Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine. The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that Defendant's Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the trial court permitted a State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) special agent to testify that the substance found on Defendant was cocaine based solely on her supervisor's notes and lab report. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's Confrontation Clause rights were not violated where (1) the SBI agent presented an independent opinion formed as a result of her own analysis, not surrogate testimony; (2) Defendant was able to conduct a cross-examination that exposed the weaknesses in the agent's testimony; and (3) the supervisor's lab notes were not admitted into evidence. View "State v. Brewington" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine and attaining a habitual felon status. The court of appeals reversed and awarded Defendant a new trial, holding that the testimony of a forensic scientist who stated her expert opinion that a substance was cocaine based upon her independent analysis of testing performed by another analyst in her labor violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant failed to preserve for appeal the issues he raised before the Court; and (2) even if Defendant had timely objected to the testimony at trial, he would not be entitled to a new trial because the trial court did not err in admitting the expert's opinion that the substance was cocaine, as the testimony did not violate Defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. View "State v. Brent" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for appropriate relief based upon newly discovered evidence, alleging that, after the trial, Defendant's father told a probation officer that the contraband belonged to him. The trial court set aside Defendant's convicted and ordered a new trial, concluding that the father's post-trial statement constituted newly discovered evidence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in concluding that due diligence was used to procure the father's testimony at the trial, and the information implicating the father was available to Defendant before his conviction. Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding Defendant had newly discovered evidence. View "State v. Rhodes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sold a parcel of land adjacent to a golf club to New South Properties (New South) for development as a residential community. New South hired Hunter Construction Group (Hunter) to prepare the parcel for construction. Hunter built erosion control structures and devices, including a silt collection basin. However, a dam Hunter constructed to form the silt collection basin ruptured, causing mud, water, and debris to flood the golf course. As a result of the damage to the golf course, Plaintiffs filed an action against New South, Apple Creek and Hunter, alleging negligence, nuisance, trespass, and violations of the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act (SPCA). The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the SPCA claim. Plaintiffs appealed and withdrew their appeal against all defendants except Hunter. The court of appeals affirmed. Without considering the merits of Plaintiffs' appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that because Hunter was never cited for a violation for section 113A-66 of the SPCA, Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring a civil action against Hunter pursuant to section 113A-66. View "Applewood Props., LLC v. New S. Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was driving a vehicle that stopped in the middle of the road and appeared to initiate a three-point turn by beginning to turn left and continuing onto the shoulder of the road. A highway patrol trooper testified that these actions caused him to suspect that the driver was attempting to avoid a checkpoint. The trooper stopped the vehicle and approached the vehicle, whereupon he detected the odor of alcohol on Defendant. The trooper subsequently charged Defendant with driving while impaired. The trial court concluded that the checkpoint was valid and that the trooper had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Defendant and therefore denied Defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant pled no contest to driving while impaired. The court of appeals reversed the denial of the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress and vacated the resulting judgment, holding the checkpoint to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Defendant's stopping in the middle of the roadway and turning away from a license checkpoint gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Defendant may have been violating the law. View "State v. Griffin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual offense based on insertion of male sex organ into the mouth of the alleged victim and first-degree sex offense based on insertion of the male sex organ into the anus of the alleged victim. The court of appeals (1) held that there was no error with respect to the first offense, and (2) held that the trial court's failure to give an instruction on the lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree sexual offense was plain error and granted a new trial with respect to the second offense. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment, holding that Defendant failed to show plain error under the standard set forth in State v. Lawrence. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

Defendant was named in two indictments and entered a negotiated plea in each. The trial judge found beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factor that Defendant took advantage of a position of trust, then sentenced Defendant in the aggravated range for the convictions on both indictments. Defendant appealed, arguing that he had stipulated to the aggravating factor in the earlier indictment only and that the trial court erred in imposing an aggravated sentence on the latter indictment because he had entered no stipulation in that case. The court of appeals vacated the sentence imposed on the latter indictment and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing on that indictment, finding that the transcript of plea was ambiguous. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant unambiguously stipulated to application of the aggravating factor for both indictments and that application of the aggravating factor for both indictments was supported beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence. View "State v. Khan" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were the City of Lumberton and four companies that ran promotional sweepstakes as part of their business plans. In 2010, the City amended its existing privilege license tax on businesses that utilized electronic machines to conduct sweepstakes. The prior tax for these companies was $12.50 per year. The new law made the minimum tax owed by these businesses $7,500. This change imposed a 59,900% minimum increase per business location. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding the new tax to be constitutional. Addressing the Just and Equitable Tax Clause of the North Carolina Constitution, the court of appeals affirmed, determining that the tax did not amount to a prohibition of the companies' businesses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City's privilege license tax violated the Just and Equitable Tax Clause as a matter of law, as the present tax transgressed the boundaries of permissible taxation. View "IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton" on Justia Law

Defendant, in his role as department head, wrote an annual review of Plaintiff, a tenured associate professor, in which Defendant concluded that Plaintiff did not meet the department's expectations and had engaged in disruptive behavior and conduct. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the superior court alleging that the annual review contained false and defamatory statements. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that sovereign immunity did not bar Plaintiff's claim because Plaintiff sought to sue Defendant in his individual capacity and that Defendant had published the review for the purposes of libel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff's claim was barred by sovereign immunity, as the complaint did not specify whether Plaintiff was suing Defendant in his individual or official capacity, and therefore, the Court must presume Defendant was being sued in only his official capacity. View "White v. Trew" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suits challenging the constitutionality of recently enacted redistricting plans and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent Defendants from conducting elections using the redistricting plans. Plaintiffs requested from Defendants a variety of communications concerning enactment of the redistricting plans. Defendants objected to the production of certain categories of documents based upon the attorney-client privilege, legislative privilege, or work-product doctrine. Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel production. A three-judge panel allowed the motion and also concluded that any documents prepared solely in connection with redistricting litigation remain confidential pursuant to the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the panel's conclusion of law that the General Assembly waived the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine for pre-enactment communications and documents pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 120-133; but (2) affirmed the panel's conclusion that the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply to relevant post-enactment communications and documents. View "Dickson v. Rucho" on Justia Law