Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The driver and passenger of an automobile were killed when the condition of a state-maintained road caused the vehicle to veer off the roadway. The driver lost control of the car and struck an oncoming automobile head-on. Plaintiffs, the estates of the decedents, sued DOT for negligence under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA). The Industrial Commission determined that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the public duty doctrine and granted DOT's motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the public duty doctrine did not bar Plaintiffs' claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the limitation placed on the use of the public duty doctrine by the General Assembly's 2008 amendment to the STCA applied in this case; and (2) consequently, the doctrine did not bar Plaintiffs' claims.

Defendant Paul Lewis was convicted of first-degree sexual offense, felonious breaking or entering, and robbery with a dangerous weapon. The court of appeals affirmed. Thereafter, Defendant discovered information previously unknown to him relating to his trial. Defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), alleging that his trial had been tainted because of improper communication between the investigating detective and a juror. The trial court denied Defendant's MAR, but the court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial. On retrial, Defendant was once more convicted of all charges. The court of appeals again reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the charges against Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the retrial court erred in limiting Defendant's ability to examine before a jury the State's lead investigator about the investigator's possible bias and about instances of purported misconduct by the investigator during Defendant's first trial. Remanded for a new trial.

Defendant was charged with resisting a public officer, felony possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, and attaining habitual felon status. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the resisting charge and a motion to suppress all evidence seized during the search incident to arrest. At a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the motions, the trial court granted both of Defendant's motions. Immediately thereafter, the State announced to the court that it would be unable to proceed with the case in chief on the remaining charges. As a result, the other charges were dismissed. The State appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that the prosecutor's statements to the trial court amounted to a dismissal in open court under N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-931. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals to the extent it could be read as affirming to the trial court's dismissal of charges on its own motion, holding (1) the prosecutor's statements did not amount to a dismissal in open court, and (2) the trial court had no authority to enter an order dismissing the case on its own motion. Remanded for consideration of the State's argument pertaining to the motion to suppress.

On July 29, 1994, Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The date of the offense was August 25, 1993. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison pursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA). The General Assembly enacted the Structured Sentencing Act (SSA) to supercede the FSA for offenses committed on or after the SSA's effective date, October 1, 1994. In contrast to the FSA, the SSA imposed shorter terms of imprisonment for second-degree murder. On March 28, 2011, Defendant filed an amended motion for appropriate relief requesting modification of his sentence under the SSA. The superior court ordered that Defendant's life sentence be modified to a term of 157 to 198 months under the SSA. The Supreme Court vacated the order and judgment of the trial court, holding (1) Defendant's offense was controlled exclusively by the FSA; and (2) the superior court violated a clear and unambiguous statute by modifying Defendant's sentence in accordance with the SSA. Remanded.

Defendant was convicted of second-degree sexual offense and crime against nature based on the victim's age and inability to consent due to a mental disability. The court of appeals reversed and vacated Defendant's convictions, holding that expert testimony was necessary to establish whether the victim had the requisite mental capacity to consent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the State was not required to use expert testimony pursuant to N.C. R. Evid. 702 to establish the extent of the victim's mental capacity to consent to sexual acts under the circumstances of this case; and (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to withstand Defendant's motions to dismiss.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted for trafficking in cocaine by possession, trafficking in cocaine by transportation, possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine, and carrying a concealed gun. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle during a search that was conducted only after officers had arrested him for carrying a concealed gun and placed him in a police car. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that it was not reasonable for the arresting officers to believe Defendant's vehicle contained evidence of the offense of carrying a concealed weapon. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals with instructions to reinstate the trial court's decision, holding that the search of Defendant's vehicle was constitutionally permissible under Arizona v. Gant, and the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion for relief.

After a jury trial, Defendant Thomas Starr was convicted of four counts of assaulting a firefighter with a firearm. Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to follow the procedures of N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1233 when it denied the jury's request to review the testimony of one of the firefighters involved in the incident. The court of appeals held that because the trial court instructed the jurors to rely on their recollection of the evidence, the court properly exercised its discretion in denying the jury's request. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) the trial court in this instance violated section 15A-1233 by failing to exercise its discretion, and the error was preserved by operation of law for appellate review; but (2) Defendant did not carry his burden of proving that the error was prejudicial.

Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine and sale of cocaine and pled guilty to habitual felon status. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss and vacated Defendant's convictions, concluding that in the absence of expert testimony as to the chemical analysis of the substance, the evidence was insufficient to prove an essential element of the crime, namely, that the substance was a controlled substance. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the testimony of Defendant's witness, which identified the substance as cocaine, provided evidence of a controlled substance sufficient to withstand Defendant's motion to dismiss.

After a Davidson College campus police officer stopped Defendant Julie Yencer's vehicle, the officer arrested Defendant for driving while impaired (DWI) and reckless driving. Defendant pled guilty to DWI but reserved her right to appeal the circuit court's denial of her motion to suppress. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that two state court decisions compelled the conclusion that Davidson College was a religious institution for purposes of the Establishment Clause and that the Campus Police Act, which gave the officer authority to arrest Defendant, granted an unconstitutional delegation of discretionary power to a religious institution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Campus Police Act's provision of secular, neutral, and nonideological police protection for the benefit of the students and faculty of Davidson College, as applied to Defendant's conviction, did not offend the Establishment Clause; and (2) Defendant failed to demonstrate that her arrest and conviction for DWI were influenced by any consideration other than secular enforcement of a criminal statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-138.1.

A jury found Defendant Nakia Nickerson guilty of felonious possession of stolen goods. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, contending that it was a lesser-included offense of the crime of possession of stolen goods. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is a lesser-included offense of possession of stolen goods, and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle requires proof of at least one essential element not required to prove possession of stolen goods, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle cannot be a lesser-included offense of possession of stolen goods; and (2) as such, Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.