Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a criminal homicide prosecution against defendant. The primary issue presented on appeal was whether an Administrative Judge exceeded his authority pursuant to 22 NYCRR 127.2(b) by considering the order of a trial court assigning an attorney, under article 18-B of the County Law, to a criminal proceeding. The court held that section 127.2(b), which only provided for an Administrative Judge's review of orders awarding legal fees to attorneys, did not authorize the Administrative Judge to review the assignment of counsel.

Defendant challenged his conviction for aggravated assault upon a police officer or a peace officer, an element of which is the assailant's use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. Defendant was charged with that offense by a grand jury based on evidence that he bit a police officer on the finger as the officer attempted to arrest him and defendant was HIV positive. The court concluded that defendant's saliva "came with him" and could not qualify as a dangerous instrument. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified by dismissing the count of the indictment charging aggravated assault upon a police officer or peace officer, remitting to county court for resentencing.

Defendant and co-defendant were convicted of first-degree robbery. At issue was whether the Supreme Court's error in denying defendant's request for a severance based on the improper joinder of certain counts relating only to co-defendant was harmless. The court held that Supreme Court's conceded error was not harmless because the improper joinder arguably tainted the proceedings by creating a strong risk that the voluminous evidence, unrelated to defendant, colored the jury's evaluation of defendant's case and thereby prejudiced defendant. Further, the trial court's curative instructions did not cure the prejudice to defendant.

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for the intentional killing of one victim, accompanied by the killing of another victim with the intent to cause her serious injury or death, and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. At issue was whether Penal Law 70.25(2) precluded the imposition of consecutive sentences for defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The court held that under the circumstances presented, because the offense of possessing a gun with unlawful intent was only completed upon defendant's commission of the ensuing substantive crime of shooting the victims, consecutive sentencing was prohibitive.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree. At issue was whether defendant could open the door to the admission of testimony that would otherwise be inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. The court held that he could and in this case, he did. If evidence barred under the Confrontation Clause were inadmissible irrespective of a defendant's actions at trial, then a defendant could attempt to delude a jury "by selectively revealing only those details of a testimonial statement that are potentially helpful to the defense, while concealing from the jury other details that would tend to explain the portions introduced and placed them in context[.]"

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. At issue was whether defendant could appeal an order modifying the conditions of a sentence of probation. The court concluded that such an appeal was not authorized by the Criminal Procedure Law. Instead, judicial review must be sought in a CPLR article 78 proceeding.

In this case, where defendant's conviction for depraved indifference murder was reversed on appeal, the issue before the court was whether, in accord with the principles of double jeopardy, defendant was impliedly acquitted of intentional murder when the jury was instructed to consider intentional murder and depraved indifference murder in the alternative, but that it could return a verdict on only one of the offenses. Because the jury had a full opportunity to return a verdict on both inconsistent charges, defendant was impliedly acquitted of the other count when the jury convicted defendant of the depraved indifference murder and his second trial for intentional murder twice placed defendant in jeopardy for the same offense.

This case arose when a mid-twentieth century historian sought disclosure of unredacted transcripts of interviews from a New York City Board of Education investigation, under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), Public Officers Law 87 and 89, with people who were promised confidentiality and asked to provide the names of those who had been in the Communist Party with them. The court concluded that petitioner's constitutional arguments lacked substance and therefore dismissed the appeal as of right. The court granted the motion for permission to appeal, and modified the Appellate Division order, permitting the City to redact only names and other identifying details related to informants who were promised confidentiality.

Defendant was convicted of three drug crimes and subsequently sought an order declaring that neither of two statements of predicate felony conviction created a basis for Supreme Court to determine that he was subject to an enhanced sentence as a second felony drug offender. Considering Penal Law 70.70(4) in light of Penal Law 70.06(1) and CPL 400.21(2), (4), and (7)(c), the court concluded that the Legislature meant for prosecutors and sentencing courts to take foreign violent felony convictions into account when determining a defendant's sentencing status, notwithstanding the ambiguity created by the reference in section 70.70(1)(c) to Penal Law 70.02. The court's interpretation comported more closely with the policy underlying the Drug Law Reform Act of 2004 than did defendant's approach and section 70.70 was consistent with the Legislature's general sentencing design for recidivist offenders. The court also held that it was impermissible for Supreme Court to examine the indictment underlying defendant's robbery conviction in North Carolina so as to ascertain whether his intent, as a factual matter, satisfied New York's intent element for robbery. Finally, CPL 470.15(1) barred the Appellate Division "from affirming a judgment, sentence or order on a ground not decided adversely to the appellant by the trial court, and CPL 470.35(1) grants us no broader review powers in this regard." As a result, the court could not review Supreme Court's determination, which favored defendant, that the North Carolina robbery statute was broader than any New York felony. The court examined defendant's claims of error relating to Supreme Court's suppression rulings and considered them to be without merit.

Defendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder resulting from conduct creating a grave risk of serious injury or death of a child under 11, Penal Law 125.25[4]. At issue was whether the evidence was sufficient to show that defendant possessed the culpable mental state of depraved indifference to human life to warrant a conviction of murder in the second degree. The court held that the record did not support such a finding where the evidence of depraved indifference was legally insufficient and therefore, the conviction for second-degree depraved indifference murder of a child must be vacated.