Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court awarding Plaintiffs compensation for a taking of various portions of their property with pre-judgment interest, holding that the portion of the trial court's order concerning the proper evaluation of the pre-judgment interest rate was contrary to this Court's precedents.In 1987, the General Assembly adopted the Roadway Corridor Official Map Act. In 1992 and 2006, portions of Plaintiffs' property were designated as within a roadway corridor pursuant to that statute. Plaintiffs filed an inverse condemnation complaint against the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) seeking compensation for the taking. Final judgment was issued awarding Plaintiffs $137,247 for the 1992 taking and $6,139 for the 2006 taking, both with pre-judgment interest at eight percent compounded annually. NCDOT appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err in proceeding to trial on the inverse condemnation complaint; (2) any error in the court's characterization of the taking was harmless; (3) the court's treatment of the reduced property taxes was proper; but (4) the trial court erred concerning the proper evaluation of the pre-judgment interest rate. View "Chappell v. N.C. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction, holding that the trial court clearly erred in ruling that Defendant failed to prove purposeful discrimination with respect to the State's use of peremptory challenges to strike three jurors without considering all of the evidence presented by Defendant.Defendant was found guilty of one count of first-degree murder and other crimes. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to grant three objections that he made under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in its analysis of Defendant's Batson claims with respect to the three jurors; and (2) as to all three jurors, remand was required for reconsideration of whether Defendant proved purposeful discrimination in each case. View "State v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, holding that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the law enforcement officer's stop when Defendant signaled with his middle finger from the passenger side window of a moving vehicle.While assisting a stranded motorist, the officer turned his attention to another car traveling on the roadway, a white SUV. Defendant had his arm outside the passenger window and gestured with his middle finger, making an up-and-down motion. Believing that Defendant was committing the crime of disorderly conduct, the officer pursued and then stopped the SUV. At trial, Defendant moved to suppress the officer's testimony, arguing that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant pleaded guilty to resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the specific, articulable facts did not establish reasonable suspicion of the crime of disorderly conduct. View "State v. Ellis" on Justia Law

In this complaint seeking to have the Attorney General preliminarily and permanently enjoined from distributing monies received pursuant to an agreement between the Attorney General and Smithfield Foods, Inc. and several of its subsidiaries regarding the operation of hog farms to any recipient other than the Civil Penalty and Forfeiture Fund, the Supreme Court held that the payments contemplated by the agreement did not constitute penalties for purposes of N.C. Const. art. IX, 7.In their complaint, Plaintiffs argued that payments made pursuant to the agreement constituted penalties under article IX, section 7 and that the Attorney General lacked the authority to enter into the agreement. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Attorney General, concluding that even if Smithfield and its subsidiaries had entered into the agreement in hope of avoiding future penalties, the payments made under the agreement were not penalties, forfeitures or fines collected for any breach of the penal laws of the State. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed precluding summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the payments contemplated by the agreement did not constitute penalties for purposes of article IX, section 7. View "New Hanover County Board of Education v. Stein" on Justia Law

In this business case, the Supreme Court reversed the orders of the business court denying Plaintiffs' motion for default judgment based on its finding that Plaintiffs had failed to satisfy their burden of proving that the court possessed personal jurisdiction over Defendant, a nonresident company, holding that Defendant's contacts with North Carolina were sufficient to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it in North Carolina state courts.In the complaint, Plaintiffs sought an injunction, in part, directing Defendant to turn over certain documents and information necessary for Plaintiffs to wind up the affairs of a limited-liability limited partnership. A default was entered against Defendant, but the business court denied Plaintiffs' motion for default judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with this state such that a North Carolina court could constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over it. View "Beem USA Limited-Liability Limited Partnership v. Grax Consulting LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the trial court failed to satisfy the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1242 before allowing Defendant to proceed pro se, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that Defendant did not forfeit his right to counsel and that the trial court was therefore required to ensure that his waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.Defendant was charged with offenses related to his failure to maintain a valid driver's license. Defendant was first tried in the district court, where he was convicted. Defendant appealed to the superior court, where he was tried without counsel and convicted by a jury. On appeal, a majority of the court of appeals determined that Defendant did not engage in such serious misconduct as to warrant forfeiture of the right to counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was entitled to a new trial because the trial court violated his right to counsel under the federal and state Constitutions. View "State v. Simpkins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the superior court's judgment following Defendant's plea of guilty to trafficking in cocaine, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence discovered pursuant to an unlawful traffic stop.In his appeal, Defendant argued that his initial investigatory detention was not properly tailored to address a speeding violation and contended that the officer seized him without consent or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Therefore, Defendant argued, the officer unlawfully seized items from the vehicle during the ensuing search of the car and that those objects were the fruit of the poisonous tree. The court of appeals reversed the denial of the motion to suppress, concluding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle after the traffic stop had been completed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was obtained as a result of the officer's unlawful detainment of Defendant without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity after the lawful duration of the traffic stop had concluded. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder, holding that the court of appeals properly found that the identification procedures at issue in this case were impermissibly suggestive, but the identification procedures ultimately did not violate Defendant's statutory or due process rights.After a trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress the testimony of two eyewitnesses, including their in-court identifications of Defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the eyewitness testimony was the result of impermissibly suggestive identification procedures and that the testimony was prejudicial. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals properly found that the eyewitnesses were subjected to witness identification procedures that were impermissibly suggestive but erred in failing to rule that the identification was sufficiently of independent origin to negate a substantial likelihood of a misidentification. View "State v. Malone" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the omission of pertinent facts in an officer's search warrant application resulted in a lack of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant for either Defendant's residence or vehicle.The officer in this case possessed information that would suffice to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant but failed to include key portions of this information in his affidavit supporting the warrant. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that the affidavit sufficiently established probable cause to support the magistrate's issuance of a warrant authorizing a search of Defendant's residence and vehicle. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause to search the vehicle but was insufficient to establish probable cause to search the residence. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the motion to suppress should have been allowed as to evidence seized from both Defendant's residence and vehicle. View "State v. Lewis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing, but only as to Defendant individually, the superior court's determination that North Carolina's satellite-based monitoring (SBM) of sex offenders is constitutional, holding that the court of appeals erred by limiting its holding to the constitutionality of the SBM program as applied only to Defendant.Defendant was statutorily required to enroll in the SBM program and to wear an ankle monitor at all times for his lifetime based on his convictions for sex crimes. Defendant argued that the imposition of the monitoring violated his constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The trial court found that the SBM program was not unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court held that a State conducts a search when it attaches a device to a person's body, without consent, for the purpose of tracking that individual's movements. On remand, the superior court upheld the imposition of lifetime SBM on Defendant. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that lifetime SBM of Defendant was unreasonable. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed, holding that the program is unconstitutional as applied to all individuals who, like Defendant, are subject to mandatory lifetime SBM based solely on their status as a "recidivist." View "State v. Grady" on Justia Law