Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Jesseaca Finneman appealed after a jury found her guilty of: (1) possession of more than 500 grams of marijuana with intent to deliver; (2) unlawful possession of hashish; and (3) two counts of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. Finneman argued she was entitled to a new trial because the jury verdict form for the charge of possession of more than 500 grams of marijuana with intent to deliver was confusing and misapplied the law. After review of the circumstances of this case, the North Dakota Supreme Court was satisfied that because of the confusion and uncertainty demonstrated during jury deliberations, Finneman established the plain error in the verdict form affected her substantial rights. The Court therefore reversed Finneman's conviction for possession with intent to deliver. View "North Dakota v. Finneman" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer stopped a vehicle driven by defendant Crystal Corona on October 19, 2017, after she failed to dim her headlights. The officer thereafter detected the odor of alcohol emanating from Corona, and she refused to submit to an onsite screening test for intoxication and a subsequent Intoxilyzer test. The State charged her with driving under the influence for refusing a chemical test for intoxication. The State appealed the district court order denying the its pretrial motion to allow the introduction of evidence at a jury trial about Corona's refusal to submit to an onsite screening test for intoxication. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the State's appeal was not authorized by N.D.C.C. 29-28-07(5), and dismissed the appeal. View "North Dakota v. Corona" on Justia Law

D.D. appealed a district court order requiring his involuntary hospitalization and treatment, directing law enforcement to seize D.D.'s firearms, and finding that federal and state firearm restrictions applied to him. And application for evaluation and emergency admission was filed, request for transportation for emergency detention made, and petition for involuntary commitment, alleging that D.D. was mentally ill and in need of emergency treatment was granted. D.D. was admitted to the North Dakota State Hospital. After a preliminary hearing, the district court ordered involuntary hospitalization and treatment at the State Hospital for fourteen days, and found the firearm restrictions under 18 U.S.C. sections 922(d)(4), 922(g)(4), and N.D.C.C. 62.1-02-01(1)(c) applied. Law enforcement seized about 100 firearms from D.D.'s residence. The State Hospital released D.D. three days after that seizure. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the state and federal firearms restrictions were not unconstitutionally vague and applied to D.D. However, the Court reversed the order to seize D.D.'s firearms because neither the state nor the district court identified legal authority for issuing a summary seizure order as part of a mental health commitment process. View "Interest of D.D." on Justia Law

Roland Riemers petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a writ of mandamus directing the North Dakota Secretary of State Alvin Jaeger to order a recount of the June 12, 2018 primary election for the office of secretary of state. Riemers argued he was entitled to an automatic recount under N.D.C.C. 16.1-16-01(1)(a) because he "failed to be nominated in a primary election by one percent or less of the highest vote cast for a candidate for the office sought." The Supreme Court determined the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 16.1-16-01(1)(a) requires a comparison of the highest votes cast for a candidate for the office sought without regard to the candidate's party. “The fact that we are required to construe N.D.C.C. 16.1-16-01(1)(a) does not preclude the remedy of mandamus.” Moreover, given the time constraints on ballot preparation for the general election, the Court determined no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law was available for Riemers. Under the plain language of N.D.C.C. 16.1-16-01(1)(a), Riemers was entitled to an automatic recount, and the Secretary of State was statutorily required to order that automatic recount. The Supreme Court exercised its original jurisdiction to consider Riemers' petition, and granted his request for a writ of mandamus. View "Riemers v. Jaeger" on Justia Law

After adjournment of the Regular Session of the 65th Legislative Assembly, North Dakota Governor Doug Burgum vetoed five items in four appropriation bills by striking through certain language in the bills before signing them into law. In an opinion requested by Senator Rich Wardner and Representative Al Carlson, the Attorney General concluded three of the partial vetoes were ineffective: Senate Bill 2003, section 18, subsection 3 ("Any Portion Veto"); House Bill 1020, section 5 ("Water Commission Veto"); and Senate Bill 2013, section 12 ("IT Project Veto"). The Attorney General stated that these partial vetoes were ineffective because they exceeded the Governor's constitutional authority by attempting to veto a condition on an appropriation without vetoing the appropriation itself. The Attorney General further stated that, although the Water Commission Veto and IT Project Veto were ineffective, a court would conclude the vetoed language is unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine. The Legislative Assembly, joined by individual legislators consisting of the leaders of the senate and the House of Representatives and of the legislative management committee, petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of the five partial vetoes. Governor Burgum, joined by Attorney General Wayne Stenehjem, cross-petitioned seeking judgment declaring unconstitutional the provisions in two bills which condition the spending or transfer of certain appropriated funds upon approval of a legislative committee. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, denied it in part, and granted the cross-petition. All claims presented were justiciable controversies: (1) the Workplace Safety Veto was valid and effective; (2) the Credit Hour Veto, Any Portion Veto, Water Commission Veto, and IT Project Veto were ineffective, causing the bills to have been enacted in their entirety. The Governor had standing to bring the cross-petition, and the Attorney General could advocate on the Governor's behalf. The budget section provision of House Bill 1020, section 5, was unconstitutional as an improper delegation and violation of separation of powers, and the provision providing the water commission the authority to transfer funds among categories was also stricken. The budget section provision of Senate Bill 2013, section 12, was unconstitutional as an improper delegation and violation of separation of powers, and the budget section condition was stricken. View "N.D. Legislative Assembly v. Burgum" on Justia Law

