Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Senske Rentals, LLC, owns property in a subdivision affected by a City of Grand Forks improvement project to pave gravel roads and install street lighting. The city council approved a resolution creating a special assessment district for the project, and the City’s special assessment commission assigned benefits to the affected properties based on frontage, sideage, and square footage. Property owners were notified, and public input meetings were held. Despite protests from property owners, including Senske Rentals, the commission approved the special assessments.The district court of Grand Forks County affirmed the city council’s decision to approve the commission’s determination on the special assessments. Senske Rentals appealed, arguing that the commission failed to perform the required benefit analysis under North Dakota law and that the special assessment amounted to an unconstitutional taking. The district court denied Senske’s motions to strike certain documents from the record and to supplement the record, ultimately affirming the city council’s decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the City’s special assessment commission did not properly determine the benefits accruing to Senske’s property as required by N.D.C.C. § 40-23-07. The court held that the statute requires a determination of special benefits independent of, and without regard to, the cost of the improvement project. The court found that the City had conducted a cost allocation rather than an independent determination of benefit, which was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case to the City for a proper determination of special benefits to Senske’s lots, independent of the project’s cost, and to apply that special benefit as a limit on assessments to each of Senske’s lots. View "Senske Rentals v. City of Grand Forks" on Justia Law

Mark Rath and Heather Zins share a child, A.J.O., born in 2004. Zins was awarded primary residential responsibility, and Rath was ordered to pay child support. A.J.O. turned 18 in November 2022, ending Rath's ongoing support obligation, but he had accrued arrears. Rath was served with an order to show cause for civil contempt due to non-payment. After an evidentiary hearing, a judicial referee found Rath in contempt and ordered him to make monthly payments towards his arrears, with a suspended 20-day jail sentence contingent on a future hearing.Rath sought review by the District Court of Burleigh County, which adopted the judicial referee's findings. Rath appealed, arguing violations of his right to counsel, errors in child support calculations, and that the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act limits the State's ability to collect more than fifty percent of his income. He also claimed the defense of laches and third-party standing should prevent enforcement of his obligations.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case under a clearly erroneous standard. The court held that Rath's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated because the contempt hearing did not result in immediate incarceration, and procedural safeguards were followed. The court also found that Rath's child support obligation continued despite temporary custody by the division of juvenile services and that the doctrine of laches does not apply to child support arrearages. Additionally, the court ruled that the State and Zins have standing to collect arrears even after the child reached the age of majority, and the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act does not limit the State's collection efforts in this context. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Burleigh County Social Service Board v. Rath" on Justia Law

Thomas Zundel attempted to purchase a firearm but was denied due to a 1990 simple assault charge in Jamestown Municipal Court, which was flagged in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). The charge was noted as continued for a year pending counseling, with no conviction confirmed. Zundel's voluntary appeal to the FBI was denied because the final disposition of the case was missing. Zundel sought records from various agencies, but none had documentation beyond the initial arrest. He then petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to close the case and restore his constitutional rights.The Jamestown Municipal Court and other respondents argued that Zundel had an adequate remedy in federal court, referencing Ross v. Fed. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that a federal suit would not adequately address the state court records issue. The court emphasized the municipal court's duty to maintain accurate records and noted that the missing record should have been retained permanently according to administrative rules.The North Dakota Supreme Court granted the petition in part, ordering the Jamestown Municipal Court to conduct a diligent inquiry to locate or reconstruct the missing record and document the results. The court denied Zundel's requests for declaratory relief regarding the nature of the 1990 charge and his right to possess a firearm, citing a lack of evidence in the record to make such determinations. The court's decision underscores the importance of accurate court records for due process and public accountability. View "Zundel v. City of Jamestown" on Justia Law

