Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether a county sheriff can meet the constitutional obligation of providing notice of a sheriff's sale to a plaintiff by letter directing the plaintiff's attorney to monitor a website for a listing of the date, time, and location of sale. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in denying plaintiff's motion to set aside the sheriff's sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that constructive notice by publication to a party with a property interest in a foreclosure proceeding via a sheriff's office website is insufficient to constitute due process when that party's address is known or easily ascertainable. Remanded.

Appellant, who was incarcerated, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming (1) the Adult Parole Authority improperly revoked his parole, and (2) the evidence obtained by his parole officer's search of his e-mail account constituted a criminal act, and the evidence obtained from the search could not be used to revoke his parole. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant's habeas corpus petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's parole was properly revoked; (2) the evidence obtained by Appellant's parole officer's search was lawfully obtained; and (3) habeas corpus is generally not available to challenge parole conditions that allegedly restrained a petitioner's liberty.

Petitioner filed a habeas corpus action in federal district court, asserting that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at his criminal trial. Respondent, warden of the London Correctional Institution, countered that Petitioner's plea of no contest in the underlying criminal case constituted a waiver of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner objected, arguing that under Ohio law, the state may not use his no-contest plea and resulting conviction against him, including using the plea as evidence that he waived his right to effective assistance. Finding there was no controlling precedent on the admissibility of a no-contest plea in a habeas proceeding, the federal district court certified a question for the Supreme Court's resolution. The Supreme Court answered by holding that Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(B)(2) and Ohio R. Evid. 410(A)(2), which prohibit the use of a defendant's no contest plea against the defendant in any subsequent civil proceeding, do not apply to prohibit the use of such a plea in a subsequent civil proceeding which is a collateral attack on the criminal judgment which results from the no contest plea, such as the current habeas corpus action.

Defendant, who was convicted for criminal offenses, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, the county common pleas court judge, to issue a new sentencing entry. Defendant asserted that his current sentencing entry was not a final, appealable order because it did not contain a disposition concerning specifications that he was charged with but not convicted of. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied the requested relief, holding that the sentencing entry for Defendant fully complied with Ohio R. Crim. P. 32(C) and Ohio Rev. Code 2505.02 because it stated that he was convicted by a jury of specified crimes, set forth the sentence, was signed by a judge, and was entered upon the journal by the clerk of court.

Appellants here were property owners who alleged that a foreign municipality rezoned land that lay in the municipality but that was adjacent to their property in another municipality for the benefit of private enterprise rather than public health. The complaint sought both a declaratory judgment, alleging violations of due process and equal protection, and a writ of mandamus, alleging a regulatory taking for which Appellants were entitled to compensation. The trial court concluded (1) Appellants had standing to bring a declaratory-judgment action, but Appellants' constitutional claims failed; and (2) Appellants' takings claim failed. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the property owners lacked standing to bring their claims without distinguishing between the declaratory judgment and mandamus claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) consistent with the Court's holding in Clifton v. Blanchester, Appellants did not have standing to assert a mandamus claim for appropriation of land outside the territorial limits of municipality; but (2) Appellants did have standing to bring a declaratory-judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinances.

Appellant pled no contest to burglary and was sentenced accordingly. Appellant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress and to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the arrest warrant pursuant to which Appellant had been arrested was invalid because the deputy clerk who issued the warrant impermissibly acted in a dual capacity; but (2) the invalid warrant led to no evidence subject to suppression. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) a person acting in the dual capacities of deputy sheriff for a county and deputy clerk for a municipal court located in the same county is not a neutral and detached magistrate for purposes of determining whether probable cause exists for issuing an arrest warrant; and (2) because the arrest was predicated primarily upon Appellant's pre-arrest confession, the issue of whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for an invalidly issued arrest warrant was not properly before the Court.

Real property owners (Owners) sued Appellant, the county engineer, complaining that their property had been flooded for several years and the water caused damage to their property. Owners alleged that the draining system was improperly designed, constructed, or installed and pleaded that the court require Appellant to upgrade the system to prevent future flooding. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the county engineer was immune from litigation under Ohio Rev. Code 2744, which addresses political-subdivision liability for torts. Owners appealed, arguing that the design, planning, or construction of a sewer system is a proprietary function, which is an exception to political subdivision immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because upgrading a storm-sewer system involves construction and design, such upgrading is a governmental, not a proprietary, function.

In July 2010, a grand jury returned a 73-count indictment charging several current and former public officials and three organizations with criminal charges. In December 2010, the county court of common pleas judge granted the Cafaro defendants' motion to seal a bills of particulars and notices of intent to introduce "other acts" evidence. Relators, a newspaper and television station, filed this writ of mandamus to compel the judge to release all records in the criminal case and a writ of prohibition to vacate the December 2010 order. The Cafaro defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. In July 2011, the indictment was dismissed. In August 2011 the judge unsealed many of the sealed filings but granted the Cafaro defendants' motion to seal a discussion of facts in the state's memorandum in opposition to the Cafaro defendants' motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus to compel the judge to release all remaining records that were sealed and granted the writ of prohibition to compel the judge to vacate his December 2010 and August 2011 decisions and to prohibit him from issuing further orders presumptively sealing any documents or records in the criminal case.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing the petition of Appellant for writs of mandamus and procedendo to compel Appellees, the court of common pleas judge and the common pleas court, to issue a valid, final judgment in one of his criminal cases and to vacate his sentence in another of his criminal cases. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's sentencing entries constituted final, appealable orders; (2) the sentences Appellant challenged complied with Ohio R. Crim. P. 32(C) by specifying that Appellant was convicted upon his no-contest pleas; and (3) insofar as Appellant argued that one of his sentences was erroneous because there was no authorization for consecutive six-month jail sentences, Appellant had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise his claim of sentencing error.

Appellee, together with four codefendants, was indicted for murder, aggravated robbery, involuntary manslaughter, and theft. The defendants' initial convictions were reversed due to a Batson violation. On retrial, the trial court declared a mistrial. The state proceeded to retry three of the defendants, including Appellant, and a third jury returned verdicts finding them guilty of all charges. The court of appeals again reversed their convictions. In Appellee's case, the court held (1) the trial court should have declared a mistrial after the second trial because a statement of a state's witness from a previous trial, which had not been admitted into evidence, had inadvertently been submitted to the jury; and (2) double jeopardy barred retrial because there had not been a manifest necessity for the mistrial declared at the second trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals to the extent that it held the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial, holding (1) the trial judge erred during the second trial by improperly declaring a mistrial; and (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the retrial of Appellee.