Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent, a resident of Southold, but not a resident of Fishers Island, filed with the Suffolk County Board of Elections a petition designating himself a candidate in the September 2009 primary election. Petitioners filed objections to the designated petition, alleging that it was invalid because respondent did not meet a residency requirement. At issue was the constitutionality of the residency requirement for the elected position of town justice/town board member, Fishers Island, Town of Southold, Suffolk County. The court held that the residency requirement did not violate the equal protection clause and that the residency requirement passed the rational basis test where the residency requirement imposed only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the right to vote; where any Southold resident who would otherwise be eligible to run for political office could run for the Fishers Island seat; where the residency requirement affected the right to vote, but only in an incidental way; and where the legislative history of the residency requirement articulated several rational bases for the residency requirement and retaining the dual town justice/town board member seat.

Respondent, a designee of the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, petitioned for an order under Mental Health Hygiene Law 9.60 requiring assisted outpatient treatment ("AOT") for Miguel M. At issue was whether the Privacy Rule adopted by the federal government pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), 42 U.S.C. 1320d-2, prohibited respondent from disclosing, at the petition hearing, records from two hospitals related to three occasions on which Miguel was hospitalized. The court held that the Privacy Rule prohibited the disclosure of a patient's medical records to a state agency that requested them for use in a proceeding to compel the patient to accept mental health treatment where the patient had neither authorized the disclosure nor received notice of the agency's request for the records. Accordingly, the medical records at issue were not admissible in a proceeding to compel AOT.

Defendant was convicted for unauthorized use of a vehicle in the second degree, criminal mischief in the third degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, and possession of burglar's tools. At issue was whether defendant's conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle in the second degree was supported by legally sufficient evidence. The court held that the evidence adduced at trial was legally sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction where a rational jury could have found that defendant broke into the vehicle at issue by "popping" out the driver's side door lock, entered the car without consent, unscrewed and ripped apart the driver's side dashboard, and stole the vehicle's light control module; and where defendant's unauthorized entry coupled with multiple acts of vandalism and the theft of a part unquestionably interfered with the owner's possession and use of the vehicle.

Defendant was convicted of second degree assault and weapon possession where he was involved in a fight at a movie theater. At issue was whether the failure of the police to interview witnesses after overhearing two potentially exculpatory statements constituted a Brady v. Maryland violation. Also at issue was whether defendant was improperly precluded during cross-examination from challenging the adequacy of the police investigation. The court declined to impose an affirmative obligation upon the police to obtain exculpatory information for criminal defendants and held that the failure to investigate the sources of the two statements was not a Brady violation. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting the use of hearsay statements and precluding defendant from challenging the adequacy and thoroughness of the police investigation where the probative force of the proposed evidence was outweighed by the dangers of speculation, confusion, and prejudice.

Defendant was charged with crimes related to the criminal possession of a controlled substance, criminal possession of a weapon, and criminal possession of marijuana. After a Sandoval hearing and just prior to the commencement of voir dire, the court directed defendant's father to leave the court room due to unavailable seating. At issue was whether defendant's right to a public trial was violated when the trial judge sua sponte closed the court room, specifically ejecting defendant's father during voir dire without considering any alternative accommodations. The court held that such an action violated defendant's right to a public trial where the ability of the public to observe questioning of this sort was important and warranted reversal of defendant's conviction.

Defendant applied to the Appellate Division for a writ of coram nobis claiming that appellate counsel's representation was deficient because he did not fault defense counsel for failing to argue at his violation of parole ("VOP") hearing. At issue was whether the Appellate Division properly denied the application. The court held that there was no reason for appellate counsel to make an ineffective-assistance argument when counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise an issue of uncertain efficacy on the appeal where the arguments that defendant asserted trial counsel should have advanced at the VOP hearing were not so strong that "no reasonable defense lawyer could have found [them]...to be not worth raising."

Defendants appealed the denial of their motions to suppress a gravity knife found on each defendant in separate situations. In People v. Ernest Brannon, the arresting officer testified that he was able to see the hinged top of the knife and observed the outline of a pocketknife but was unable to testify that he suspected or believed that it was a gravity knife. In People v. Jose Fernandez, there was evidence on the record that supported the Appellate Division's conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed where the officer's attention was drawn to defendant who was standing ten to fifteen feet away because the officer saw the "head" of the knife that was sticking out of, and clipped to, defendant's pants pockets and based on his experience, gravity knives were commonly carried in a person's pocket, attached with a clip, with the "head" protruding. At issue was the level of knowledge a police officer must possess before he or she had reasonable suspicion to believe an individual possessed a gravity knife as opposed to other similar knives. The court held that the detaining officer must have reason to believe that the object observed was indeed a gravity knife, based on his or her experience and training and/or observable, identifiable characteristics of the knife. An individual may not be detained merely because he or she was seen in possession of an object that appeared to be a similar, but legal object, such as a pocketknife. Accordingly, the court reversed the Appellate Division in Brannon and granted his motion to suppress and dismissed the indictment. The court then affirmed the Appellate Division in Fernandez.

Several months into a criminal trial on charges related to alleged Medicaid fraud, the supreme court determined that the prosecution failed to meet their obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland. Having concluded that defendants could not receive a fair trial under the circumstances, the supreme court dismissed the indictments with prejudice. At issue was whether the prosecution lacked the statutory right to bring appeal from a dismissal of an indictment in response to a discovery violation. The court held that the prosecution had a right to appeal the dismissal of the indictments where CPL 240.70 did not provide an express grant of dismissal power. Accordingly, the court reversed and remitted to the appellate division for consideration of the merits of the appeal.

Defendant was charged with rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, and three counts of endangering the welfare of a child. At issue was whether the trial court erred in precluding evidence of the victim's sexual conduct around the time of the incident pursuant to New York's rape shield law and in disqualifying one juror and failing to discharge another. The court held that the county court appropriately accepted defendant's argument that evidence of the complainant's sexual conduct would be relevant to his defense if the prosecution introduced evidence of her bruising caused by sexual contact and attributed such evidence to him. The court concluded that such evidence would have been relevant to both charges of rape but the prosecutor decided not to offer evidence of bruising. The court also held that although the county court failed to make a probing inquiry regarding a sworn juror's ability to render an impartial verdict, its discharge was not error as such action was authorized by CPL 270.15(4) and that there was no error in refusing to disqualify a prospective juror due to a former professional relationship with the prosecutor where the relationship was distant in time and limited in nature.

Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated while his conditional license was in effect. At issue was whether the offense in section 1196(7)(f), regarding traffic infractions for conditional license-holders, and section 511, regarding the aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, of the Vehicle and Traffic Law may be prosecuted at the same time. The court held that a driver whose license had been revoked, but who had not received a conditional license and failed to comply with its conditions, may be prosecuted only for the traffic infraction of driving for a use not authorized by his license, not for the crime of driving while his license was revoked.