Renae Gerszewski filed a petition for a disorderly conduct restraining order (DCRO) against Conrad Rostvet, leading to a temporary DCRO and a scheduled hearing. Rostvet responded by filing his own petitions for DCROs against Renae and Wayne Gerszewski. The cases were consolidated, and the hearing was delayed for nearly six months due to continuances. The dispute centered around the use of a road running from the highway past Rostvet’s property to the Gerszewskis’ property.The District Court of Walsh County, Northeast Judicial District, heard testimony about the ongoing conflict and issued an order granting Renae Gerszewski’s petition for a DCRO while denying Rostvet’s petitions. The court found that Rostvet’s actions, including stopping his vehicle to point at Renae, cultivating land near her, blocking the road, and pushing snow into the roadway, constituted disorderly conduct. Rostvet appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion and that his actions were constitutionally protected.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the DCRO to Renae Gerszewski, as there were reasonable grounds to believe that Rostvet engaged in disorderly conduct. The court also found no error in the district court’s denial of Rostvet’s petitions, as he failed to show that the Gerszewskis engaged in disorderly conduct. Additionally, the Supreme Court rejected Rostvet’s arguments regarding judicial notice of documents and the delay in the hearing, noting that these issues were not properly raised in the lower court. View "Rostvet v. Gerszewski" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Richard Dean Anderson, Jr., who was stopped by law enforcement for a broken tail light. During the stop, Anderson was questioned about his activities, to which he responded that he had been grocery shopping in West Fargo and was heading home to Hunter, a location more than 35 miles away. The officers found his story suspicious due to the late hour and the lack of visible groceries in the car. They conducted a background check, revealing Anderson's prior drug convictions. Based on this information, the officers called a K-9 unit, which detected drugs in Anderson's vehicle. Anderson was subsequently charged with possession of drug paraphernalia.Prior to his trial, Anderson moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, arguing that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to expand the traffic stop into a drug investigation. The district court denied his motion, and Anderson entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the officers did not expand the scope of the traffic stop until after they discovered Anderson's criminal history. Until that point, the officers were diligently pursuing the mission of the traffic stop. After learning of the drug convictions, the officers shifted their focus to a drug investigation. The court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop and start a new investigation based on the totality of the circumstances, including the late hour, Anderson's vague explanation for his travel, the lack of visible groceries in the car, Anderson's change in demeanor when questioned, and his prior drug convictions. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Richard Sargent, who was charged with 17 counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 17 counts of theft of a firearm, and one count of theft of $500-$1000. The charges were based on evidence obtained during a traffic stop, where law enforcement officers found firearms in a vehicle being towed by Sargent. The stop was initiated based on an anonymous tip and a traffic violation committed by Sargent. Sargent filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop and subsequent search were unlawful.The District Court of Williams County denied Sargent's motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that the traffic stop was valid due to a traffic violation committed by Sargent. It also ruled that the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop and call in a K-9 unit, based on Sargent's extreme nervousness, his criminal history, his probation status, and the inconsistencies in his travel plans. The court further held that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement allowed the officers to search the vehicle being towed by Sargent.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court agreed that the traffic stop was valid and that the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. It also held that the automobile exception permitted the officers to search the towed vehicle. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Sargent's motion to suppress evidence, thereby affirming the lower court's decision. View "State v. Sargent" on Justia Law

The case involves Howard Studhorse, who was charged with five counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of contributing to the deprivation or delinquency of minors. The charges were based on allegations involving three victims, identified as Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, and Jane Doe 3. After a jury trial, Studhorse was found guilty on all six charges. He appealed, raising several issues including the district court's application of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and potential violations of his right to remain silent and his protection against double jeopardy.Studhorse argued that the district court misapplied the North Dakota Rules of Evidence by allowing Jane Doe 3 to testify without taking an oath or affirmation to tell the truth. The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court's discussion with Jane Doe 3 impressed upon her the duty to tell the truth, which complied with the rules. Therefore, this was not an obvious error.Studhorse also claimed that the State improperly elicited testimony about his silence, implying his guilt. The court found that any error in this regard was harmless and did not require reversal of Studhorse's convictions.Studhorse further argued that he was convicted of non-cognizable offenses on counts IV and V because the jury instructions did not require that he touched the victims on "sexual or other intimate parts," as required by the statute. The court found that the lack of specificity in the jury instructions did not create a non-cognizable crime.Studhorse also claimed that his convictions on counts II and V violated his right against double jeopardy. The court found that the jury instructions for counts IV and V permitted a conviction for both counts on the basis of the same conduct, which was an obvious error. Therefore, the court reversed Studhorse's conviction on count V as duplicative to count IV.Finally, Studhorse argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of counts I and II. The court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove a sexual act in count I, and reversed Studhorse's conviction on that count. However, the court affirmed the conviction on count II. View "State v. Studhorse" on Justia Law

