Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose when defendant was charged in the state of Washington with raping and kidnapping two teenage girls and subsequently moved to New York. Rulings of administrative agencies could ordinarily be reviewed only in proceedings under CPLR 78. The court held, however, that the unusual features of New York's sex offender registration system justified an exception to that rule: A determination by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders that a person who committed an offense in another state must register in New York was reviewable in a proceeding to determine the offender's risk level.

Defendant was acquitted of intentional murder but convicted of, among other things, depraved indifference murder, felony murder, and kidnapping in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the evidence was legally sufficient to support defendant's conviction for depraved indifference murder. It also held the merger doctrine inapplicable to the felony murder and kidnapping convictions, concluding that "the acts constituting the kidnapping were discrete." The Appellate Division also rejected defendant's other contentions as either meritless or unpreserved. Defendant appealed. The court modified, by reducing the conviction of depraved indifference murder to manslaughter in the second degree, and otherwise, affirmed.

Defendant was charged with third-degree criminal sale of a controlled substance and criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds. Before defendant pleaded guilty, the trial judge observed to defense counsel that she would accept the plea "on the condition" that defendant withdrew "any and all motions that [were] outstanding," which included a recently filed pro se constitutional speedy trial motion, and waived the right to appeal. During allocution, the judge twice asked defendant if he "under[stood]" that by entering into the guilty plea, all his "outstanding writs and motions" were "being withdrawn," and he responded that he did. The court concluded that the judge's statements, considered in context, did not go against the court's decisions in People v White, People v. Blakley, and People v Sutton. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence.

Petitioners commenced this special proceeding seeking a declaration that Chapter 16 of Laws of 2012, insofar as it expanded the size of the New York State Senate from 62 to 63 districts, was unconstitutional. Specifically, petitioners argued that the Legislature's failure to apply a consistent method of calculating the number of Senate seats due to population growth throughout the State was arbitrary and violated article III, section 4 of the New York State Constitution. The court found that petitioners have failed to satisfy their heavy burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of this legislation and therefore affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and the issue on appeal was whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. Defendant maintained that there was insufficient evidence that he intended to cause serious physical injury when he fired a gun into a crowd of people. The court held that a reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant fired his gun with the intent to cause serious physical injury and, as a result, caused the victim's death. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment.

Pursuant to a contract with the State of New York, defendant agreed to provide various courier services via air and ground transportation. Plaintiffs own a trucking company and served as an independent contractor to defendant, providing ground shipping services to defendant within the state. In this qui tam action, the court was asked to consider whether plaintiffs' claims on behalf of the State of New York, pursuant to the New York False Claims Act (FCA), State Finance Law 187 et seq., were federally preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), 49 U.S.C 47173[b][1]. The court held that they were and that the market participant doctrine was inapplicable. Plaintiffs' remaining contentions were deemed without merit.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree assault, a violent felony offense. At issue was whether "a determinate sentence of imprisonment actually imposed" included the mandatory period of postrelease supervision (PRS) for purposes of calculating the duration of an order of protection issued at sentencing. After reviewing revisions of the Penal Law, the court held that it did and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.

Defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree and conspiracy in the second degree. On appeal, defendant raised several issues, including the contentions that he should have been granted a suppression hearing in regard to the eavesdropping warrant issue, that his postrelease supervision team had been illegally imposed in his absence, and that his prison sentence was harsh and excessive. The Appellate Division rejected all of defendant's claims, except the challenge to his postrelease supervision sentence, which the People conceded. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's holding that suppression of wiretap evidence based on the prosecution's violation of CPL 700.50(3) was not warranted without a showing of prejudice, and found that defendant failed to allege any prejudice and had a full opportunity to challenge the legality of the warrant when he received notice of it at his arraignment. That court modified and, as modified, affirmed Supreme Court's judgment, remitting the matter for the sole purpose of the imposition of a postrelease supervision term in defendant's presence. Defendant's remaining arguments were without merit.

Defendant was convicted of criminal charges related to an underlying dispute regarding cab fare. On appeal, the court addressed the relation between a claim of right defense and a mistake of fact defense in the second-degree robbery context. The court concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, the two defenses were equivalent. The jury heard evidence that defendant had negotiated a $4 cab fare even though she carried $21; tried to pay the cabdriver the agreed fare from money he had given her as change, after retrieving from him the money she had paid him; scratched and bit the cabdriver in an effort to take money from him; and produced a knife while continuing to demand money. Considering the facts in the light most favorable to the People, the jury could have rationally concluded that defendant had no good faith belief that the bills she tried to take were hers, but was instead trying to take money she knew was another's. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction.

Verizon attached a box to a building that plaintiffs owned and used the box to transmit telephone communications to and from Verizon's customers in other buildings. Plaintiffs claimed that Verizon took their property without paying them just compensation and deceived them into believing that no compensation was owed. The court held that plaintiffs have stated a valid "inverse condemnation" claim for just compensation, and that the claim was not time-barred. However, their claim for an alleged violation of General Business Law 349 was barred by the statute of limitations, and their unjust enrichment claim was legally insufficient. The court also held that the courts below properly denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification.