Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted first-degree robbery pursuant to a plea agreement. Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging, among other things, that the sentence promise was deficient because the judge did not explain to him at the time of the plea that a violation of post release supervision could result in his being incarcerated for up to five additional years of imprisonment, "over and above the ten years promised by the court." The county court denied the motion, and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the ramifications of a defendant's violations of the conditions of postrelease supervision are collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, are speculative at the time of the guilty plea, and are not a core component of the sentence imposed on the defendant by the judge. View "People v. Monk" on Justia Law

This appeal involved three defendants, who were charged with multiple counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance. In each case, the trial court concluded that the courtroom should be closed to the general public during the testimony of two undercover officers on the ground that closure was necessary to protect the officers' safety and ongoing investigations. After jury trials, Defendants were convicted as charged. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court properly closed the courtroom to the general public during the testimony of the undercover officers. The Court of Appeals held that the limited closures comported with Sixth Amendment public trial principles but that a new trial was required in one case based on an erroneous jury charge on the agency defense. View "People v. Echevarria" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery, menacing, and possession of a weapon. Defendant appealed, arguing that the People violated N.Y. Crim. Proc. 710.30, which Defendant argued entitled him to the suppression of testimony about the victim's post-arrest identification. Defendant also argued that trial counsel's failure to raise that issue deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, assuming there was a section 710.30, if defense counsel did make a mistake in failing to object to the evidence, the mistake was not so egregious and prejudicial as to deprive Defendant of a fair trial. View "People v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

After his vehicle was stopped by a police officer, Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated, and a breathalyzer test computed his blood alcohol content at close to twice the legal limit. Defendant was subsequently indicted for felony DWI. During the jury trial, the People offered into evidence documents pertaining to the routine calibration and maintenance of the breathalyzer machine used in Defendant's breath test to demonstrate it was in proper working order at the time Defendant was tested. Defendant raised a Confrontation Clause challenge to the documents, contending that he was entitled to cross-examine the authors of the records. The county court allowed the documents to be received in evidence, and Defendant was convicted of felony DWI. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that documents pertaining to the routine inspection, maintenance, and calibration of breathalyzer machines are nontestimonial, and consequently, the Confrontation Clause was not implicated in this case, and the trial judge did not err in declining Defendant's request to cross-examine the authors of the testing records before the court ruled on their admissibility. View "People v. Pealer" on Justia Law

Defendant and three codefendants - Eric Young, Marvin Howard and Nathaniel Williams - were jointly indicted on a theory of accomplice liability for second-degree murder and second-degree weapon possession. Young and Howard waived their right to a jury, and Defendant and Williams were tried jointly. Howard testified during the trial. Defendant and Williams were convicted of both crimes, and the judge acquitted Howard. Defendant appealed on the ground that the judge's refusal to direct Howard to testify outside the jury's presence deprived him of his right to a fair trial. The appellate division agreed and reversed the judgment of conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was prejudiced by the judge's decision to allow the jury to hear Howard's defense. View "People v. Warren" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first and third degrees and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Defendant pleaded guilty to all three counts. At the time of the guilty plea, Defendant had a prior undischarged state sentence stemming from a felony drug conviction and also faced a federal violation of supervised release in connection with two prior federal felonies. Defendant was later sentenced to a determinate prison term of twelve years. The sentencing court stated that the sentence would be concurrent to the federal sentence. In addition, as a second felony drug offender, N.Y. Penal Law 70.25(2-a) required Defendant's twelve-year prison term to run consecutively to his prior undischarged state sentence. Defendant appealed, asserting that his guilty plea was involuntary because the trial court did not advise him of the consequence of his plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the failure of the trial court to address the impact of section 70.25(2-a) during the plea colloquy did not require vacatur of the plea. View "People v. Belliard" on Justia Law

Following a verbal exchange between Defendant and a police officer in which Defendant swore at the officer and accused the officer of harassing him, Defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct. In a search incident to arrest, the police discovered Defendant was in possession of twenty-five bags of cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress the drugs found on his person, contending that the arrest for disorderly conduct was illegal, rendering the contraband fruit of the poisonous tree. After the motion was denied, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance third degree and assault second degree. The Court of Appeals reversed, vacated Defendant's guilty plea, and granted Defendant's motion to suppress, holding (1) Defendant's arrest for disorderly conduct was not supported by probable cause due to insufficient proof on the public harm element; and (2) because the arrest was unlawful, the cocaine seized during the search incident to that arrest should have been suppressed. View "People v. Baker" on Justia Law

Three police officers pulled over Defendant's vehicle because of a defective rear brake light. While the vehicle was stopped, one of the officers asked the vehicle's occupants if they possessed any weapons. The offices subsequently discovered weapons in the vehicle. An ensuing misdemeanor information charged Defendant with two counts of misdemeanor possession of an air pistol or rifle. Supreme Court granted Defendant's motion to suppress the air rifles recovered from his vehicle, holding that the officer's inquiry into the presence of weapons required suspicion of criminality and that mere nervousness on the part of occupants did not give rise to such suspicion. Upon reargument, Supreme Court reversed its prior order, finding that the officer's inquiry was permissible even though the officer lacked a foundation of criminality. The Appellate Division reversed, granted Defendant's suppression motion, and dismissed the information. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) the appellate division did not err in suppressing the air guns; but (2) the case should be remitted for consideration of the People's alternative claim that officers would have inevitably discovered the disputed physical evidence. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, among other charges. At his initial trial, the jury deadlocked on that charge but rendered a partial verdict convicting Defendant of the lesser included offense of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree. Prior to the second trial, defense counsel moved to dismiss the count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, arguing that reprosecution for that offense would violate double jeopardy. The court denied the motion and proceeded to trial, convicting Defendant of third degree criminal possession. The appellate division reversed and dismissed the count of the indictment charging Defendant with third degree criminal possession, finding that Defendant's conviction of the lesser included offense of seventh degree criminal possession was deemed an acquittal of third degree possession and that double jeopardy barred Defendant's retrial for the greater offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that by opting for a mistrial and a retrial on the remaining counts, Defendant could not now claim his retrial was barred. View "People v. McFadden" on Justia Law

Supreme Court convicted Defendant of three crimes of terrorism under N.Y. Penal Law 490.25 premised on first-degree manslaughter, attempted second-degree murder and second-degree weapon possession, as well as second-degree conspiracy for agreeing to commit first-degree gang assault as a crime of terrorism. The Appellate Division modified by reducing the terrorism convictions to the three primary offenses, holding that the People established that Defendant only engaged in gang-related street crimes, not terrorist acts. Both parties appealed. On the People's appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence in this case was insufficient to establish Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under Penal Law 490.25, as Defendant's criminal acts as a member of a gang were not acts of terrorism under the statute. On Defendant's cross-appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant was entitled to a new trial on the underlying offenses specified in the terrorism counts because the theory of terrorism should not have been charged, and the People were therefore permitted to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence that unduly prejudiced the jury's ability to fairly adjudicate Defendant's guilt or innocence. View "People v. Morales" on Justia Law