Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of kidnapping in the second degree, as well as burglary, endangering the welfare of a child, and two weapons offenses. At issue was whether it was possible for a parent who had custodial rights to a child to be guilty of kidnapping that child. The court held that it was possible, and that it happened in these circumstances, where defendant used his baby daughter as a hostage, threatening to kill her if the police approached him.

These appeals involve a similar issue, albeit in different contexts. At issue in People v Dais was whether the People could introduce a new predicate felony statement at the resentencing proceeding to demonstrate that defendant must be adjudicated a second felony drug offender whose prior conviction was for a violent felony, not withstanding the fact that defendant, at his original sentencing had been adjudicated a second felony offender based on a prior non-violent felony. The issue presented in People v Stanley was the converse of the one in Dais. The court concluded that a de novo review of whether the defendant's prior felony was non-violent or violent was proper in a 2009 Drug Law Reform Act of 2009, Penal Law 60.04 and 70.70, resentencing proceeding.

Plaintiff was convicted of attempted rape in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and endangering the welfare of a child. At issue was whether plaintiff, suing his former criminal defense attorney in legal malpractice, could recover nonpecuniary damages. Plaintiff claimed several errors, including that his attorney failed to investigate or present evidence concerning an allegedly meritorious defense, failed to interview certain potential witnesses, and failed to cross-examine the victim regarding discrepancies in her testimony. The court found that such damages were not available in an action for attorney malpractice. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed.

The People filed a misdemeanor information charging defendant, a registered level-three sex offender, with two counts of failing to personally verify his home address with local law enforcement every 90 days and two counts of failing to register as a sex offender within 10 days after changing his address. At issue was whether a defendant's admission must be corroborated in order to satisfy the prima facie case requirement for an information. The court held that corroboration was not necessary in this context where the absence of allegations in the information corroborating defendant's statements about his residences in December 2005 and February 2006 did not affect the jurisdictional validity of the information and his conviction on the guilty plea should not have been set aside.

Defendant was convicted of Promoting a Sexual Performance by a Child and Possessing a Sexual Performance by a Child. At issue was whether the evidence proffered at defendant's trial was legally sufficient to support his convictions. The court must consider, among other issues, the evidentiary significance of "cache files," or temporary internet files automatically created and stored on a defendant's hard drive, and defendant's awareness of the presence of such files. The court concluded that where the evidence failed to show that defendant had such awareness, the People have not met their burden of demonstrating defendant's knowing procurement or possession of those files. The court further concluded that merely viewing Web images of child pornography did not, absent other proof, constitute either possession or procurement within the meaning of the Penal Law.

This case arose when defendant was charged in the state of Washington with raping and kidnapping two teenage girls and subsequently moved to New York. Rulings of administrative agencies could ordinarily be reviewed only in proceedings under CPLR 78. The court held, however, that the unusual features of New York's sex offender registration system justified an exception to that rule: A determination by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders that a person who committed an offense in another state must register in New York was reviewable in a proceeding to determine the offender's risk level.

Defendant was acquitted of intentional murder but convicted of, among other things, depraved indifference murder, felony murder, and kidnapping in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the evidence was legally sufficient to support defendant's conviction for depraved indifference murder. It also held the merger doctrine inapplicable to the felony murder and kidnapping convictions, concluding that "the acts constituting the kidnapping were discrete." The Appellate Division also rejected defendant's other contentions as either meritless or unpreserved. Defendant appealed. The court modified, by reducing the conviction of depraved indifference murder to manslaughter in the second degree, and otherwise, affirmed.

Defendant was charged with third-degree criminal sale of a controlled substance and criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds. Before defendant pleaded guilty, the trial judge observed to defense counsel that she would accept the plea "on the condition" that defendant withdrew "any and all motions that [were] outstanding," which included a recently filed pro se constitutional speedy trial motion, and waived the right to appeal. During allocution, the judge twice asked defendant if he "under[stood]" that by entering into the guilty plea, all his "outstanding writs and motions" were "being withdrawn," and he responded that he did. The court concluded that the judge's statements, considered in context, did not go against the court's decisions in People v White, People v. Blakley, and People v Sutton. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence.

Petitioners commenced this special proceeding seeking a declaration that Chapter 16 of Laws of 2012, insofar as it expanded the size of the New York State Senate from 62 to 63 districts, was unconstitutional. Specifically, petitioners argued that the Legislature's failure to apply a consistent method of calculating the number of Senate seats due to population growth throughout the State was arbitrary and violated article III, section 4 of the New York State Constitution. The court found that petitioners have failed to satisfy their heavy burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of this legislation and therefore affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and the issue on appeal was whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. Defendant maintained that there was insufficient evidence that he intended to cause serious physical injury when he fired a gun into a crowd of people. The court held that a reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant fired his gun with the intent to cause serious physical injury and, as a result, caused the victim's death. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment.