Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a group of 50 taxpayers of the State of New York, commenced this declaratory judgment action against the State and other defendants, challenging numerous loans and grants issued by public defendants to private entity defendants and other private companies in order to stimulate economic development. At issue was plaintiffs' challenge to appropriations in the New York State 2008-2009 budget. The court held that it could find no constitutional infirmity to the challenged appropriations. Although some could question the wisdom of the policy choices, "the legislature has made a valid legislative judgment." Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed.

Defendant was convicted of robbery in the second degree and appealed the judgment of the conviction, arguing, among other things, that the evidence of the show-up identification of a co-defendant was inadmissible. The Appellate Division ruled that any error was harmless and affirmed Supreme Court's judgment. The court concluded that the victim's testimony concerning his identification of the co-defendant was probative of whether defendant had attacked the victim. This was because the victim's accuracy in identifying the person who, it turned out, had his cell phone was relevant to whether the conditions on the landing of a certain address were conducive to observing the other attacker and accurately identifying him at trial. Thus, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the material testimony or grant a mistrial.

The issue in this appeal was whether the evidence adduced at trial was legally sufficient to establish that defendant acted "[w]ith intent to prevent" an emergency medical technician (EMT) "from performing a lawful duty" when he caused an EMT to suffer physical injury. As the uniformed EMT was climbing into the driver's side of an ambulance, defendant blindsided him with a blow to the head, threw him to the ground and pummeled him repeatedly about the face and head. The EMT and his partner on a two-person ambulance crew were about to drive away from the premises where they had just treated an injured woman. The court concluded that the People made out a prima facie case of intent by presenting evidence that defendant attacked someone he had reason to know was an EMT on duty at the time.

Defendants were accused of robbing a store and using a stun gun to incapacitate the store manager temporarily. The court agreed with the Appellate Division that the People failed to prove that the stun gun was a "dangerous instrument" as defined in the Penal Law, and that therefore, defendants' convictions for first degree robbery and fourth degree weapon possession could not stand. However, the court sustained defendants' convictions for second degree robbery.

Defendant was convicted of first degree robbery but acquitted of first degree burglary. On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the statutory definitions of the terms "deprive" and "appropriate" as they related to the meaning of larcenous intent. The court held that defendant's challenge to the jury charge was preserved. At trial, defendant's counsel expressed concern that the jury might not understand the meaning of the phrase "[a]ppropriated for himself and requested a particular charge as to intent with regard to that phrase, which the trial court rejected. The court found this to be sufficient to preserve the issue for review because the definition of the term went directly to the question of the permanency of the taking and the requisite intent. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and a new trial ordered.

Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery, third-degree weapon possession, and second-degree menacing. On appeal, defendant contended that the People's proof was legally insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under People v. Ledwon. The court held that the limited rule of Ledwon did not govern on these facts and the proof at trial was sufficient to support defendant's conviction despite the evidentiary discrepancies. Nevertheless, an unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedure entitled defendant to a new trial preceded by an independent source hearing.

Petitioners brought these Article 78 proceedings to challenge, among other things, their placement on involuntary leave without having been provided a hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law 72. At issue was whether Civil Service Law 72, which provided certain procedural safeguards to a public employee when placed on an involuntary leave of absence, applied to employees who were prevented from returning to work following a voluntary absence. The court held that it did and the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and the judgment of Supreme Court reinstated.

Defendant was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse and endangering the welfare of a child. At issue was whether Supreme Court abused its discretion when it dismissed a hearing-impaired prospective juror for cause. The court held that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by granting the cause challenge to venire member 1405 because the record supported the determination that his hearing impairment would have unduly interfered with his ability to be a trial juror. Defendant's remaining contentions did not require reversal. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed.

Defendant was indicted on one count of first-degree robbery and on one count of grand larceny in the fourth degree. At issue was whether defendant's written statement threatening to shoot a robbery victim with a gun constituted legally sufficient evidence that he was in actual possession of a dangerous instrument at the time of the crime to support the charge of robbery in the first degree. The court held that a defendant's statement that he was in possession of a dangerous instrument, standing alone, did not supply sufficient proof to establish actual possession of a dangerous instrument at the time of the crime to support the charge of first-degree robbery. The court held that this type of statement - whether in the form of a verbal threat or a handwritten note - not only established the threat of physical force necessary to support the charge of third-degree robbery. Accordingly, the People must furnish additional proof, separate and apart from a defendant's statement, that would permit a rational fact finder to infer that a defendant was in actual possession of a dangerous instrument.

The common question in these appeals was whether the courts fulfilled their responsibility to make a "searching inquiry" before allowing defendants to give up the right to a lawyer and conduct their defenses pro se. The court held that, in both cases, the inquiries were deficient because defendants were not adequately advised of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.