Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

James Kremer appealed an order calling for the forfeiture and destruction of property involved in his criminal convictions for possessing images of sexual conduct by minors. In 2016 Kremer pled guilty to three class C felony counts of possessing prohibited materials. for which he was sentenced to serve ten years in prison followed by three years of supervised probation. During the first year after his release from incarceration, Kremer was prohibited from possessing "any equipment which allows you to access the internet." During the final two years of his probation, Kremer was allowed "to access the internet as per your probation officer." In December 2016, the State moved for the items to be forfeited and destroyed because the State alleged the items had been used or intended to be used to facilitate the commission of a criminal offense and because the items were illegal for Defendant to possess based upon Defendant's sentence in this matter. Defendant argued he did not want to possess the items, but all tax information, personal documents, personal photos, business documents, school e-books and documents, and account information contained on the items needed to be saved, and that after saving such information Defendant's family would then be able to sell the items, and such would not be "illegal" based upon Defendant's sentence. Rejecting this premise, the district court ordered forfeiture and destruction of Kremer's X-Box, PlayStation, laptop, and portable hard drive which were in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The court found the laptop and hard drive "were used in the commission of the crime" and all four items "were either used in the commission of the crime . . . and/or enable the defendant to have access to the internet, an action specifically prohibited by his Criminal Judgment." The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court did not err in ordering forfeiture and destruction of the laptop and hard drive, but erred with respect to the X-Box and Playstation. With regard to the game systems, the State argued the "only way that we know that Mr. Kremer is not going to get these items back and access the internet when he is released from prison is to forfeit them." The Supreme Court found the State cited no authority for its proposition that the possibility defendant might use otherwise unforfeitable property in an unlawful manner after completion of his criminal sentence rendered the property forfeitable. View "North Dakota v. Kremer" on Justia Law

John Isom appeals from a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of aggravated assault--domestic violence. Isom argues the district court imposed an illegal sentence, abused its discretion in substituting a juror after empanelment, and erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Specifically, Isom argued the district court imposed an illegal sentence of five years supervised probation when N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-06.1(2) provided a maximum of three years for aggravated assault--domestic violence. Furthermore, Isom argued the district court abused its discretion and committed reversible error under N.D.R.Crim.P. 24 substituting a juror after jeopardy attached. The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Isom that the sentence he received was not in accordance with N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-06.1(2). The Court disagreed with Isom’s contention with respect to the juror substitution. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for resentencing. View "North Dakota v. Isom" on Justia Law

Dylan Groce appealed after a jury found him guilty of aggravated assault. Groce argued the district court abused its discretion by quashing subpoenas for two witnesses and denying a motion for mistrial. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err by quashing the subpoenas and did not abuse its discretion in denying Groce's motion for a mistrial. View "North Dakota v. Groce" on Justia Law

A jury found Kevin Decker guilty of disorderly conduct. Decker argued on appeal the district court created a structural error by denying his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial when court staff excluded one member of the public from jury selection proceedings. He also argued the State presented insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty of disorderly conduct. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding the district court's exclusion of one member of the public was too trivial to amount to structural error and the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. View "North Dakota v. Decker" on Justia Law

The State appealed a district court order granting Tyler Fleckenstein's motion to suppress. Fleckenstein was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (third offense). Fleckenstein moved to suppress the blood test. At the motion hearing, only the arresting officer testified. The district court concluded that the consent to the blood test was involuntary and granted the motion to suppress the blood test. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court misapplied the law by ruling Fleckenstein's consent to a blood test was per se involuntary and thus did not consider the totality of the circumstances. The Court reversed the district court's order and remanded for additional findings of fact and a determination of voluntariness on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. View "North Dakota v. Fleckenstein" on Justia Law

The State appealed a district court order granting Tyler Fleckenstein's motion to suppress. Fleckenstein was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (third offense). Fleckenstein moved to suppress the blood test. At the motion hearing, only the arresting officer testified. The district court concluded that the consent to the blood test was involuntary and granted the motion to suppress the blood test. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court misapplied the law by ruling Fleckenstein's consent to a blood test was per se involuntary and thus did not consider the totality of the circumstances. The Court reversed the district court's order and remanded for additional findings of fact and a determination of voluntariness on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. View "North Dakota v. Fleckenstein" on Justia Law

Aaron Bruce appealed a district court's amended criminal judgment awarding restitution. In December 2015, the State charged Bruce with unlawful manufacturing, delivering, or possession with intent to deliver heroin; manslaughter; tampering in a criminal investigation; ingestion of a controlled substance; and theft of property. The charges arose from an incident in July 2015. In March 2017, pursuant to an agreement, the State amended the manslaughter charge to negligent homicide, and dismissed three of the charges. Bruce pled guilty to negligent homicide and manufacturing, delivering, or possession with intent to deliver heroin. The State requested $6,165 for funeral expenses for Aidan Vanderhoef, the victim of the negligent homicide charge, $500 for a cell phone that was allegedly stolen from Vanderhoef, and $492.20 for his father's transportation costs to and from the court proceedings. The court ordered Bruce to pay restitution in the amount of $7,157.20. Bruce argues the district court abused its discretion in ordering restitution for funeral expenses, a cell phone, and transportation costs to and from the court proceedings for Vanderhoef's father. Bruce also argues the district court abused its discretion when ordering restitution without considering his ability to pay. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the restitution award. View "North Dakota v. Bruce" on Justia Law

