Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Dylan Saari was charged with the crime of accomplice to forgery, a class C felony. The charge came after an investigation into his girlfriend's attempt to post bond for him while Saari was detained on a probation revocation. While Saari was detained in October 2014, he made several telephone calls to his girlfriend. During these recorded calls, Saari and his girlfriend discussed how she could obtain money to use to post bond. Saari's girlfriend ultimately passed a forged check belonging to her stepfather while on the phone with Saari. The funds were seized by police when Saari's girlfriend attempted to post bond. Saari pleaded guilty and was sentenced to five years of incarceration to run concurrently with his sentences in other cases. He appealed the district court's order denying Saari's application for post-conviction relief, arguing his conduct did not support a conviction for accomplice to forgery. Saari argued his conduct only supported a conviction for criminal facilitation, a class A misdemeanor, which made his sentence unauthorized by law. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Saari v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Elijah Addai of murder. Addai applied for post-conviction relief arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his application. In 2015 Addai applied for post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence. He appealed the denial of his petition, arguing that a witness who did not testify at trial, would offer the new evidence. The district court concluded the witness' statements to police were not 'evidence' in any sense, and "certainly not new evidence which could be the basis for reversal of the conviction here." Finding that the district court did not err in denying Addai's claim of newly discovered evidence and dismissing his application for post-conviction relief, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Addai v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Michael Brewer appealed this conviction on two counts of gross sexual imposition. The Supreme Court concluded Brewer waived his claim of error that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the State to admit evidence surrounding G.H.'s forensic interview by not renewing his objection to the admission of this evidence at trial. View "North Dakota v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Sargent County Deputy Sheriff David Kozok arrested Paul Vincent for driving under the influence of alcohol after a blood test revealed Vincent's alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limits. Vincent moved to suppress any evidence related to the chemical test arguing, in part, that the deputy violated his limited statutory right to speak with an attorney before submitting to the chemical test. The deputy asked Vincent if he would submit to a chemical test. Vincent did not answer, instead said "talk to my attorney." The deputy informed Vincent that he would take his silence as a refusal. The deputy then transported Vincent to the Richland County jail. On the way to jail, the deputy received a call from the Richland County Sheriff, who advised the deputy to read the implied consent advisory to Vincent again. The deputy pulled over on the side of the road and, again, read Vincent the implied consent advisory. After the deputy finished, Vincent again stated "talk to my attorney." The deputy testified he told Vincent if Vincent could "get a hold of an attorney" he would be able to talk to one. Vincent gave the deputy a phone number, but did not provide the deputy with the name of the attorney. The deputy testified that it appeared to be a local cell phone number. The deputy called the number using his personal cell phone, but there was no answer. Vincent was in the back seat of the patrol car when the deputy placed the call. After the deputy's failed attempt to call the number Vincent gave him, Vincent did not mention an attorney again and agreed to submit to a blood test. The deputy drove Vincent to the Lisbon Hospital where a blood test was taken revealing his alcohol concentration level exceeded the legal limits. Vincent appealed his ultimate conviction on driving under the influence of alcohol, arguing evidence of the blood test should have been suppressed after having twice invoked his right to counsel. Finding no reversible error in denying the motion to suppress evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Gwinner v. Vincent" on Justia Law

Russell Schank appealed when the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence. A City of Dickinson police officer arrested Schank and transported him to the law enforcement center. At the law enforcement center, Schank requested to speak with an attorney after being given the implied consent advisory. The officer brought Schank to an office that contained a working telephone. According to the officer, the office door was left open for him to monitor Schank to ensure nothing was placed in his mouth. Schank attempted to close the door to the office, but the officer did not allow it. At the suppression hearing, the officer indicated if the door was closed, he would have been locked out of the office. While Schank used the telephone, the officer stood at the doorway of the office, about six to eight feet away from Schank. In the hallway, the officer engaged in a conversation with another officer for at least part of the time Schank was inside the office. Standing in the hallway, the officer heard Schank ask the officer whether he (Schank) had taken a preliminary test. Responding, the officer told Schank his preliminary test result. Schank then continued his call, took the chemical test, and was allowed to post bond. Schank filed a motion to suppress evidence based upon a violation of his limited statutory right to counsel. The district court held a hearing at which only the arresting officer testified. The court denied the motion to suppress; Schank entered a conditional guilty plea, and the district court entered a criminal judgment. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the criminal judgment, concluding the district court did not err by denying Schank's motion to suppress evidence. View "City of Dickinson v. Schank" on Justia Law

The State appealed a pretrial order dismissing criminal charges of theft of property and exploitation of a vulnerable adult against Caroline Conrad based on the civil dispute doctrine. In December 2015 the State charged Conrad, alleging Conrad used for herself more than $50,000 in funds her elderly mother deposited in a joint bank account which listed the mother as the "member" and Conrad as a "joint owner." After the district court found probable cause at the preliminary hearing, Conrad, at the court's suggestion, brought a motion to dismiss the charges based on the civil dispute doctrine. Based on the mother's joint account application and her account contract with the bank, the court found "a legitimate dispute exists" regarding the mother's donative intent in determining whether an inter vivos gift had been given by the mother to Conrad. The court found delivery occurred because the mother changed her sole ownership of the funds to joint ownership with Conrad and Conrad accepted the gift because she "used these funds herself." The court concluded Conrad met her burden of showing "a legitimate dispute on a fairly unique underlying issue of property or civil law." The court therefore dismissed the charges. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings because the civil dispute doctrine did not apply in this case. View "North Dakota v. Conrad" on Justia Law