The case involves SCS Carbon Transport LLC ("Summit") and a group of landowners. Summit plans to construct an interstate pipeline to transport carbon dioxide to sequestration sites in North Dakota and four other states. To determine the appropriate pipeline route, Summit needs to access the landowners' properties. However, the landowners denied Summit permission to enter their lands. Consequently, Summit filed lawsuits against the landowners, seeking a court order confirming its right under North Dakota law to enter the lands to conduct pre-condemnation surveys and examinations. The landowners counterclaimed, arguing that the statute authorizing entry is unconstitutional.The district courts granted summary judgment to Summit, concluding that the statute does not constitute an unconstitutional per se taking, Summit is a common carrier authorized to exercise eminent domain, and the proposed surveys and examinations are the type of minimally invasive surveys and examinations allowed under the statute. The courts confirmed Summit's right to enter the lands to complete civil, environmental, and archaeological/cultural surveys and examinations, including any necessary geotechnical/soil borings, archaeological/cultural resource surveys and examinations, and including any necessary core or water sampling activities subject to any conditions.The landowners appealed the judgments and order granting summary judgment, arguing that the statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to them under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and article I, § 16 of the North Dakota Constitution.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court concluded that the landowners have not established a constitutional violation on the face of the entry statute or as applied to them, and the judgments and order do not exceed the scope of the entry statute. The court also found that the district court's judgment does not grant Summit an indefinite or perpetual right of access. The court held that a constitutionally permissible entry may not be longer or more invasive than necessary to complete the examination or survey needed to confirm and minimize the scope of the anticipated taking of private property. View "SCS Carbon Transport v. Malloy" on Justia Law

Michael Fuglesten was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor after a police officer entered his garage without a warrant. The officer had responded to a 911 call about a truck repeatedly driving by a house with loud music. The officer identified the truck as Fuglesten's, knew his license was suspended, and followed him to his home. The officer did not attempt a traffic stop or initiate his overhead lights. Upon reaching Fuglesten's home, the officer approached the garage on foot and interacted with Fuglesten, who was inside the garage. Fuglesten was subsequently arrested and charged.Fuglesten filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer's entry into his garage was unlawful. The district court denied the motion, and Fuglesten conditionally pled guilty to the charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court found that the officer had probable cause to believe Fuglesten had committed the offense of driving under suspension, but did not find evidence of exigent circumstances relating to dissipation or destruction of evidence.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's decision. The court held that, under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lange v. California, exigent circumstances were required for law enforcement to enter Fuglesten's garage without a warrant. The court found that the facts presented to the district court did not establish exigent circumstances. The court concluded that the officer's entry into Fuglesten's garage, without exigent circumstances, constituted an illegal entry. The court reversed the criminal judgment and remanded the case to allow Fuglesten to withdraw his guilty plea. View "State v. Fuglesten" on Justia Law

Whitetail Wave LLC, a Montana Limited Liability Company, sued XTO Energy, Inc., a Delaware corporation, the Board of University and School Lands of the State of North Dakota, the State of North Dakota, and the Department of Water Resources and its Director. Whitetail Wave claimed ownership of certain property in McKenzie County, North Dakota, and alleged that XTO Energy had breached their lease agreement by failing to make required royalty payments. Whitetail Wave also claimed that the State's assertion of an interest in the mineral interests associated with the property constituted an unconstitutional taking without just compensation.The District Court of McKenzie County granted summary judgment in favor of the State and XTO Energy. The court concluded that the State owned certain mineral interests within the ordinary high watermark as defined by North Dakota law. The court also found that XTO Energy was within the safe harbor provision provided by North Dakota law and did not breach the parties’ lease agreement when it withheld the royalty payments. The court awarded XTO Energy recovery of its attorney’s fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the judgment of the district court. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in dismissing Whitetail Wave's claim of an unconstitutional taking against the State, as the State's actions were limited to a title dispute. The Supreme Court also found that the district court did not err in dismissing Whitetail Wave's claim against XTO Energy for the non-payment of royalties, as XTO Energy fell within the safe harbor provision of North Dakota law. Finally, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in awarding XTO Energy a recovery of its attorney’s fees as the prevailing party. View "Whitetail Wave v. XTO Energy" on Justia Law