Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Helseths first learned of the underlying foreclosure action and a scheduled auction sale of the property at issue when they were informed by their real estate broker that potential buyers had inquired about the lot. As a result, they moved by order to show cause to stay the sale of the property but Supreme Court declined to sign a temporary restraining order, adjourning the matter to a date after the auction. Consequently, the Helseths appeared at the auction and submitted a winning bid, paying a deposit. However, they failed to remit the remaining balance and the County auctioned the property to another party. At issue was whether the County provided sufficient notice, in accord with constitutional due process, of the release option offered pursuant to Local Law No. 7 of County of Orange. The court concluded that the release option in this appeal was a discretionary, permissive remedy made available to the Helseths after the property was lawfully foreclosed and conveyance to the County did not establish or extend a property right entitled to due process protection as any property interests held by the Helseths were lawfully extinguished as of the expiration of their right to redemption and the entry of the judgment of foreclosure. Rather, the release was simply an option to repurchase property then-owned by the County. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and that branch of respondents' motion, which was to allow them to pay back taxes and interest due for a release with respect to the property, denied.

Defendant was convicted of driving while ability impaired after a motor vehicle stop. On appeal, defendant maintained that the trial court erred in permitting the People to introduce as proof of consciousness of guilt evidence that he refused to take a chemical breathalyzer test to determine his blood alcohol content when requested to do so by State Troopers. The court held that, since a reasonable motorist in defendant's position would not have understood that, unlike the prior encounters, the further request to speak to an attorney would be interpreted by the troopers as a binding refusal to submit to a chemical test, defendant was not adequately warned that his conduct would constitute refusal. Therefore, the evidence of that refusal was received in error at trial and the court reversed the conviction, remitting for a new trial.

Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree assault, second degree assault, and unlawful imprisonment for attacking his wife. At issue was whether defendant's identity was so conclusively established as to prevent the identity exception to the Molineux rule from being invoked. The court held that the identity was not so conclusively established as to render evidence of a prior crime inadmissible where defendant admitted that he was present at the time when the victim said the acts occurred, and did not accuse anyone else of committing them, but denied that he did what he was accused of doing. Therefore, the Appellate Division erred in holding defendant's identity to be "conclusively established" for Molineux purposes.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree for strangling his roommate. The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant's uncharged murder to rebut defendant's extreme emotional disturbance defense concerning the murder for which he was on trial. The court held that the evidence was properly admitted where defendant put his state of mind in issue and evidence of other uncharged crimes or prior bad acts could be admitted to rebut such fact. Additionally, the court rejected defendant's claim that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. Further, defendant's claim, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, that he did not authorize defense counsel to raise the extreme emotional disturbance defense involved matters which were dehors the record, and is therefore not reviewable by the court.

The Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 permitted resentencing for persons in the custody of the Department of Corrections who were serving an indeterminate sentence with a maximum term of more than three years for a Penal Law article 220 class B felony that was committed before January 13, 2005. Defendant Steward moved for resentencing on his March 2004 convictions for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third and fourth degrees. Defendant Wright sought resentencing on his May 2005 conviction for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. The trial courts in Steward and Wright concluded that neither defendant was eligible for resentencing because each had been convicted of an "exclusion offense" as defined by CPL 440.46(5)(a)(i). The Appellate Division affirmed in each appeal, holding that the reference to "'predicate felony conviction' does not require that the defendant be so adjudicated." The court affirmed, holding that defendants had predicate felony convictions for an "exclusion offense."

Under the Drug Law Resentencing Act of 2009 (DLRA-3), certain defendants serving indeterminate sentences imposed pursuant to the now repealed Rockefeller Drug Laws for class B drug felonies, may apply for resentencing. Defendant applied for resentencing pursuant to the then recently enacted DLRA-3. The focus of this appeal was upon one threshold condition of eligibility for relief under DLRA-3, namely, that the applicant for resentencing not have committed what was referred to in subsection 5 of CPL 440.46 as an "exclusion offense." The court agreed with the Appellate Division's holding that the critical 10-year "look-back" period should extend from the date of the resentence application and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree. At issue was whether Supreme Court abused its discretion by denying defendant's request for the substitution of assigned counsel and a Sandoval ruling which permitted the prosecutor to refer to defendant's prior drug-related felony convictions by naming the specific crimes, should he choose to testify. The court held that, pursuant to People v Hayes, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion where, although the concerns of Sandoval still existed and could have been implicated in this case, the lower court weighed appropriate concerns and limited the scope of cross-examination.

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and second degree murder. The principal issues on appeal where whether courtroom seating arrangements wherein court officers stationed themselves directly behind defendant during the course of his trial deprived him of his constitutional right to communicate confidentially with his attorney and prejudicially conveyed to the jury that he was dangerous, whether Supreme Court abused its discretion when it permitted the People under Molineux to introduce certain evidence of defendant's uncharged crimes, and whether the People's evidence elicited at trial exceeded the scope of such ruling. The court concluded that the positioning of the court officers in the case did not infringe upon defendant's constitutional right to counsel or deprive him of a fair trial and defendant's claim as to this issue was without merit. The court also held that Supreme Court exercised its sound discretion in permitting testimony about limited incidents of defendant's uncharged crimes leading to the shootings and the People adhered to the scope of the trial court's Molineux ruling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his convictions for health care fraud in the fourth degree and grand larceny in the third degree. The primary issue on appeal was the legal sufficiency of the evidence. The court held that defendant's convictions were supported by legally sufficient evidence where defendant knowingly and willfully provided materially false information to Medicaid. The court also held that defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

In 2007, defendant was indicted for charges related to the sexual assault of his step-granddaughter, Jane. When Jane was 19 years old, she informed police that she had been sexually assaulted by defendant on three occasions in 2002. When Jane was 14 years old, she underwent a medical examination that revealed she was 12 weeks pregnant, which she eventually claimed was a result of consensual, unprotected intercourse with a 14 year old boy in August 2002. At issue was whether the information that Jane disclosed to the police in 2002 was a "report" to the authorities that was sufficient to bar the availability of the tolling provision in CPL 30.10(3)(f) in connection with the indictment against defendant. The court held that the information Jane shared with the police in 2002 did not activate the statutes of limitations under CPL 30.10(3)(f) because she neither identified defendant as the perpetrator nor reported or revealed any of the sex offenses charged in the indictment. Under these facts, the statutes of limitations for the indicted sex crimes did not begin to run until Jane reached 18 years of age in January 2006. Therefore, the charged offenses were not time barred.