Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The issue presented in this appeal was whether the filing of a pretrial motion to suppress by a co-defendant automatically tolls the time within which a defendant must be brought to trial. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions of aggravated robbery and felonious assault, concluding that Defendant was timely tried on those charges, as the time to bring Defendant to trial was tolled when his co-defendant filed a pretrial motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the time in which to bring Defendant to trial was not automatically tolled when his co-defendant filed pretrial motions to suppress. Remanded for the court of appeals to determine whether the setting of the trial date beyond the statutory time was reasonable.

This case was a public-records action in which relator, ESPN, Inc., sought certain records from respondent, Ohio State University. Ohio State rejected ESPN's requests because the university deemed them to be "overly broad per Ohio's public record laws." EPSN then filed this action for a writ of mandamus to compel Ohio State to provide access to the requested records. The Supreme Court (1) granted the writ for limited records that should have been disclosed because they were not exempt from disclosure based on the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA); but (2) denied the writ for the rest of the records because Ohio State established that FERPA and the attorney-client privilege prohibited the disclosure of the requested records.

After a jury trial, Appellant Maxwell White was convicted of aggravated murder with capital specifications and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. White subsequently obtained federal habeas corpus relief from his death sentence, obliging the trial court to resentence him. Before the federal court invalidated White's death sentence but after White killed the trooper, the Legislature enacted Ohio Rev. Code 2929.06(B), which requires the trial court, when resentencing a capital offender whose death sentence has been set aside, to empanel a new jury and conduct a fresh penalty hearing, at which death may be a penalty to be considered by the jury. The trial court held it could not retroactively apply the statute in resentencing White, and therefore, White was ineligible for a death sentence. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution does not bar the statute's retroactive application in cases where the aggravated murder was committed before its enactment but the death sentence was set aside after its enactment; (2) the statute's application in this case does not violate the ex post facto clause; and (3) retroactive application of the statute does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.

A jury convicted Wayne Powell of the aggravated murder of four victims and of aggravated arson. The jury recommended the sentence of death for the aggravated murder of the victims. The trial court accepted those recommendations and sentenced Powell accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed Powell's convictions and sentences of death, finding no reversible error regarding (1) any pretrial and trial issues; (2) any penalty-phase issues; or (3) counsel's effectiveness during both phases of the trial. In addition, the court held that because Powell received a fair trial, the doctrine of cumulative error was not applicable to the present case, and Powell's death sentence was appropriate and proportionate.

In this action the Cincinnati City School District Board of Education asked the Supreme Court to rule on the validity of a deed restriction it placed on school property that it offered for sale at a public auction. At issue was whether the deed restriction contravened public policy by preventing an unused school building from being used by a public charter school. The trial court concluded that the deed restriction was void as against public policy, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because this case involved a contract between a private party and a political subdivision, there was a compelling reason to apply the principle of the public policy exception to parties' rights to make contracts; and (2) therefore, the inclusion of a deed restriction preventing the use of property for school purposes in the contract for sale of an unused school building was unenforceable as against public policy.

Defendant Carl Morris was convicted by a jury of two counts of rape involving a minor. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of other acts to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith, in violation of Ohio R. Evid. 404(B). A divided appellate court vacated the conviction, concluding that the trial court improperly admitted other-acts testimony, that the court's error was not harmless, and that the error materially prejudiced Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an appellate court is to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review when considering an assignment of error that claims the trial court improperly admitted evidence of other acts to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith, in violation of Rule 404(B); and (2) the appellate court erred when it applied a de novo standard of review to this matter. Remanded.

The Ohio Department of Health (ODH) issued several notices of violations of the Smoke Free Act to Appellants, a privately owned bar and its CEO. ODH subsequently filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief ordering Appellants to comply with the Smoke Free Act. Appellants filed a counterclaim for declaratory and injunctive relief against ODH and a cross-claim against the attorney general, alleging that the Smoke Free Act operated in violation of Appellants' constitutional rights, that the Act was invalid as applied to them, and that ODH engaged in rulemaking that exceeded its authority. The trial court held that ODH had exceeded its authority in implementing a policy of strict liability for violations of the Act by issuing fines regardless of whether Appellants were at fault and denied ODH's request for a permanent injunction. The court of appeals reversed and granted a permanent injunction to ODH. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and could not use declaratory judgment to vacate final orders, the previous violations of the Act were res judicata; and (2) the Act was a valid exercise of the state's police power and did not amount to a regulatory taking.

A jury found Defendant Donald Eafford guilty of permitting drug abuse and possession of cocaine. The court of appeals vacated Eafford's felony sentence for possession of cocaine and remanded for resentencing, holding that Eafford was convicted only of misdemeanor possession of drugs because the jury-verdict form did not state the degree of the offense or specify that Eafford had possessed cocaine. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the sentence, holding that the trial court did not plainly err in imposing sentence, as (1) the indictment charged Eafford with possession of cocaine, and the least degree of that offense is a felony of the fifth degree; (2) the evidence presented at trial proved Eafford possessed cocaine; (3) the trial court instructed the jury that it could find Eafford guilty only if it found the drug involved to be cocaine; and (4) the jury, which found Eafford guilty as charged in the indictment, thus found him guilty of possession of cocaine as a felony. .

Reporters for the Cincinnati Enquirer requested that the Cincinnati police department provide the newspaper with certain records related to a shootout at a local bar, including the names of the two police officers shot, their personnel files, and an unredacted copy of the incident report of the shootout. The Cincinnati police chief denied the requests insofar as the newspaper sought names and identifying information regarding the officers involved in the shootout. The Enquirer subsequently filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the police chief to make the requested records available for inspection and copying and seeking attorney fees. The court of appeals denied the writ and the request for attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not in denying the writ and request for attorney fees, as the requested identifying information of the police officers wounded in the shooting was exempted from disclosure under the Public Records Act by the constitutional right of privacy.

Appellant Wesley Lloyd was convicted in Texas of aggravated sexual assault. Lloyd subsequently moved to Ohio. Lloyd was later convicted of several charges relating to his failure to register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the offense for which Appellant was convicted in Texas was a sexually oriented offense under Ohio law because it is substantially equivalent to rape, a listed Ohio offense, and therefore, Appellant's offense triggered a duty to register in Ohio; but (2) because the State failed to prove that at the time Appellant moved to Ohio, he was under a duty to register in Texas as a result of his conviction for aggravated sexual assault, Appellant's convictions must be vacated.