Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The parties in this case were the City of Lumberton and four companies that ran promotional sweepstakes as part of their business plans. In 2010, the City amended its existing privilege license tax on businesses that utilized electronic machines to conduct sweepstakes. The prior tax for these companies was $12.50 per year. The new law made the minimum tax owed by these businesses $7,500. This change imposed a 59,900% minimum increase per business location. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding the new tax to be constitutional. Addressing the Just and Equitable Tax Clause of the North Carolina Constitution, the court of appeals affirmed, determining that the tax did not amount to a prohibition of the companies' businesses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City's privilege license tax violated the Just and Equitable Tax Clause as a matter of law, as the present tax transgressed the boundaries of permissible taxation. View "IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton" on Justia Law

Defendant, in his role as department head, wrote an annual review of Plaintiff, a tenured associate professor, in which Defendant concluded that Plaintiff did not meet the department's expectations and had engaged in disruptive behavior and conduct. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the superior court alleging that the annual review contained false and defamatory statements. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that sovereign immunity did not bar Plaintiff's claim because Plaintiff sought to sue Defendant in his individual capacity and that Defendant had published the review for the purposes of libel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff's claim was barred by sovereign immunity, as the complaint did not specify whether Plaintiff was suing Defendant in his individual or official capacity, and therefore, the Court must presume Defendant was being sued in only his official capacity. View "White v. Trew" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suits challenging the constitutionality of recently enacted redistricting plans and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent Defendants from conducting elections using the redistricting plans. Plaintiffs requested from Defendants a variety of communications concerning enactment of the redistricting plans. Defendants objected to the production of certain categories of documents based upon the attorney-client privilege, legislative privilege, or work-product doctrine. Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel production. A three-judge panel allowed the motion and also concluded that any documents prepared solely in connection with redistricting litigation remain confidential pursuant to the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the panel's conclusion of law that the General Assembly waived the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine for pre-enactment communications and documents pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 120-133; but (2) affirmed the panel's conclusion that the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply to relevant post-enactment communications and documents. View "Dickson v. Rucho" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempting to traffic in cocaine by transportation and possession. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a search of the vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger, alleging that the stop was an illegal seizure. Specifically, Defendant argued that the law enforcement officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that the driver of the vehicle was engaging in illegal activity by operating a vehicle without a properly functioning brake light. The court of appeals reversed, holding that state law requires a motor vehicle to have only one brake light, and therefore, the traffic stop was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, although the officer was mistaken about the requirements of the motor vehicle laws, his mistake of law was objectively reasonable, and under the totality of the circumstances, there was an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of the vehicle in this case. View "State v. Heien" on Justia Law

In an effort to regulate gambling, the General Assembly passed N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-306.4, which bans the operation of electronic machines that conduct sweepstakes through the use of an "entertaining display" such as video poker or video bingo. Originally, Plaintiffs were companies that marketed and sold prepaid products. As a promotion, Plaintiffs developed electronic sweepstakes systems where participants were allowed to access a gamestation terminal that revealed the content of the sweepstakes entry using different displays that simulated various game themes. After the General Assembly enacted the current version of section 14-306.4, Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the statute under the First Amendment. The trial court concluded that the law was constitutional. The court of appeals majority concluded that the announcement of the sweepstakes result and the video games were protected speech and that the entire statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislation regulated conduct and not protected speech and was therefore constitutional. View "Hest Techs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Perdue" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. The State filed a notice of appeal seven days after the trial judge in open court orally granted Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress but three months before the trial judge issued his corresponding written order of suppression. The court of appeals sua sponte dismissed the State's appeal, finding that the State's notice of appeal was untimely pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 4. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' dismissal of the State's appeal, holding that, under Rule 4 and N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1448, the window for the filing of a written notice of appeal in a criminal case opens on the date of rendition of the judgment or order and closes fourteen days after entry of the judgment or order. View "State v. Oates" on Justia Law

Erik Williams drowned at a park owned by defendant county and operated by defendant county parks and recreation department. Williams' estate filed a claim against Defendants alleging negligence. Defendants made a limited motion for summary judgment, contending that Williams's allegations were barred by the doctrines of governmental and sovereign immunity. The trial court denied Defendants' limited motion, concluding that Defendants were not entitled to governmental immunity because they charged and collected a fee for the use of the park. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that because the decision of the court of appeals that Defendants were not entitled to governmental immunity turned predominantly upon the fact that the services Defendants provided could also be provided by nongovernmental entities, without consideration of a number of additional factors, the case must be vacated and remanded for additional proceedings.

This appeal considered whether defendant County had the authority pursuant to its general zoning powers or, in the alternative, a 2004 law enacted by the General Assembly, to adopt an adequate public facilities ordinance (APFO) that effectively conditioned approval of new residential construction projects on developers paying a fee to subsidize new school construction to prevent overcrowding in the County's public schools. The trial court concluded that the County did not have the authority to enact its APFO pursuant to North Carolina's general zoning or subdivision statutes. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the County did not have the statutory authority to adopt its APFO, and N.C. Sess. Laws 2004-39 did not authorize enactment of the APFO.

Defendant reserved her right to appeal from the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress and then pleaded guilty to one count of trafficking in marijuana by possession. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant's challenges to the trial court's findings of fact were either without merit or inconsequential and that law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion to extend a detention of Defendant's vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, the law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop; and (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree sexual offense with a child under the age of thirteen and two counts of first-degree statutory rape of a child under the age of thirteen. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court committed plain error when it admitted conclusory expert testimony on whether the juvenile victim had been sexually abused, as it was "highly plausible" that the jury would have reached a different result absent the expert testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals as modified, holding (1) the admission of the testimony was plain error; but (2) the plain error standard requires a determination that the jury "probably would have" returned a different result. Remanded for a new trial.