Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, who worked as a teacher's assistant, was alleged to have sexually abused a four-year-old boy left in her care. Defendant was convicted of all counts charged and she subsequently appealed. At issue was the admissibility of expert testimony proffered on the issue of reliability of a confession. While in a proper case, expert testimony on the phenomenon of false confessions should be admitted, the expert here did not propose testimony relevant to this defendant or her interrogation. As a result, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he declined to hold a Frye hearing to assess whether any principles about which the expert proposed to testify were generally accepted in the scientific community, or to permit the expert to testify. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant, a former member of the New York City Police Department, was charged with twelve counts of perjury in the first degree. The charges arose after defendant falsely answered questions posed to him on cross-examination during the criminal trial of Erik Crespo. Defendant was found guilty of three counts of perjury in the first degree and one count of perjury in the third degree. The court granted the People and defendant leave to appeal. The court agreed with the Appellate Division that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the statement made by defendant that he never questioned Crespo was material to the Crespo trial. More specifically, it was relevant to the jury's determination on whether Crespo's statement to his mother was truly spontaneous and voluntary or whether it was triggered by police conduct that could reasonably have been anticipated to evoke such a statement. Defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to prove intent was not preserved for review and his further assertion that the statements were a result of a perjury trap was without merit. On defendant's appeal, the judgment was affirmed. The People's appeal should be dismissed upon the ground that the Appellate Division modification was not "on the law alone or upon the law and such facts which, but for the determination of law, would not have led to... modification."

Defendant was indicted for several crimes after he drove a pickup truck into a police officer, injuring her seriously. After defendant was convicted of second degree assault, defendant wanted the jury to consider one of the offenses for which defendant was indicted. The People argued that they have discretion to withdraw such a count, not a lesser included offense. The court held that a prosecutor did not have the unilateral power to dismiss a count of a grand jury indictment over a defendant's objection. Whether such a count should be dismissed at the prosecutor's request was an issue to be decided by the court in its discretion.

Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree. On appeal, defendant argued that the accusatory instrument charging him with that crime was jurisdictionally deficient because it failed to adequately allege that he was in a "public place" and that the marijuana was "open to public view" - two elements of the fifth degree possession offense. The court concluded that the allegations were jurisdictionally sufficient and affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner was on parole in January 2009 when he was arrested for arson in the third degree and related offenses stemming from two separate incidents involving the same victim. Petitioner subsequently commenced a CPLR 70 proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition was dismissed under CPL 520.10(2) where the judge concluded that the statute did not preclude a judge from setting a single form of bail. The Appellate Division affirmed. The court reversed and held that CPL 520.10(2)(b) prohibited a court from fixing only one form of bail.

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that there was a violation of CPL 310.20(2) and that harmless error analysis could not be applied. The court has held that it was reversible error, not subject to harmless error analysis, to provide a jury in a criminal case with a verdict sheet that contained annotations not authorized by CPL 310.20(2). The Legislature, responding to these decisions, amended the statute to expand what was permitted in the verdict sheet, but it left the basic principle unchanged: Nothing of substance could be included that the statute did not authorize. Because that rule was violated in this case, the court's previous holdings required that defendant's conviction be set aside.

Defendant was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree, two counts of robbery in the first degree, and robbery in the first degree. At issue was whether CPL 430.10 precluded the Appellate Division from remitting a case for resentencing after concluding that the trial court imposed unlawful consecutive sentences on two of the counts. The court held that, the Appellate Division, having found that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence, possessed the authority to remit the matter to the trial courts for resentencing. By choosing to remit this matter to Supreme Court, the Appellate Division left the determination of the proper resentence to the discretion of Supreme Court. The court also concluded that defendant's remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims were without merit where, viewing the record as a whole, defendant received meaningful representation.

The Helseths first learned of the underlying foreclosure action and a scheduled auction sale of the property at issue when they were informed by their real estate broker that potential buyers had inquired about the lot. As a result, they moved by order to show cause to stay the sale of the property but Supreme Court declined to sign a temporary restraining order, adjourning the matter to a date after the auction. Consequently, the Helseths appeared at the auction and submitted a winning bid, paying a deposit. However, they failed to remit the remaining balance and the County auctioned the property to another party. At issue was whether the County provided sufficient notice, in accord with constitutional due process, of the release option offered pursuant to Local Law No. 7 of County of Orange. The court concluded that the release option in this appeal was a discretionary, permissive remedy made available to the Helseths after the property was lawfully foreclosed and conveyance to the County did not establish or extend a property right entitled to due process protection as any property interests held by the Helseths were lawfully extinguished as of the expiration of their right to redemption and the entry of the judgment of foreclosure. Rather, the release was simply an option to repurchase property then-owned by the County. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and that branch of respondents' motion, which was to allow them to pay back taxes and interest due for a release with respect to the property, denied.

Defendant was convicted of driving while ability impaired after a motor vehicle stop. On appeal, defendant maintained that the trial court erred in permitting the People to introduce as proof of consciousness of guilt evidence that he refused to take a chemical breathalyzer test to determine his blood alcohol content when requested to do so by State Troopers. The court held that, since a reasonable motorist in defendant's position would not have understood that, unlike the prior encounters, the further request to speak to an attorney would be interpreted by the troopers as a binding refusal to submit to a chemical test, defendant was not adequately warned that his conduct would constitute refusal. Therefore, the evidence of that refusal was received in error at trial and the court reversed the conviction, remitting for a new trial.

Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree assault, second degree assault, and unlawful imprisonment for attacking his wife. At issue was whether defendant's identity was so conclusively established as to prevent the identity exception to the Molineux rule from being invoked. The court held that the identity was not so conclusively established as to render evidence of a prior crime inadmissible where defendant admitted that he was present at the time when the victim said the acts occurred, and did not accuse anyone else of committing them, but denied that he did what he was accused of doing. Therefore, the Appellate Division erred in holding defendant's identity to be "conclusively established" for Molineux purposes.