Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was driving a vehicle that stopped in the middle of the road and appeared to initiate a three-point turn by beginning to turn left and continuing onto the shoulder of the road. A highway patrol trooper testified that these actions caused him to suspect that the driver was attempting to avoid a checkpoint. The trooper stopped the vehicle and approached the vehicle, whereupon he detected the odor of alcohol on Defendant. The trooper subsequently charged Defendant with driving while impaired. The trial court concluded that the checkpoint was valid and that the trooper had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Defendant and therefore denied Defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant pled no contest to driving while impaired. The court of appeals reversed the denial of the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress and vacated the resulting judgment, holding the checkpoint to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Defendant's stopping in the middle of the roadway and turning away from a license checkpoint gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Defendant may have been violating the law. View "State v. Griffin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual offense based on insertion of male sex organ into the mouth of the alleged victim and first-degree sex offense based on insertion of the male sex organ into the anus of the alleged victim. The court of appeals (1) held that there was no error with respect to the first offense, and (2) held that the trial court's failure to give an instruction on the lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree sexual offense was plain error and granted a new trial with respect to the second offense. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment, holding that Defendant failed to show plain error under the standard set forth in State v. Lawrence. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

Defendant was named in two indictments and entered a negotiated plea in each. The trial judge found beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factor that Defendant took advantage of a position of trust, then sentenced Defendant in the aggravated range for the convictions on both indictments. Defendant appealed, arguing that he had stipulated to the aggravating factor in the earlier indictment only and that the trial court erred in imposing an aggravated sentence on the latter indictment because he had entered no stipulation in that case. The court of appeals vacated the sentence imposed on the latter indictment and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing on that indictment, finding that the transcript of plea was ambiguous. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant unambiguously stipulated to application of the aggravating factor for both indictments and that application of the aggravating factor for both indictments was supported beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence. View "State v. Khan" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were the City of Lumberton and four companies that ran promotional sweepstakes as part of their business plans. In 2010, the City amended its existing privilege license tax on businesses that utilized electronic machines to conduct sweepstakes. The prior tax for these companies was $12.50 per year. The new law made the minimum tax owed by these businesses $7,500. This change imposed a 59,900% minimum increase per business location. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding the new tax to be constitutional. Addressing the Just and Equitable Tax Clause of the North Carolina Constitution, the court of appeals affirmed, determining that the tax did not amount to a prohibition of the companies' businesses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City's privilege license tax violated the Just and Equitable Tax Clause as a matter of law, as the present tax transgressed the boundaries of permissible taxation. View "IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton" on Justia Law

Defendant, in his role as department head, wrote an annual review of Plaintiff, a tenured associate professor, in which Defendant concluded that Plaintiff did not meet the department's expectations and had engaged in disruptive behavior and conduct. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the superior court alleging that the annual review contained false and defamatory statements. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that sovereign immunity did not bar Plaintiff's claim because Plaintiff sought to sue Defendant in his individual capacity and that Defendant had published the review for the purposes of libel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff's claim was barred by sovereign immunity, as the complaint did not specify whether Plaintiff was suing Defendant in his individual or official capacity, and therefore, the Court must presume Defendant was being sued in only his official capacity. View "White v. Trew" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suits challenging the constitutionality of recently enacted redistricting plans and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent Defendants from conducting elections using the redistricting plans. Plaintiffs requested from Defendants a variety of communications concerning enactment of the redistricting plans. Defendants objected to the production of certain categories of documents based upon the attorney-client privilege, legislative privilege, or work-product doctrine. Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel production. A three-judge panel allowed the motion and also concluded that any documents prepared solely in connection with redistricting litigation remain confidential pursuant to the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the panel's conclusion of law that the General Assembly waived the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine for pre-enactment communications and documents pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 120-133; but (2) affirmed the panel's conclusion that the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply to relevant post-enactment communications and documents. View "Dickson v. Rucho" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempting to traffic in cocaine by transportation and possession. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a search of the vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger, alleging that the stop was an illegal seizure. Specifically, Defendant argued that the law enforcement officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that the driver of the vehicle was engaging in illegal activity by operating a vehicle without a properly functioning brake light. The court of appeals reversed, holding that state law requires a motor vehicle to have only one brake light, and therefore, the traffic stop was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, although the officer was mistaken about the requirements of the motor vehicle laws, his mistake of law was objectively reasonable, and under the totality of the circumstances, there was an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of the vehicle in this case. View "State v. Heien" on Justia Law

In an effort to regulate gambling, the General Assembly passed N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-306.4, which bans the operation of electronic machines that conduct sweepstakes through the use of an "entertaining display" such as video poker or video bingo. Originally, Plaintiffs were companies that marketed and sold prepaid products. As a promotion, Plaintiffs developed electronic sweepstakes systems where participants were allowed to access a gamestation terminal that revealed the content of the sweepstakes entry using different displays that simulated various game themes. After the General Assembly enacted the current version of section 14-306.4, Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the statute under the First Amendment. The trial court concluded that the law was constitutional. The court of appeals majority concluded that the announcement of the sweepstakes result and the video games were protected speech and that the entire statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislation regulated conduct and not protected speech and was therefore constitutional. View "Hest Techs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Perdue" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. The State filed a notice of appeal seven days after the trial judge in open court orally granted Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress but three months before the trial judge issued his corresponding written order of suppression. The court of appeals sua sponte dismissed the State's appeal, finding that the State's notice of appeal was untimely pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 4. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' dismissal of the State's appeal, holding that, under Rule 4 and N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1448, the window for the filing of a written notice of appeal in a criminal case opens on the date of rendition of the judgment or order and closes fourteen days after entry of the judgment or order. View "State v. Oates" on Justia Law

Erik Williams drowned at a park owned by defendant county and operated by defendant county parks and recreation department. Williams' estate filed a claim against Defendants alleging negligence. Defendants made a limited motion for summary judgment, contending that Williams's allegations were barred by the doctrines of governmental and sovereign immunity. The trial court denied Defendants' limited motion, concluding that Defendants were not entitled to governmental immunity because they charged and collected a fee for the use of the park. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that because the decision of the court of appeals that Defendants were not entitled to governmental immunity turned predominantly upon the fact that the services Defendants provided could also be provided by nongovernmental entities, without consideration of a number of additional factors, the case must be vacated and remanded for additional proceedings.