Danny Nelson appeals from a district court order civilly committing him as a sexually dangerous individual. Nelson was convicted in 2009 of continuous sexual abuse of a child. The underlying conduct for the conviction consisted of Nelson having repeated sexual contact and intercourse with his step-daughter between the time she was nine or ten years old until she was roughly fourteen or fifteen years old. After his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child, Nelson was sentenced to ten years in prison with three years suspended. While in prison, Nelson completed sex offender programming. Specifically, Nelson completed a low-intensity sex offender program in 2010 and a high-intensity sex offender program in 2014. The State petitioned the district court to civilly commit Nelson. The district court found probable cause to commit and ordered Nelson transported to the State Hospital for evaluation and creation of a report. Two doctors submitted reports of their evaluations of Nelson to the district court: one doctor diagnosed Nelson with "Unspecified Paraphilic Disorder, Other Specified Personality Disorder with Antisocial Personality and Narcissistic Traits;" the other doctor testified Nelson had "reasonable control" over his behavior and did not meet the requirement of serious difficulty controlling behavior. On appeal, Nelson argued his substantive due process rights were violated because he was committed after he already completed a sex offender treatment program while incarcerated. Nelson also argued the State failed to prove he was a sexually dangerous individual. Alternatively, Nelson argued the district court failed to specifically state the facts on which it relied to determine Nelson met the definition of a sexually dangerous individual. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's findings were inadequate to permit appellate review. While retaining jurisdiction under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3), the Court remanded with instructions that the district court make specific findings of fact on whether Nelson was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct and whether Nelson had a present serious difficulty controlling behavior. View "Interest of Nelson" on Justia Law

Daniel Myers appealed a district court order summarily dismissing his application for postconviction relief. In April 2012, Myers pled guilty to aggravated assault domestic violence, a class C felony. The district court sentenced Myers to five years' imprisonment, with five years suspended and five years of supervised probation. In August 2012, Myers pled guilty in three additional criminal cases involving theft of property, possession of drug paraphernalia, carrying a concealed weapon, hindering law enforcement, and driving while license suspended. The district court sentenced Myers to five years' imprisonment, with five years suspended and three years of supervised probation. The August 2012 judgments stated the sentences for all of the crimes would run concurrent to each other. The August 2012 judgments did not state whether the sentences would run concurrent or consecutive to Myers' April 2012 aggravated assault sentence. In April 2013, the State petitioned to revoke Myers' probation in all four criminal cases after Myers tested positive for methamphetamine. The district court revoked Myers' probation and entered amended criminal judgments sentencing him to ten years' imprisonment through a variation of concurrent and consecutive sentences in all of the cases. Myers applied for postconviction relief in August 2013, claiming the court failed to advise him that revocation of his probation could result in additional prison time. n April 2015, Myers filed another application for postconviction relief, claiming his sentence after revocation was not authorized by law and the district court should have sentenced him to five years' imprisonment instead of ten years. The State moved to dismiss Myers' application for postconviction relief, arguing Myers misused the postconviction relief process by inexcusably failing to raise his grounds for relief in his earlier application for postconviction relief. The district court summarily dismissed his application without a hearing. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Myers' postconviction relief application was a misuse of process. View "Myers v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Dennis Gaede appeals a judgment dismissing his amended complaint against Leann Bertsch, Director of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and from an order denying his motion for relief from the judgment. In 2006, Gaede was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and affirmed denials of his applications for post-conviction relief. In November 2015, Gaede sued Leann Bertsch, Director of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, claiming Bertsch violated N.D.C.C. 23-06-03 by fraudulently claiming he will be responsible for his funeral and burial expenses upon his death. He claimed Cass County was responsible for his funeral expenses under the statute, but Bertsch automatically placed 25 percent of his earned monies into a release aid account and the funds are being held to pay for his future funeral expenses. Gaede requested the court order all money the Department was holding in his release aid account be returned to him and grant a permanent injunction preventing Bertsch from deducting any further amounts for deposit in his release aid account for future funeral expenses. In December 2015, Gaede amended his complaint to sue Bertsch in both her official and personal capacities. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gaede v. Bertsch" on Justia Law

Chace Stewart appealed an order summarily denying his application for post-conviction relief. In August 2013, the State charged Stewart with two counts of aggravated assault for alleged assaults against his mother and step-father. In December 2013, in conjunction with the two pending charges of aggravated assault, two petitions to revoke probation for earlier aggravated assault convictions, and pending charges for disorderly conduct and for driving under the influence, Stewart, with counsel, entered into a written plea agreement with the State to resolve all the cases against him. In the written plea agreement, Stewart admitted the allegations in the two petitions to revoke his probation, the pending disorderly conduct charge, and the two pending aggravated assault charges. After a hearing, the district court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Stewart under the agreement. In May 2015, Stewart filed a self-represented application for post-conviction relief, claiming his guilty plea to the aggravated assault charges against his mother and step-father was not voluntary and he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Stewart claimed his counsel "did not do what [Stewart] had submitted to him in writing," and his guilty plea was "unlawfully induced or not made voluntarily with understanding" because there was an "[a]bsence of [his] right to a psychological evaluation." Stewart's application sought withdrawal of his guilty plea. After review of this matter, the Supreme Court concluded Stewart failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and therefore affirmed. View "Stewart v. North Dakota" on Justia Law