Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal considered whether defendant County had the authority pursuant to its general zoning powers or, in the alternative, a 2004 law enacted by the General Assembly, to adopt an adequate public facilities ordinance (APFO) that effectively conditioned approval of new residential construction projects on developers paying a fee to subsidize new school construction to prevent overcrowding in the County's public schools. The trial court concluded that the County did not have the authority to enact its APFO pursuant to North Carolina's general zoning or subdivision statutes. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the County did not have the statutory authority to adopt its APFO, and N.C. Sess. Laws 2004-39 did not authorize enactment of the APFO.

Defendant reserved her right to appeal from the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress and then pleaded guilty to one count of trafficking in marijuana by possession. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant's challenges to the trial court's findings of fact were either without merit or inconsequential and that law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion to extend a detention of Defendant's vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, the law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop; and (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree sexual offense with a child under the age of thirteen and two counts of first-degree statutory rape of a child under the age of thirteen. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court committed plain error when it admitted conclusory expert testimony on whether the juvenile victim had been sexually abused, as it was "highly plausible" that the jury would have reached a different result absent the expert testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals as modified, holding (1) the admission of the testimony was plain error; but (2) the plain error standard requires a determination that the jury "probably would have" returned a different result. Remanded for a new trial.

Defendant was convicted of one count of rape of a child, two counts of first-degree statutory sexual offense, two counts of sexual offense with a child, and five counts of indecent liberties with a child. The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial for Defendant's two convictions for sexual offense with a child, holding that Defendant was prejudiced by a disjunctive jury instruction. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals erred in ordering a new trial for two of Defendant's sexual offense convictions based on fellatio, as the State satisfied the corpus delicti rule by presenting evidence of the trustworthiness of Defendant's confession to the incidents of fellatio.

After Defendant appealed his district court conviction for driving while impaired, the superior court granted Defendant's motion to suppress based upon its conclusion that there was not probable cause to stop Defendant's vehicle because of the contradictory testimony of the arresting officers and the allegations contained in Defendant's affidavit. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the superior court erred by applying the probable cause standard instead of the reasonable suspicion standard to determine the validity of Defendant's traffic stop. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the superior court did not apply the correct legal standard and failed to make findings of fact sufficient to allow a reviewing court to apply the correct legal standard. Remanded.

Defendant pleaded guilty to driving while impaired, reserving her right to appeal. Defendant subsequently appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained from the stop of her vehicle. The court of appeals reversed, holding that one of the trial court's findings of fact was not supported by the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in finding that one of the trial court's findings of fact was not supported by the evidence; but (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress because there was reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of committing a misdemeanor sexual battery. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court committed plain error by admitting testimony referring to Defendant's post-Miranda exercise of his right to remain silent. The court of appeals (1) affirmed the trial court's determination of guilt, concluding that the admission of the statements was not plain error; but (2) vacated the trial court's order requiring that Defendant register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the admission of the post-Miranda testimony was error; but (2) this error did not amount to plain error.

Defendant was indicted for first degree rape. Four years later, he was indicted for additional charges of felony child abuse by committing a sexual act on a child, incest, and indecent liberties with a child. The victim in this case was Defendant's daughter, who experienced a "flashback" to the alleged events and reported the allegedly repressed memory to her therapist. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to suppress expert testimony regarding the repressed memory, concluding that even though evidence of repressed memory was relevant, the evidence must be excluded because its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals' determination that the trial court properly granted Defendant's motion; but (2) disavowed the portion of the opinion that, relying on an earlier opinion of that court, required expert testimony always to accompany the testimony of a lay witness in cases involving allegedly recovered memories. Remanded.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm by a felon and trafficking in cocaine by possession. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the charges. Defendant contended that the State's evidence was insufficient to support the charges and therefore the charges should not have been submitted to the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to reach a reasonable inference that Defendant constructively possessed the cocaine and rifle at issue, and therefore, the motion to dismiss was properly denied.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of indecent liberties with a child and first-degree sexual offense. At issue on appeal was whether evidence of prior acts was properly admitted against Defendant under N.C. R. Evid. 404(b). The court of appeals reversed the convictions, determining that the evidence was not sufficiently similar to the alleged crimes to be admitted under Rule 404(b). The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, concluding that the trial court, after carefully evaluating the evidence, correctly ruled that the prior acts had sufficient similarity and temporal proximity to those alleged in the charged crimes. Remanded.