Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

S.W.S. appealed a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to T.R.C. S.W.S. is the father and C.M.C. is the mother of T.R.C., who was born in 2011. The child was taken into custody of Traill County Social Services in late 2012, based on abandonment by C.M.C. A reunification plan was developed for each parent for reunification with the child. Close to a year later, the State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of S.W.S. and C.M.C. C.M.C. appeared at an initial hearing and advised the court that she wished to voluntarily terminate her parental rights to the child. A termination hearing was held and various witnesses testified, including the father, the father's wife, and the child's social worker. There was evidence presented about conditions in the father's home, the father's employment, and the father's chemical dependency. After the hearing, the juvenile court ordered termination of both parents' parental rights. The court found the child was deprived and the deprivation was likely to continue. The court also found it was contrary to T.R.C.'s welfare to continue to live with his parents, reasonable efforts were made to prevent the need for removing the child and to make reunification possible, and termination was in T.R.C.'s best interests. After review of S.W.S's argument on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding the trial court's findings did not adequately explain the basis for its decision. View "Interest of T.R.C." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Justin Yarbro appealed his conviction after a jury found him guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child and the district court's order denying his motion for a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant's failure to object to the admission of DNA evidence during trial and in his motion for a new trial precluded him from raising arguments on appeal about the admission of that evidence. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct. View "North Dakota v. Yarbro" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Tamri Stewart appealed her conviction following a conditional plea of guilty to class C felony abuse or neglect of a child, reserving the right to challenge the district court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence. Because the facts in this case did not support the district court's decision that a police officer's entry into Stewart's home was justified by the emergency exception to the warrant requirement, the Supreme Court reversed the criminal judgment and remanded the case to allow Stewart to withdraw her guilty plea. View "North Dakota v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Chad Klein appealed a district court order denying his motion to correct his sentence. The Supreme Court, after review, concluded that the district court acted within the limits prescribed by statute to sentence him for gross sexual imposition (a class A felony). Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion. View "North Dakota v. Klein" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Luke Gatlin appealed his conviction following a conditional plea of guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia. Because the Supreme Court held Gatlin could not assert a violation of a third party's expectation of privacy in the home searched by police and because Gatlin failed to object to the search, it affirmed the district court judgment. View "North Dakota v. Gatlin" on Justia Law

Kathy Inwards was injured while employed as an assembler by Bobcat. WSI accepted liability for her claim and awarded Inwards vocational rehabilitation benefits to assist her in returning to work. In early June 2011, WSI issued a notice of intention to discontinue benefits ("NOID") stating her disability benefits would end then convert to retraining benefits. She had 30 days to request reconsideration of the decision. WSI issued a formal order requiring Inwards to "enter into training at Hutchinson Community College, Hutchinson, Kansas, in the Business Management & Entrepreneurship AAS program." Inwards requested reconsideration of the vocational rehabilitation plan, but attended two college courses during the summer of 2011 in accordance with the plan. Inwards complained to her physician that she was having increased pain as a result of her course work. Although Inwards registered for fall courses at the college, she withdrew from them. In October 2011, WSI issued a NOID to Inwards stating "[t]here is no medical evidence that supports your professed inability to attend the classes as outlined in the administrative order dated June 27, 2011. You are now considered to be in non-compliance with vocational rehab." Inwards timely requested reconsideration of this NOID, and on January 13, 2012, WSI issued a formal order suspending Inwards' rehabilitation benefits based on her noncompliance with the rehabilitation plan. Inwards timely requested a hearing to challenge WSI's finding of noncompliance and suspension of benefits. The ALJ reversed WSI's January 13, 2012 order suspending benefits for noncompliance with the vocational rehabilitation plan. WSI appealed to district court and Inwards moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because WSI failed to serve the notice of appeal and specification of errors on Inwards and her employer. The court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding Inwards had no standing to object to defective service on her employer and there was good cause to excuse WSI's mistake about recently mandated court electronic filing requirements. The court reversed the ALJ's decision, concluding the finding of good cause was "not supported by law," and reinstated WSI's January 13, 2012 order of noncompliance. The Supreme Court concluded the ALJ erred as a matter of law in ruling Inwards had good cause for failing to comply with a retraining program because WSI's previous order requiring Inwards to participate in the retraining program had been appealed and had not been finally resolved at the time she withdrew from the retraining program. The Court affirmed the district court judgment reversing the ALJ's decision and reinstating WSI's order of noncompliance. View "Inwards v. WSI" on Justia Law

