Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his convictions for health care fraud in the fourth degree and grand larceny in the third degree. The primary issue on appeal was the legal sufficiency of the evidence. The court held that defendant's convictions were supported by legally sufficient evidence where defendant knowingly and willfully provided materially false information to Medicaid. The court also held that defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

In 2007, defendant was indicted for charges related to the sexual assault of his step-granddaughter, Jane. When Jane was 19 years old, she informed police that she had been sexually assaulted by defendant on three occasions in 2002. When Jane was 14 years old, she underwent a medical examination that revealed she was 12 weeks pregnant, which she eventually claimed was a result of consensual, unprotected intercourse with a 14 year old boy in August 2002. At issue was whether the information that Jane disclosed to the police in 2002 was a "report" to the authorities that was sufficient to bar the availability of the tolling provision in CPL 30.10(3)(f) in connection with the indictment against defendant. The court held that the information Jane shared with the police in 2002 did not activate the statutes of limitations under CPL 30.10(3)(f) because she neither identified defendant as the perpetrator nor reported or revealed any of the sex offenses charged in the indictment. Under these facts, the statutes of limitations for the indicted sex crimes did not begin to run until Jane reached 18 years of age in January 2006. Therefore, the charged offenses were not time barred.

Defendant appealed his conviction of second-degree kidnapping, second-degree burglary, and other offenses against his former girlfriend. The court held that County Court abused its discretion as a matter of law when it denied defendant's for-cause challenge to a prospective juror who had personal and professional relationships with several of the witnesses expected to testify at defendant's trial. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and a new trial ordered.

Defendant plead guilty to first-degree rape in exchange for a promised determinate sentence of nine years imprisonment followed by five years of postrelease supervision. At issue was the enforceability of the appeal waiver. Applying the standard in People v. Lopez, the court held that the record failed to establish that defendant validly waived his right to appeal because the trial court failed to ensure that defendant grasped the minimal information pertaining to the appeal waiver it provided during the plea colloquy. The court agreed with the Appellate Division that testimony concerning complainant's identification of defendant in a lineup should have been suppressed since the People did not meet their burden in establishing probable cause for defendant's arrest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Appellate Division's reversal of the judgment of conviction and sentence.

Defendant was convicted of petit larceny. At issue on appeal was whether defendant's swipe of an unlimited MetroCard in return for a fee, although decidedly criminal in nature, constituted larceny. The court held that it did not where there was no basis upon which the petit larceny charge in the accusatory instrument could be upheld. Defendant was not prosecuted under, and the court did not address the applicability of, the theft of services statute.

Plaintiffs, a group of 50 taxpayers of the State of New York, commenced this declaratory judgment action against the State and other defendants, challenging numerous loans and grants issued by public defendants to private entity defendants and other private companies in order to stimulate economic development. At issue was plaintiffs' challenge to appropriations in the New York State 2008-2009 budget. The court held that it could find no constitutional infirmity to the challenged appropriations. Although some could question the wisdom of the policy choices, "the legislature has made a valid legislative judgment." Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed.

Defendant was convicted of robbery in the second degree and appealed the judgment of the conviction, arguing, among other things, that the evidence of the show-up identification of a co-defendant was inadmissible. The Appellate Division ruled that any error was harmless and affirmed Supreme Court's judgment. The court concluded that the victim's testimony concerning his identification of the co-defendant was probative of whether defendant had attacked the victim. This was because the victim's accuracy in identifying the person who, it turned out, had his cell phone was relevant to whether the conditions on the landing of a certain address were conducive to observing the other attacker and accurately identifying him at trial. Thus, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the material testimony or grant a mistrial.

The issue in this appeal was whether the evidence adduced at trial was legally sufficient to establish that defendant acted "[w]ith intent to prevent" an emergency medical technician (EMT) "from performing a lawful duty" when he caused an EMT to suffer physical injury. As the uniformed EMT was climbing into the driver's side of an ambulance, defendant blindsided him with a blow to the head, threw him to the ground and pummeled him repeatedly about the face and head. The EMT and his partner on a two-person ambulance crew were about to drive away from the premises where they had just treated an injured woman. The court concluded that the People made out a prima facie case of intent by presenting evidence that defendant attacked someone he had reason to know was an EMT on duty at the time.

Defendants were accused of robbing a store and using a stun gun to incapacitate the store manager temporarily. The court agreed with the Appellate Division that the People failed to prove that the stun gun was a "dangerous instrument" as defined in the Penal Law, and that therefore, defendants' convictions for first degree robbery and fourth degree weapon possession could not stand. However, the court sustained defendants' convictions for second degree robbery.

Defendant was convicted of first degree robbery but acquitted of first degree burglary. On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the statutory definitions of the terms "deprive" and "appropriate" as they related to the meaning of larcenous intent. The court held that defendant's challenge to the jury charge was preserved. At trial, defendant's counsel expressed concern that the jury might not understand the meaning of the phrase "[a]ppropriated for himself and requested a particular charge as to intent with regard to that phrase, which the trial court rejected. The court found this to be sufficient to preserve the issue for review because the definition of the term went directly to the question of the permanency of the taking and the requisite intent. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and a new trial ordered.