Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Dennis Gould of rape, gross sexual imposition, pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor, and illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material, all based on images located on the hard drive of Gould's computer. The court of appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the trial court should have excluded all evidence that resulted from the warrantless search of Gould's hard drive. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the trial court, holding (1) because Gould had abandoned the hard drive, Gould did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the hard drive; and (2) therefore, the warrantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

After Appellant Jermaine McKinney was convicted and sentenced in a criminal case, Appellant petitioned for writs of mandamus and procendendo to compel Appellee, a county court of common pleas judge, to issue a final, appealable order in his criminal case. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the judge's sentencing entry in the criminal case fully complied with Ohio. R. Crim. P. 32(C) by including the findings of the jury upon which Appellant's convictions were based, the sentence, the signature of the judge, and the clerk's time stamp; and (2) Appellant had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise the claim that the judge erred in his sentencing entry.

Relator, Angela Dawson, requested a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent, a local school district, to provide her with access to (1) itemized invoices of law firms providing services to the district in matters pertaining to Dawson and her children, and (2) communications from the school district's insurance carrier identifying the district's legal representative and describing the liability and exposure of the district and insurance company related to a case filed against the district by Dawson on behalf of one of her children. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the requested records were exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act because the school district met its burden of establishing the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to the requested records.

Relators, Ohioans for Fair Districts and its members, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent, Secretary of State Jon Husted, to treat Sections 1 and 2 of H.B. 319, which established new congressional districts for the state based on the 2010 decennial census, as subject to referendum, to accept the submission of Relators' referendum-petition summary, and to discharge the duties of Husted's office as provided by Ohio Const. art. II and Ohio Rev. Code 3519.01. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) the writ was consistent with precedent and the plain language of Ohio Const. art. II, and (2) unless a valid referendum petition was timely filed with the secretary of state, H.B. 319 would become effective ninety days from the date the bill was filed by the governor in the office of the secretary of state.

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of various crimes. The judgment entry of conviction did not set out whether the conviction was based upon a guilty or no-contest plea or upon a bench trial or jury trial. The cause was remanded for resentencing for other reasons. On remand, the judgment entry contained the same error. The trial court then sua sponte filed a nunc pro tunc judgment entry supplementing the wording of the original resentencing judgment entry. The appellate court sua sponte dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding no new or substantial right was affected by correction of the sentencing judgment. Appellant subsequently obtained a certification of a conflict of the decision in this case with that of State v. Lampkin. At issue on appeal was whether a nunc pro tunc judgment entry that is issued solely to correct a clerical omission in a prior final judgment entry constitutes a new final order from which a new appeal may be taken. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no new right of appeal is created by such an entry, and therefore, the entry in this case was not a final order from which an appeal could be taken.

A jury convicted Roland Davis of aggravated murder, murder, kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery. Davis was sentenced to death. The trial court dismissed Davis's petition for postconviction relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. Davis then filed a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act on a motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding (1) a trial court has jurisdiction over a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence when the specific issue has not been decided on direct appeal; and (2) an appellate court has jurisdiction, in a case in which a death penalty has been imposed, to consider the trial court's denial a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

Travis Carpenter, a Clinton Township police officer, was involved in a motor vehicle accident outside his own jurisdiction while responding to a general dispatch call for assistance from an officer in another jurisdiction. The passenger in the vehicle that collided with Carpenter's vehicle filed a personal-injury suit naming as defendants, inter alia, Carpenter and Clinton Township. The trial court granted summary judgment to Carpenter and Clinton Township, concluding that they were entitled to immunity under Ohio Rev. Code 2744 because Carpenter was on an emergency call for purposes of the statute as he had a professional obligation to respond to the dispatch. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Carpenter could be considered to have been on an emergency call at the time of the accident for purposes of chapter 2744 when the evidence was insufficient to establish the existence of a mutual-aid agreement between the jurisdictions because application of the immunity statutes in this case did not depend on whether a mutual-aid agreement existed.

Corey Hazel filed a writ of habeas corpus to compel his release from prison. With his petition, Hazel filed an affidavit of indigency and sought waiver of prepayment of the court's filing fees. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, holding that the petition was defective because Hazel failed to include in his affidavit of indigency a statement setting forth his balance in his inmate account for the preceding six months, as certified by the institutional cashier, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the court of appeals did not err in finding the petition defective because (1) the petition was in violation of section 2969.25(C), (2) as Hazel could have raised his claims in a previous habeas corpus case, res judicata barred Hazel from filing a successive habeas corpus petition, and (3) as Hazel's petition did not state a facially valid habeas corpus claim, the appellate court's dismissal without prior notice was proper.

Edward Lang was convicted of the aggravated murder of two persons and aggravated robbery, with each count carrying gun specifications. Lang was sentenced to death for one murder and life with no possibility of parole for the other murder. The trial court also imposed a ten-year term of imprisonment for the aggravated-robbery conviction and a three-year term for the gun specifications, which it had merged for sentencing. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Lang's convictions and sentences of death and life without parole despite Lang's mental illness and history of abuse, but (2) remanded for the proper imposition of postrelease control pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2929.91 on Lang's sentence for aggravated robbery.

Michael Pruitt filed writs of mandamus and prohibition to compel Appellees, common pleas court judges, to vacate his convictions and sentence. Pruitt argued that the common pleas court erred in entering a sentence that incorrectly stated that Pruitt had entered pleas of guilty to having a weapon while under disability and to a firearm specification relating to an attempted-murder charge. The court of appeals dismissed Pruitt's claims, noting that all of the cases cited by Pruitt were resolved in the ordinary course of law by appeal rather than in an action for an extraordinary writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed Pruitt's claims as Pruitt had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law to raise his claims.