Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant’s vehicle was stopped by a firefighter for driving erratically. Defendant unexpectedly drove away from the scene but was soon encountered by police officers, who cited her for driving while impaired and driving while license revoked. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to driving while impaired. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress, claiming that firefighters do not have legal authority to conduct traffic stops. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order, finding that the firefighter’s actions constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant never challenged the actions of the arresting officers, she presented no legal basis for suppressing the evidence supporting her conviction. View "State v. Verkerk" on Justia Law

Through the Towing Ordinance and the Mobile Phone Ordinance the Town of Chapel Hill sought to regulate the business of towing vehicles parked in private lots and the use of mobile telephones while driving. Plaintiff, who operated a towing business within the town limits of Chapel Hill, sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate both ordinances, claiming that the Town lacked the authority to enact either ordinance. The trial court agreed with Plaintiff and entered a permanent injunction barring enforcement of both ordinances. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the Towing Ordinance covered a proper subject for regulation under the Town’s police power; and (2) Plaintiff was not entitled to challenge the Mobile Phone Ordinance because he had not been cited for a violation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the fee schedule and credit card fee provisions of the Towing Ordinance exceeded the Town’s authority, but the remainder of the Towing Ordinance was valid; and (2) the legislature’s comprehensive scheme regulating use of a mobile phone on streets and highways precluded the Town from doing so. View "King v. Town of Chapel Hill" on Justia Law

After visiting a county office building to pay his water bill, James Bynum fell while walking down the front steps. As a result, Bynum’s legs and right arm were paralyzed. Bynum and his wife filed a complaint against the County alleging that the County negligently failed to inspect, maintain, and repair a county office building. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of governmental immunity. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the County was entitled to summary judgment on the basis of governmental immunity because the County’s operation of the building was governmental in nature. View "Bynum v. Wilson Cnty" on Justia Law

By 2013, the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) had purchased several hundred properties for the construction of a highway project known as the Northern Beltway. In 2010, Plaintiffs filed a complaint and declaratory judgment against NCDOT, asserting claims for, inter alia, inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs also sought class certification for themselves and all others similarly situated whose property NCDOT was “obliged to purchase.” The proposed class included over 800 property owners within the Northern Beltway. The trial court denied NCDOT’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim of inverse condemnation but denied class certification. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals, holding (1) the courts below erred in analyzing the substantive merits of Plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim at the class certification stage; and (2) the court of appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification because the unique nature of property, coupled with the large number of diverse tracts involved in this litigation, would make individual issues predominate over common issues of law and fact in a trial on the merits. View "Beroth Oil Co. v. N.C. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of trafficking in opium by possession. During the trial, a laboratory report of the results of a chemical analysis of the contraband were admitted, over Defendant’s objection, without calling the testing chemist as a witness. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the State failed to establish that Defendant waived his confrontation rights because the record did not demonstrate that the State had provided a pretrial copy of the lab report to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Defendant failed properly to raise or preserve the issue regarding the State’s compliance with the statutory requirement that the State provide a copy of the lab report to a defendant before trial. Remanded. View "State v. Whittington" on Justia Law

Greensboro police officers recovered a firearm ten to twelve feet from a car in which Defendant, a convicted felon, was a passenger. Defendant was arrested and later confessed that the firearm belonged to him. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and possession of a firearm by a felon. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred by denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon because, pursuant to the corpus delicti rule, the State did not present corroborative evidence, independent of Defendant's confession, tending to show that the crime in question occurred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the State v. Parker articulation of the corpus delicti rule, the State was not required to submit alternative evidence proving Defendant's identity as the perpetrator beyond Defendant's confession, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient for the State to survive Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon. View "State v. Cox" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought a judicial determination that the 2011 legislative changes made to North Carolina's pre-kindergarten program failed to comply with the state's constitutional obligations recognized in Leandro v. State and Hoke County Board of Education v. State. After a hearing, the trial court found that some of the changes violated the State Constitution and mandating that the State not deny any eligible at-risk four-year-old admission to the North Carolina pre-kindergarten program. While the State's appeal was pending, the General Assembly amended the challenged statutory provisions. The court of appeals subsequently affirmed the trial court in part and dismissed the appeal in part. The Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeal as moot because the 2012 amendments constituted material and substantial changes to the provisions that the trial court found unconstitutional, and thus the questions originally in controversy between the parties were no longer at issue. View "Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, and Defendant thereafter admitted his habitual felon status. Defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of testimony by an expert in forensic chemistry regarding the results of a chemical analysis performed by another chemist violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. The court of appeals reversed and granted Defendant a new trial, concluding that the admission of the testimony was error. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if admission of the testimony was error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the testimony of an expert in forensic science as to her opinion that the substance found in Defendant's vehicle was cocaine based upon her independent analysis of testing performed by another analyst in her laboratory violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him was not violated in this case, where (1) the admission of the expert's opinion, from the expert's own analysis of the data, constituted the substantive evidence being prevented against Defendant, and Defendant was able to cross-examine the expert concerning all aspects of her testimony; and (2) even assuming the admission of the expert's opinion violated Defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause, the error was harmless. View "State v. Ortiz-Zape" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of several drug-related counts. The court of appeals vacated Defendant's convictions for two counts of conspiracy to sell or deliver cocaine and one count of sale or delivery of cocaine, holding that the trial court violated Defendant's Confrontation Clause rights by admitting into evidence lab reports through the testimony of a substitute analyst. The Supreme Court agreed that there was a Confrontation Clause violation where the testifying analyst did not give her own independent opinion, but rather gave "surrogate testimony" reciting the testing analysts' opinions. The Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals' decision that Defendant was entitled to a new trial for the sale or delivery charge; but (2) reversed the court of appeals' decision vacating Defendant's conspiracy convictions, as those convictions were not affected by the erroneous admission of the substitute analyst's testimony. View "State v. Craven" on Justia Law