In July 2013, a Bismarck Police Officer arrested Appellant Ducote Haynes for being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The police transported Haynes to jail, but the arresting officer did not have a copy of the correct Report and Notice form for Haynes. The officer went to the police station to obtain and fill out the proper Report and Notice. The arresting officer's shift ended shortly after he filled out the Report and Notice and he requested another officer issue the Report and Notice and deliver it to Haynes at the jail. The second officer testified he delivered the Report and Notice to the jail and placed it in an elevator for jail staff to retrieve. Haynes requested an administrative hearing regarding the revocation of his driving privileges. At the hearing, Haynes argued the Department did not have authority to revoke his license because he was not immediately issued the Report and Notice. The hearing officer found Haynes received the Report and Notice and revoked Haynes' driving privileges for 180 days. Haynes appealed the decision to the district court, arguing the hearing officer erred in finding the Department had authority to revoke his license because the Report and Notice was not immediately issued and was not personally served on him. The district court affirmed the hearing officer's decision. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Haynes v. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Before the 2013-2014 school year, the Dickinson Education Association and the Dickinson Public School District conducted negotiations and developed and agreed upon a series of negotiated master agreements that contained the terms and conditions of employment between the certified staff and the District. Between December 2012 and May 2013, the Association and the Dickinson Board of Education held collaborative bargaining team meetings for purposes of formulating a negotiated agreement. The Association and the District's negotiations covered various provisions for both the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years, but the parties were ultimately unable to come to a resolution on all issues. In May 2013, after declaring an impasse, the parties sought the involvement of an education fact-finding commission. The Commission's report recommended: (1) a two-year contract; (2) that all items previously agreed to remain in the agreement; (3) the Board's final offer on salary in year one and year two of the two-year contract; and (4) the addition of one professional development day in year two of the contract. In late-July 2013, with the parties still unable to reach an agreement, the District unilaterally issued contracts based on the Commission's recommendations, containing provisions for the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years. In August 2013, the Association petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus and also filed an application for temporary restraining order and other supporting documents. The district court granted an alternate writ of mandamus, suspending the continuing contract offers made by the Board for the 2013-2014 school year, prohibiting the District from requiring the contract offers be returned until further court order, and ordering the District to execute a negotiated agreement for only the 2013-2014 school year. Later, district court issued an order quashing the alternate writ of mandamus and ordering that individual teaching contracts for the 2013-2014 school year based on the Board's final offer were due September 13, 2013. The Association's petition for writ of mandamus remained pending, and the parties agreed the issue before the court was whether the District could unilaterally issue contracts for the 2014-2015 school year based on the negotiation process. In October 2013, the district court granted the petition, concluding the unilateral offer of a two-year negotiated agreement was not lawful in North Dakota and the Association was entitled to an order of mandamus requiring the District to offer the Association a one-year negotiated agreement for the 2013-2014 school year. The District appealed. Finding no abuse of discretion or reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dickinson Education Association v. Dickinson Public School District" on Justia Law

Gerald Middleton was found guilty by a jury of continuous sexual abuse of a child, a class AA felony, and corruption of a minor, a class C felony. After the trial, attorney Steven Light, now deceased, was substituted as Middleton's new counsel. Middleton then moved for a new trial. The district court denied Middleton's motion, ruling Middleton failed to include any legal arguments or facts to support his motion. Middleton was sentenced, and a judgment was subsequently entered. Light died three months after submitting the brief in support of the new trial motion. Middleton filed an application for postconviction relief, arguing his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective on four grounds. With respect to Light, Middleton argued, "Post-trial counsel filed a substantively deficient motion for new trial thereby effectively denying Mr. Middleton direct appellate review of his case by the North Dakota Supreme Court[.]" After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Middleton's application for postconviction relief. Middleton appealed the district court order denying his application for postconviction relief, challenging only the ruling as it pertained to Light's representation. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief: "Middleton has not established the existence of meritorious issues that could have been raised in either the new trial motion or the direct appeal had a new trial motion not been filed by Light. Rather, Middleton argues prejudice should be presumed because the inadequate new trial motion effectively denied him the right to appeal." View "Middleton v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Nicholas Baatz was convicted by a jury of gross sexual imposition in 2009 and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. In 2010 Baatz filed an application for postconviction relief alleging he was denied effective assistance of counsel because no attorney was appointed for him before trial and because the attorney who finally was appointed failed to appeal his criminal conviction. The district court granted the petition insofar as Baatz requested the right to file an untimely appeal from his criminal conviction, but did not specifically address the other issues raised because "[t]estimony by Defendant at the hearing indicated his only contention at this point was his denial of a right to appeal issue and not ineffective assistance of counsel at trial." Baatz appealed from the criminal judgment and filed a supplemental brief raising the same arguments that were not specifically addressed by the district court in the postconviction order. Baatz did not appeal from the postconviction order, but the State appealed, arguing the court erred in allowing Baatz to file an untimely appeal from the criminal judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the court's decision to allow the appeal "without prejudice to Baatz's right to raise denial of his constitutional right to counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel in postconviction proceedings." No petitions for rehearing were filed. In 2012 Baatz filed a second application for postconviction relief again alleging he was denied his right to counsel before trial and effective assistance of trial counsel after counsel was appointed. Baatz also claimed he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the prior appeal. The district court denied the application, concluding the first two grounds alleged were barred by res judicata or misuse of process and Baatz had not shown how appellate counsel was ineffective. Baatz appealed the district court order denying his postconviction application, challenging only the district court's findings on res judicata and misuse of process. He did not challenge the district court's substantive findings on his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court determined that, under the law of the case doctrine, its Court's decision in Baatz's first case allowed Baatz to raise the claims of denial of the right to counsel and of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a second postconviction proceeding. The case was then remanded to address the merits of these claims. On remand, the district court held no additional hearings, but addressed the merits of Baatz's claims of denial of the right to counsel and of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court determined Baatz waived his right to counsel at the preliminary hearing, Baatz failed to show trial counsel was ineffective, and Baatz failed to show trial counsel's alleged errors deprived him of a fair trial. Baatz appealed the district court's denial, on the merits, of his postconviction application. Finding that Baatz failed to meet his burden of showing prejudice resulting from his trial attorney's conduct, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Baatz v. North Dakota" on Justia Law