Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Harold Olson appealed a district court order affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation's ("Department") revocation of his driving privileges for two years, following an arrest for driving under the influence. The revocation of driving privileges for refusal to submit to chemical testing requires a valid arrest; in the absence of authority from Congress, the State lacks criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-member Indians on tribal land. Whether an officer has jurisdiction to arrest depends on the law of the place where the arrest is made. Olson argued the deputy lacked the authority to arrest him on tribal land and that a valid arrest was a prerequisite to revocation of his driving privileges. Absent a valid arrest, Olson argued the revocation order was not in accordance with the law. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the deputy lacked authority to arrest Olson, a non-member Indian, on Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation tribal land. The Court therefore reversed the district court's order affirming the Department's revocation of Olson's driving privileges and reinstated Olson's driving privileges. View "Olson v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Michael Terrill appealed a criminal judgment entered upon a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. Terrill argued the district court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Terrill" on Justia Law

Steven Sauter appealed a judgment entered upon a conditional guilty plea to criminal vehicular homicide, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the results of a warrantless blood-alcohol test. Sauter argued there was not sufficient evidence to support the district court's decision that exigent circumstances permitted the warrantless blood-alcohol test. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the warrantless blood-alcohol test was authorized under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, and thus affirmed the trial court’s denial of Sauter’s suppression motion. View "North Dakota v. Sauter" on Justia Law

The City of Bismarck appealed a district court’s suppression order. In December 2016, at about 10:10 p.m., a Bismarck police officer observed a vehicle fail to negotiate a turn and slide into a snowbank on the side of the road. The officer then observed the vehicle back out of the snowbank and proceed to fishtail down the street. The officer testified he suspected the driver was driving at an unsafe speed for the road conditions. The police officer followed the vehicle, and activated his overhead lights, but the driver, defendant Deanne Brekhus, did not stop. The vehicle made several turns before entering a parking lot, and after about thirty seconds of pursuit, stopped in front of a garage door, waited for the door to open, and entered the garage. The garage was not attached to the defendant's residence, and the overhead garage door remained open. The officer commanded Brekhus to stay in the vehicle when she attempted to exit her vehicle. At this point the police officer entered the garage on foot and made contact with the defendant, immediately noting the odor of burnt marijuana and alcohol. The officer observed Brekhus was slurring her speech; had bloodshot, glossy eyes; and had difficulty keeping her eyes open while speaking with the officer. The officer had her come out of the garage and perform field sobriety tests. Brekhus was unable to follow directions for the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. The City ultimately charged Brekhus with driving under the influence, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana. In February 2017 Brekhus moved the district court to suppress evidence, arguing that her rights under the Fourth Amendment and North Dakota Constitution were violated when the police entered her garage and searched her vehicle. She also contended her statutory right to consult counsel before chemical testing was violated. The City opposed both motions. The district court granted Brekhus's motion to suppress the basis of the police officer's initial entry into the open, detached garage without a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the police officer's warrantless limited entry into her open garage while in "hot pursuit" did not violate Brekhus’ Constitutional rights under the federal or North Dakota Constitutions. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Bismarck v. Brekhus" on Justia Law

Marcus Chatman appealed an order summarily dismissing his second application for post-conviction relief. Chatman was charged with possession of heroin with intent to deliver or manufacture, a class A felony; possession of cocaine, a class C felony; and possession of marijuana by a driver, a class A misdemeanor. Chatman argues the district court erred in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing on newly discovered evidence, abused its discretion in granting summary dismissal prior to ruling on outstanding motions, and erred in determining the anticipatory search warrant in the underlying case was legal. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the order summarily dismissing Chatman's application for post-conviction relief, finding Chatman did not provide competent, admissible, newly discovered evidence sufficient to grant an evidentiary hearing, did not show an abuse of discretion in the district court's order summarily dismissing his application before ruling on his discovery motions, and the legality of the anticipatory search warrant issued for his criminal conviction could not be challenged at this stage of post-conviction relief. View "Chatman v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Sergei Carlson appealed a district court order summarily dismissing his post-conviction relief application. In July 2007, law enforcement officers responded to a report of a non-responsive female. When they arrived, officers found W.P.C., a 16-year-old girl, lying in bed not breathing. W.P.C. was pronounced dead. Carlson, the victim's adoptive brother, and P.R., the victim's mother, were the only other people present in the home at the time of W.P.C.'s death. An autopsy of W.P.C. indicated the cause of death was suffocation and/or asphyxiation. Carlson told the officers during an interview that he strangled W.P.C. with his hands and placed pillows over her face to muffle the sound. Carlson then indicated he had sexual contact with W.P.C. after strangling/suffocating her. In September 2008, Carlson pled guilty to murder and performing a deviant sexual act. Carlson was 15 years old at the time and was initially charged in juvenile court before the case was transferred to adult court. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole in October 2008. Carlson filed a post-conviction relief application in October 2016. The district court appointed Carlson counsel at his request. The State answered Carlson's pro se application for post-conviction relief in November 2016. The State subsequently moved for summary disposition, specifically asserting the application should be barred by the two-year statute of limitations under N.D.C.C. 29-32.1-01. Carlson responded to the motion through his counsel and the parties stipulated that the court could address the matter of timeliness of Carlson's application based on the written pleadings before the court. The court dismissed Carlson's application as untimely in June 2017, because it did not meet an exception to the two-year statute of limitations. Carlson filed a notice of appeal in July 2017. In this matter before the North Dakota Supreme Court, Carlson argued the district court erred in summarily dismissing his post-conviction relief application based on the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err by summarily dismissing Carlson's post-conviction relief application. View "Carlson v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