Charles Koenig appealed a district court order denying his motion for entry of default judgment and summarily dismissing his application for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. In November 2015, a criminal complaint was filed against Koenig, alleging two counts of possession of a controlled substance and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia. On December 15, 2015, Koenig filed a speedy trial request. On January 6, 2016, a preliminary hearing was held. Probable cause was found on all counts followed by arraignment where a criminal information mirroring the complaint with the addition of a witness list was filed. On that same date, the prosecuting attorney recognized and informed the court of Koenig's December 15, 2015 request for speedy trial. Koenig made a second request for speedy trial. On April 1, 2016, a jury trial was held and Koenig was found guilty on all counts. On July 22, 2016, Koenig was sentenced to a total of eighteen months and two years of supervised probation commencing upon release from incarceration. On January 13, 2017, Koenig filed an application for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct because he was denied his right to speedy trial. Koenig also argued his conviction on count 1 (possession of a controlled substance) was obtained through circumstantial evidence. The application was docketed January 19, 2017, and served on the state's attorney's office on January 23, 2017. On February 22, 2017, Koenig filed a notice, motion, brief, and affidavit for default judgment. On February 23, 2017, the State filed an answer to Koenig's application for post-conviction relief. On February 24, 2017, the State filed a response to the motion for default judgment and a motion to dismiss for misuse of process. On March 20, 2017, Koenig filed a response to the State's motion to dismiss. On May 9, 2017, the district court filed a memorandum containing an order denying Koenig's motion for entry of default judgment, an order denying the State's motion to dismiss for misuse of process, and an order for summary disposition of Koenig's application for post-conviction relief. Koenig argued to the North Dakota Supreme Court he was entitled to default judgment because the State's response to his application for post-conviction relief was untimely. Further, Koenig argued the district court misapplied the law when it determined his election of a speedy trial right was not timely. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding Koenig failed to show any real prejudice as a result of the delayed response. Koenig's trial was within 90 days of arraignment, thus his argument under N.D.C.C. 29-19-02 failed. View "Koenig v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Marlon Comes appealed a district court order summarily dismissing his post-conviction relief petition and a court order denying his motion for a new trial. In 1995, the State charged Comes with murder, a class AA felony and robbery, a class A felony. Comes received court-appointed counsel. In 1996, Comes pled guilty to both crimes. The district court sentenced Comes to life imprisonment at the North Dakota Department of Corrections with the possibility of parole, and a concurrent 10 years for robbery, with 307 days credit for time served. In 2017, Comes filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief, claiming he would be subjected to an ex post facto punishment in violation of the U.S. Const. art. I, section 10 because his original sentence was life with the possibility of parole after 85 percent of 30 years had been served. Using that calculation, Comes argued he would be eligible for a parole hearing in June 2021, if no good time was given to him prior to that date. Comes believed he would not receive a parole hearing until August 2041, which he argued violates his constitutional rights. From the face of the record, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined Comes did not file his post-conviction relief within the two-year time limit established by N.D.C.C. 29-32.1-09(1). Therefore, his post-conviction relief application was beyond the statute of limitations, unless one of the exceptions applies. The State did not raise the statute of limitations as a defense prior to the district court dismissing the petition. Because the State did not raise the two-year statute of limitations under N.D.C.C. 29-32.1-09(1), the defense was waived. Comes argued to the Supreme Court his claim for post-conviction relief was not time barred because the retroactive application of N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 51 would not occur until June 2021. The Supreme Court agreed Comes' application was not time barred, but neither was it ripe for review. As correctly pointed out by the district court, all the case law argued by Comes was more than two years old, so it did not meet the requirement under N.D.C.C. 29-32.1-01(3)(b). However, at some point in the future, when Comes can show he was being unlawfully restrained based on the sentence imposed, he will have the right to file for post-conviction relief under N.D.C.C. 29-32.1-01(g). The Supreme Court dismissed Comes’ appeal. View "Comes v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Marlon Comes appealed a district court order summarily dismissing his post-conviction relief petition and a court order denying his motion for a new trial. In 1995, the State charged Comes with murder, a class AA felony and robbery, a class A felony. Comes received court-appointed counsel. In 1996, Comes pled guilty to both crimes. The district court sentenced Comes to life imprisonment at the North Dakota Department of Corrections with the possibility of parole, and a concurrent 10 years for robbery, with 307 days credit for time served. In 2017, Comes filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief, claiming he would be subjected to an ex post facto punishment in violation of the U.S. Const. art. I, section 10 because his original sentence was life with the possibility of parole after 85 percent of 30 years had been served. Using that calculation, Comes argued he would be eligible for a parole hearing in June 2021, if no good time was given to him prior to that date. Comes believed he would not receive a parole hearing until August 2041, which he argued violates his constitutional rights. From the face of the record, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined Comes did not file his post-conviction relief within the two-year time limit established by N.D.C.C. 29-32.1-09(1). Therefore, his post-conviction relief application was beyond the statute of limitations, unless one of the exceptions applies. The State did not raise the statute of limitations as a defense prior to the district court dismissing the petition. Because the State did not raise the two-year statute of limitations under N.D.C.C. 29-32.1-09(1), the defense was waived. Comes argued to the Supreme Court his claim for post-conviction relief was not time barred because the retroactive application of N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 51 would not occur until June 2021. The Supreme Court agreed Comes' application was not time barred, but neither was it ripe for review. As correctly pointed out by the district court, all the case law argued by Comes was more than two years old, so it did not meet the requirement under N.D.C.C. 29-32.1-01(3)(b). However, at some point in the future, when Comes can show he was being unlawfully restrained based on the sentence imposed, he will have the right to file for post-conviction relief under N.D.C.C. 29-32.1-01(g). The Supreme Court dismissed Comes’ appeal. View "Comes v. North Dakota" on Justia Law