Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The common issue presented by these two consolidated appeals was whether an appeal lies from an oral order issued by a criminal court on a pre-trial matter. In People v. Elmer, the People appealed from an oral decision by the trial court that granted, in part, defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. In People v. Cooper, Defendant sought review of an oral order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in a search attendant to his arrest. In both cases, the appellate division ruled adversely to the appellants, finding that the failure to obtain a written order precluded appellate review. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that an appeal does lie from an oral order of a criminal court that finally disposes of the pre-trial matter at issue.

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder upon evidence that he killed his fiancee by inflicting numerous knife wounds. Although Defendant had sought to interpose the affirmative defense that his homicidal acts had been committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, and upon that theory to afford the jury the option of returning a verdict of manslaughter in the first degree instead of murder, the trial court refused to charge the defense, deeming the charge unwarranted absent proof that Defendant suffered from an underlying "mental infirmity." The appellate division affirmed, concluding that Defendant's conduct before, during and after the offense was inconsistent with the loss of self-control associated with the defense. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the charge should have been given, as the evidence would have permitted Defendant's jury reasonably to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of the homicide, he was affected by an extreme emotional disturbance, and that the disturbance was supported by a reasonable explanation or excuse rooted in the situation as he perceived it.

In Soundview Park in the Bronx, a New York City police officer observed a knife on Defendant's person and seized it while issuing Defendant a summons for trespass and questioning him about his presence in the park after hours. The knife turned out to be a gravity knife, and Defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. Defendant moved to suppress the knife as the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure. The Supreme Court granted the motion on the ground that, at the time the officer took the knife, he lacked probable cause to believe that Defendant had committed a crime. The appellate court reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under these circumstances, it was reasonable for the officer to retrieve the knife and make an arrest when the knife turned out to be unlawful.

At issue here was national assets stolen by President Ferdinand Marcos. Victims of Marcos' human rights abuses ("Pimentel class") obtained a judgment against Marcos' estate and, in enforcing the judgment, sought to obtain assets also sought by the Republic of the Philippines and its commission organized to retrieve the assets (collectively, Republic). In dispute was the assets of Arelma, a Panamanian corporation, which were held in a brokerage account. The brokerage firm commenced an interpleader action in federal court. The district court awarded ownership of the Arelma assets to the Pimentel claimants. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the assertion of sovereign immunity by the Republic required dismissal for lack of a required party. Petitioner then commenced this turnover proceeding seeking to execute the Pimental judgment against the Arelma account. Meanwhile, a Philippine court determined the assets had been forfeited to the Republic. PNB and Arelma moved to intervene, requesting dismissal. Supreme Court denied the motion. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate division did not err in concluding that dismissal was required under N.Y.C.P.L.R. 1001, as the Republic was a necessary party but could not be subject to joinder in light of the assertion of sovereign immunity.

Defendant was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of third degree robbery, a felony. Defendant was sentenced as a second degree felony offender, on the basis of a previous conviction in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York of conspiracy to distribute heroin, and to possess it with intent to distribute. The court held that, under New York's "strict equivalency" standard for convictions rendered in other jurisdictions, a federal conviction for conspiracy to commit a drug crime could not serve as a predicate felony for sentencing purposes.

This appeal arose from a criminal homicide prosecution against defendant. The primary issue presented on appeal was whether an Administrative Judge exceeded his authority pursuant to 22 NYCRR 127.2(b) by considering the order of a trial court assigning an attorney, under article 18-B of the County Law, to a criminal proceeding. The court held that section 127.2(b), which only provided for an Administrative Judge's review of orders awarding legal fees to attorneys, did not authorize the Administrative Judge to review the assignment of counsel.

Defendant challenged his conviction for aggravated assault upon a police officer or a peace officer, an element of which is the assailant's use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. Defendant was charged with that offense by a grand jury based on evidence that he bit a police officer on the finger as the officer attempted to arrest him and defendant was HIV positive. The court concluded that defendant's saliva "came with him" and could not qualify as a dangerous instrument. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified by dismissing the count of the indictment charging aggravated assault upon a police officer or peace officer, remitting to county court for resentencing.

Defendant and co-defendant were convicted of first-degree robbery. At issue was whether the Supreme Court's error in denying defendant's request for a severance based on the improper joinder of certain counts relating only to co-defendant was harmless. The court held that Supreme Court's conceded error was not harmless because the improper joinder arguably tainted the proceedings by creating a strong risk that the voluminous evidence, unrelated to defendant, colored the jury's evaluation of defendant's case and thereby prejudiced defendant. Further, the trial court's curative instructions did not cure the prejudice to defendant.

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for the intentional killing of one victim, accompanied by the killing of another victim with the intent to cause her serious injury or death, and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. At issue was whether Penal Law 70.25(2) precluded the imposition of consecutive sentences for defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The court held that under the circumstances presented, because the offense of possessing a gun with unlawful intent was only completed upon defendant's commission of the ensuing substantive crime of shooting the victims, consecutive sentencing was prohibitive.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree. At issue was whether defendant could open the door to the admission of testimony that would otherwise be inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. The court held that he could and in this case, he did. If evidence barred under the Confrontation Clause were inadmissible irrespective of a defendant's actions at trial, then a defendant could attempt to delude a jury "by selectively revealing only those details of a testimonial statement that are potentially helpful to the defense, while concealing from the jury other details that would tend to explain the portions introduced and placed them in context[.]"