The parents of nine minor children, individually and as guardians of the children, appealed a district court judgment determining the statutory damage cap for tort claims against a political subdivision was constitutional. In January 2015, a collision occurred between a Larimore Public School District bus and a BNSF Railway train. At the time, there were thirteen School District students riding home from school on the bus. One child died as a result of injuries sustained in the accident and the other children suffered serious injuries. The accident resulted in the potential for multiple damage claims in excess of the School District's aggregate statutory cap on liability under the codification of N.D.C.C. 32-12.1-03(2) in effect at the time of the accident, which limited the liability of political subdivisions "to a total of two hundred fifty thousand dollars per person and five hundred thousand dollars for injury to three or more persons during any single occurrence regardless of the number of political subdivisions, or employees of such political subdivisions, which are involved in that occurrence." The School District and its government self-insurance pool, the North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund, brought this interpleader action and deposited five hundred thousand dollars with the district court to satisfy the damage cap for claims arising from the accident under the applicable language of N.D.C.C. 32-12.1-03(2). The parents and guardians for some of the children answered and counterclaimed, asserting the damage cap was unconstitutional. The parents argued the damage cap violated the open court, jury trial, equal protection, and special law provisions of the state constitution. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the damage cap did not violate those constitutional provisions, and affirmed the judgment. View "Larimore Public School District No. 44 v. Aamodt" on Justia Law

Russell Parshall appealed a district court order denying his application for post-conviction relief. In 2015 Parshall pled guilty to "Driving Under the Influence N.D.C.C. 39-08-01 (First Offense Refusal)" by a N.D.R.Crim.P. 43 plea agreement. Parshall's Rule 43 Change of Plea and Sentencing Appearance Waiver listed the charge without the parenthetical "(First Offense Refusal);" however, both the formal plea agreement section of the document and the later criminal judgment included the parenthetical. Parshall applied for post-conviction relief, arguing the United States Supreme Court's holding in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), was a retroactively applicable substantive rule of constitutional law that prohibited the State from imposing criminal liability for refusing a warrantless blood test. In opposing Parshall's application the State argued the factual basis in the plea agreement supported both general driving while impaired and refusal to submit to the blood test. The district court found Parshall entered a guilty plea to the general charge of driving under the influence, not merely refusal. The district court declined to rule on the retroactivity of Birchfield, "The Court need not make that ruling, as the Court finds that the ruling in Birchfield made the statute regarding conviction by refusal to provide a blood sample unconstitutional from the moment of passage." The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the parties' intent could be ascertained from the plea agreement itself. The plea agreement signed by Parshall stated "Defendant hereby pleads guilty to a charge of COUNT I DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE N.D.C.C. 39-08-01 (First Offense Refusal) a Class B Misdemeanor." The criminal judgment mirrored this language. From this the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in interpreting the factual basis following the plea agreement to determine Parshall pled guilty to general driving under the influence when the plain language indicated refusal. With respect to Birchfield, because the district court did not rule on that issue, the matter was remanded for resolution. View "Parshall v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Laura Rende appealed after a jury found her guilty of simple assault on a peace officer and driving under the influence. The district court did not instruct the jury to make a finding whether Rende knew the arresting officer was acting in his official capacity at the time of her arrest. A district court's use of jury instructions that fail to include every element of the offense is error. However, that error is waived if defendant invited the error by submitting proposed instructions that also failed to include every element of the offense and if the defendant failed to object to the instructions at trial. "It is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may not challenge as error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that party. A party may not take advantage of irregularities in the proceedings unless he objects at the time they occur, allowing the district court to take appropriate action." After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, because Rende invited the error. View "North Dakota v. Rende" on Justia Law

Nathan Rolfson appealed after a jury verdict finding him guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Rolfson argued the district court erred in admitting into evidence three foundation documents for the Intoxilyzer test result because the State failed to disclose the documents in response to his discovery request. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding, that although the State violated the discovery rule, Rolfson failed to show significant prejudice resulted from the State's failure to disclose the three challenged documents before trial, and therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exclude the exhibits from evidence. View "North Dakota v. Rolfson" on Justia Law