courtroom increased as the voices of the defendant and some of the spectators became louder.  Thirty-nine seconds after the bailiff first told the crowd to rise and while audible statements were still being made, Respondent yelled, "That's enough! I'll hold every one of you in contempt and jail you all!" Upon review of the trial record, the Court found that the record reflects that whoever had been acting in any disruptive or disobedient manner had ceased doing so immediately upon Respondent's oral pronouncement that he was sending everyone to jail. "Petitioners clearly were jailed for the past behavior of one or more of them and not as a coercive measure to stop any continuing disorderly or disobedient behavior. Respondent lawfully could have initiated indirect contempt proceedings against those individuals whom he had reason to believe were participating in disruptive or defiant conduct, but he was required to honor the procedures of the law and the limits of constitutional due process."  In this case, the Court concluded he "utterly" failed to do so. The Court held that Respondent's convictions and jail sentences of Petitioners were an unlawful abuse of judicial power requiring the Court's order that Petitioners be released from jail and that their criminal contempt convictions be vacated. 

Carol Sloan, a New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (PRC) Commissioner, was convicted and subsequently sentenced for aggravated battery and burglary. That same day, the Attorney General filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto asking the Supreme Court remove Ms. Sloan from office because of her felony convictions. Although Ms. Sloan did not dispute that she was convicted and sentenced for two felony offenses, she nonetheless maintained that those convictions did not disqualify her from continuing to hold public office until the expiration of the term for which she was elected. Ultimately the Court found that because Ms. Sloan was a convicted felon, forfeiture of her office was automatic.