Bismarck Police received a call from a shipping store employee about a suspicious package defendant Mitchell Biwer dropped off to be shipped to Denver, Colorado. The employee told police "[Biwer] was explaining too much and talking too much about why the package was being sent out. And then when questioned what was in the package, he said it was an owner's manual, and the cost for shipping this owner's manual was $47 for overnight shipping." Upon inspection, police observed a cardboard mailer bulging in a way consistent with cash rather than an owner's manual. Biwer had a 2013 conviction for marijuana possession, and the package recipient had a 2010 conviction for marijuana possession with intent to deliver. Police applied for a warrant, testifying to these facts, his drug interdiction training, and his belief Colorado was a major source for marijuana in North Dakota. The magistrate granted the first search warrant for the package. Inside the package was $4,700.00 in four separate envelopes marked with initials. Between observing the package and applying for the search warrant, police conducted a trash pull at what they believed was Biwer's address, which lead to a second and third search warrant. Biwer entered a conditional guilty plea to six felonies and three misdemeanors relating to drug possession and distribution. Biwer appealed, arguing probable cause did not exist for the first and a third search warrant; he did not contest the validity of the second warrant. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the evidence showed Biwer may have been sending cash rather than an owner's manual, but nothing more than a hunch showed he was sending illicit proceeds from the sale of drugs. Accordingly, the Court reversed judgment as to suppression of evidence relating to the contents of the package (first warrant). The Court affirmed as to the search warrant to search the residence. The case was remanded to allow Biwer to withdraw his guilty plea and for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Biwer" on Justia Law

Sean Kovalevich appealed district court orders summarily dismissing in part and denying the balance of his application for post-conviction relief. In 2013, a jury found Kovalevich guilty of two counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of corruption of a minor. Kovalevich engaged in sexual acts with a minor female at Canad Inns, a hotel in Grand Forks, North Dakota in February and August of 2012. Kovalevich appealed, and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the criminal judgment. Kovalevich applied for post-conviction relief and moved for a new trial. These were denied by the district court, and the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. In April 2017, he again applied for post-conviction relief. At the evidentiary hearing, the district court summarily disposed of three of the issues, and proceeded only on the claim of newly discovered evidence. Kovalevich argued that a new receipt, which he received from Canad Inns after writing them several letters in April 2017, showed he stayed at Canad Inns in July 2012 ("July receipt") and qualified as newly discovered evidence. The district court disagreed that the evidence was newly discovered and denied Kovalevich post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court determined the July receipt was not inconsistent with the other evidence that the February trip, not the July trip, was when the first instances of sexual assault (the two AA felonies) occurred. Thus, even if the district court admitted the July receipt into evidence, an acquittal would not be likely. "Because we cannot say the weight and quality of this evidence would likely result in acquittal, the district court did not err in denying Kovalevich's application for post-conviction relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence." View "Kovalevich v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Omar Kalmio appealed the district court's judgment denying his application for post-conviction relief. In 2013, Kalmio was convicted of four counts of class AA felony murder. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the district court's judgment, concluding: (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kalmio's fifth and sixth motions to amend his application; (2) the district court did not err by denying Kalmio's claims related to ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (3) the district court erred by finding Kalmio did not meet the first prong of the Strickland test relating to the representation of his appellate counsel during the direct appeal in his criminal proceedings. View "Kalmio v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

In 2004, Raymond Voisine was incarcerated after he pled guilty to gross sexual imposition for acts involving a six-year-old victim. Voisine appealed an order denying his petition for discharge from treatment as a sexually dangerous individual. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded clear and convincing evidence supported the district court's findings and order, and the court did not misapply the doctrine of res judicata. View "Interest of Voisine" on Justia Law

Walter Grant, Jr. appealed his convictions after pleading guilty to gross sexual imposition, burglary, aggravated assault, and terrorizing. He argued the district court committed obvious error by failing to determine whether he was competent to proceed; he did not argue that the court erred by failing to hold a competency hearing or that he was incompetent when he pled guilty. Grant argued N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-04 required the district court make a determination about competency if doubt existed about a defendant's fitness. Because the court ordered an examination and ordered he be detained at the state hospital for up to thirty days to complete the examination, Grant contended there was doubt about his fitness to proceed, no presumption he was competent, and the court was required to find by a preponderance of the evidence that he was competent and fit to proceed. To the extent Grant argued his constitutional due process rights were violated because the court failed to determine whether he was competent, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded his argument failed: Grant claimed the district court implicitly found reasonable doubt about his competency because it ordered his examination and detention at the state hospital. "Although N.D.C.C. 12.1-04-06 authorizes a court to order a defendant's detention for purposes of an examination whenever there is reason to doubt the defendant's fitness to proceed ... a trial court's decision to grant a motion for a psychological examination alone was not sufficient to raise the required reasonable doubt about the defendant's competence for purposes of a due process violation, regardless of the effect granting the motion may have under state law." In this case, an examiner filed a report containing findings that Grant was competent to proceed and that there was no reason to believe Grant lacked the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense. Grant did not object to the report or otherwise contest the examiner's findings. No clear statutory provisions or case law required the district court to make a determination about Grant's competency under these circumstances. The Court determined Grant did not show the trial court's failure to make a finding about his competency after the psychological evaluation report was filed was a clear deviation from statutory or case law. The district court did not commit obvious error by failing to fully adjudicate Grant's competency before accepting his guilty pleas. View "North Dakota v. Grant" on Justia Law