Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) adopted amendments to regulations pertaining to the protection of endangered and threatened species. The amendments established a formal process through which individuals could obtain a permit to allow for the incidental taking of a threatened or endangered species. Before the agency implemented the regulations at issue, the Town of Riverhead and Twon of Riverhead Community Development Agency (collectively, Riverhead) challenged the amendments. Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding, finding that Petitioners did not have standing. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Petitioners lacked standing based on their failure to allege an injury in fact and that Petitioners’ substantive challenges were not yet ripe. The Court of Appeals held that Petitioners could proceed with three of their procedural claims, as they alleged a sufficient injury regarding these claims, but Petitioners lacked standing with respect to the substantive causes of action, as those claims were not yet ripe. View "In re Ass'n for a Better Long Island" on Justia Law

In 2001, Defendant was found guilty of robbery and other crimes and sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Supreme Court later ordered that Defendant be resentenced, determining that Defendant’s sentence was illegal because it did not include a mandatory term of post-release supervision (PRS). After Defendant was conditionally released, Supreme Court resentenced Defendant by imposing a term of PRS. In 2009, the maximum term of Defendant’s prison sentence passed. In 2010, Defendant filed a motion to set aside his second sentence, arguing that the imposition of PRS constituted double jeopardy because he was out of prison on conditional release when it was imposed. Supreme Court granted the motion and resentenced Defendant, reimposing the terms of his completed initial sentence. The Appellate Division dismissed the People’s appeal, concluding that imposing PRS in this case would constitute double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Defendant had not acquired a legitimate expectation of finality in his sentence because the direct appeal of the sentence Defendant served was not over; and (2) therefore, the prohibition against double jeopardy was not implicated in this case. View "People v. Cintron" on Justia Law

In 1979, Plaintiff began his employment with Defendant, New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC), where he was eventually promoted to health facilities planner. In 2005, Plaintiff was diagnosed with pneumoconiosis, an occupational lung disease. In 2007, Defendant terminated Plaintiff. In 2008, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging, among other claims, that HHC had unlawfully discriminated on the basis of disability in violation of the State Human Rights Law (State HRL) and the City Human Rights Law (City HRL). Supreme Court granted summary judgment for HHC, concluding that Plaintiff could not, even with a reasonable accommodation, perform the essential functions of his job. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that HHC was not entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s State HRL and City HRL claims, as (1) both statutes generally preclude summary judgment in favor of an employer where the employer has failed to demonstrate that it responded to a disabled employee’s request for a particular accommodation by engaging in a good faith interactive process regarding the feasibility of that accommodation; and (2) under the facts of this case, Plaintiff presented colorable claims of disability discrimination under the City HRL and State HRL. View "Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the second degree for suffocating her stepdaughter. The Appellate Division found the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence and modified the County Court’s judgment by reducing the murder conviction to a conviction of second-degree manslaughter. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s confession to the police following the child’s death was sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence at trial to support Defendant’s conviction; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain letters into evidence, as they were sufficiently redacted; and (3) Defendant was not denied effective assistance of trial counsel. View "People v. Santiago" on Justia Law

Upon responding to a burglary report at an apartment building, police officers observed Defendant in the building’s stairwell. When the officers arrested Defendant for trespassing, one of the officers opened Defendant’s shoulder purse, which contained a loaded handgun. Defendant was subsequently indicted for criminal possession of a gun in the second degree and criminal trespass in the second degree. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the gun, and, after a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the counts charged. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the People bear the burden of demonstrating the presence of exigent circumstances in order to conduct a warrantless search of a closed container incident to arrest; and (2) in this case, the People failed to meet that burden as a matter of law. View "People v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder for murdering his infant son. The Appellate Division affirmed Defendant’s conviction. The Supreme Court reversed and directed a new trial, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that Defendant, with depraved indifference to human life, recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of serious physical injury to the four-month-old, thereby causing the child’s death; but (2) Defendant’s previously denied motion to suppress inculpating statements he made to interrogators was in error because the statements were not demonstrably voluntary, and Defendant’s confession should not have been placed before the jury. View "People v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In 2010, Nassau County passed Local Law 18, which shifted the obligation to pay real property tax refunds from the County to its individual taxing districts. Various interested parties filed three actions seeking a declaration that Local Law 18 was null, void and unenforceable because its violated the Municipal Home Rule Law (MHRL) provisions limiting the powers of local government and the State Constitution’s home rule and taxation articles. Supreme Court effectively granted summary judgment to the County in all three actions. The Appellate Division reversed, entering a declaratory judgment that Local Law 18 violated the Constitution and the MHRL. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the County exceeded its statutory and constitutional authority in its attempt to supersede a special State tax law. View "Baldwin Union Free Sch. Dist. v. County of Nassau" on Justia Law

After a nonjury trial, Defendant was convicted of unlawful surveillance in the second degree for standing outside the front door of his neighbor’s townhouse and filming the complainant while she was naked in her second floor bathroom. Defendant appealed, arguing that insufficient evidence supported his conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the evidence established that Defendant had surreptitiously recorded the complainant for his own amusement at a time and place where she had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that each element of the offense of unlawful surveillance in the second degree was established beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Schreier" on Justia Law

In 2000, Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter and was sentenced to twenty-three years incarceration. After Defendant’s incarceration, the Department of Correctional Services added a five-year PRS term to her certificate of commitment. In 2009, Defendant filed a pro se motion claiming that her plea was defective and her sentence illegal because she was not informed before she was incarcerated that she would be required to serve an additional term of PRS. Defendant was resentenced to the original sentence of twenty-three years without a term of PRS. Defendant appealed the resentence. Defendant’s counsel filed a motion under People v. Crawford asking to be relieved as counsel because there were no non-frivolous issues to be raised on Defendant’s behalf. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se supplemental brief arguing, inter alia, that the sentence was illegal. The appellate division granted counsel’s motion and affirmed the resentence without addressing Defendant’s pro se contentions. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the appellate division erred in granting the Crawford motion, and therefore, remittal for a de novo appeal was warranted. View "People v. Beaty" on Justia Law

In the first case involved in this appeal, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of marihuana. Defendant appealed, asserting that his plea was invalid because the record did not affirmatively demonstrate the waiver of his Boykin rights. The Appellate Term affirmed. In the second case, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal sale of marihuana. Defendant appealed, arguing, as in the first case, that the waiver of his Boykin rights was nonexistent. The Appellate Term affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed in both cases, holding that because the records in both cases were silent as to Defendant's waiver of his Boykin rights, the pleas must be vacated. View "People v. Tyrell" on Justia Law