Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Christopher Barker pleaded guilty to five counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. On appeal, Barker argued that the entry of his no-contest plea was not voluntary, intelligent, and knowing because the trial judge had failed to fully comply with the requirements of Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(C) when the judge told Barker that by entering the plea he was giving up the "right to call witnesses to speak on his behalf." The court of appeals agreed and reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court's admonition to Barker was insufficient to satisfy the constitutional mandate to compulsory process. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) the language employed by the trial court while addressing Barker was a reasonable explanation of Barker's right to compulsory process, and (2) other portions of the record may be referenced in resolving an alleged ambiguity such as the one here during the oral colloquy.

After a jury trial, Thomas Dunlap was convicted of two counts of gross sexual imposition involving victims under the age of thirteen, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.05(A)(4), and one count of disseminating obscene matter to juveniles. The court sentenced Dunlap to two years in prison and found Dunlap to be a tier three sex offender under Ohio Rev. Code 2950, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (S.B. 10). Dunlap appealed the section 2907.05(A)(4) convictions and his sex-offender classification, arguing that (1) section 2907.05(A)(4) requires a men rea element of recklessness, and (2) the application of S.B. 10 to offenses committed before its effective date violated the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution. The court of appeals affirmed, holding, inter alia, that section 2907.05(A)(4) requires no precise culpable state of mind. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the element of sexual contact in a section 2907.05(A)(4) violation requires a mens rea of purpose, but the indictment and jury instructions in this case sufficiently set forth the required mens rea; and (2) the application of S.B. 10 to Dunlap violated the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution. Remanded.

This case originated upon the filing of an original action pursuant to Section 3 of H.B. 1, 2011 Am.Sub. (the Act), which stated that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction over any claim asserting that any action taken pursuant to the Act violates the state constitution. Petitioners requested a declaratory judgment that H.B. 1 was unconstitutional and a prohibitory injunction preventing Respondents from acting pursuant to its provisions. The Supreme Court dismissed the cause for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding (1) the Court lacked original jurisdiction to grant relief, and (2) insofar as Section 3 of H.B. 1 attempted to confer exclusive, original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality of the act's provisions, it was unconstitutional.

This case was an original action challenging the sufficiency of an initiative petition proposing a constitutional amendment, the purpose of which, as described in the petition, was "to preserve the freedom of Ohioans to choose their health care and health care coverage." Relator Brian Rothenberg brought the action. The Supreme Court denied the challenge, holding (1) the relator's legal claims lacked merit, and (2) the relator's evidence was insufficient to meet his burden of demonstrating that the petition failed to contain a sufficient number of valid signatures to be submitted to the state's electors at the November 8, 2011 general election.

During Greg Zeigler's tenure as Stark County treasurer, his chief deputy pleaded guilty to stealing almost $2.5 million from the treasurer's office, after which the county prosecutor instituted an recoupment action under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 321.37. The board of commissioners then voted to remove Zeigler from office pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 321.38, which permits the removal of the county treasurer by the board of commissioners upon institution of a suit under Section 321.37. Zeigler then filed an action for a writ of quo warranto to oust the current treasurer and to be reinstated as treasurer, arguing that Section 321.38 is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted the writ of quo warranto, holding (1) that because Section 321.38 does not require a complaint and hearing before authorizing a board of county commissioners to remove a county treasurer, it is unconstitutional; (2) the removal of Zeigler violated Ohio Const. art. 2, 38; and (3) Zeigler was entitled to serve the remainder of his elected term.

In June 2008, appellant Thomas Everette was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. The next year Everette submitted a petition for postconviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The state moved to dismiss Everette's petition as untimely because it had been filed more than 180 days after the filing of the transcript of proceedings, which the state deemed to be the videotapes of the trial and hearings. Everette opposed the motion, arguing that his 180-day time limitation did not begin until the written transcripts were filed and thus his appeal was timely. The trial court dismissed Everette's petition, holding it was untimely under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(2). The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the videotaped recordings constituted the transcript of the proceedings. The Supreme reversed and remanded, holding that for purposes of determining when the 180-day time period for filing a postconviction relief petition shall accrue, only the certified, written transcript constitutes a "transcript" under Ohio R. App. P 9(A) and Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(2) when both a videotape recording and the written form of the proceedings are available.

D.B. and another boy were under 13 years of age when they engaged in sexual activity. The juvenile court adjudicated D.B. delinquent for rape based on the violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.01(A)(1)(b), which prohibits one from engaging in sexual conduct with a person under the age of 13. On appeal, D.B. argued that application of the statute violated his federal rights to due process and equal protection. At issue was whether a child's constitutional rights are violated when, as a member of the class protected by the statute, the child is adjudicated as a delinquent based upon a violation of the statute. The appeals court affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court held that (1) as applied to offenders who are under 13 themselves, the statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process because arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is encouraged; and (2) application of the statute in this case violates equal protection because only one child was charged with being delinquent, while others similarly situated were not.

Warren Lewis, a convicted misdemeanant, unsuccessfully sought a stay from the trial court and thereafter paid the fine and costs while on inactive probation that expired during the pendency of his appeal. At issue was whether Lewis's completion of his sentence was voluntary, thus making his appeal moot. The Supreme Court held that the completion of a sentence is not voluntary and will not moot an appeal if the circumstances surrounding it demonstrate that the appellant neither acquiesced in the judgment nor abandoned the right to appellate review. The Court concluded that the expiration of an inactive period of probation during the pendency of appeal does not render the appeal moot because the misdemeanant failed to file a motion to stay in the appellate court where the misdemeanant unsuccessfully sought a stay of execution from the trial court to prevent an intended appeal from being declared moot and subsequently filed a notice of appeal to challenge the conviction.

In 2007, grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant Jeremy Damron that charged one count of felonious assault, two counts of domestic violence and one count of rape. In 2009, Defendant entered a guilty plea to the assault charge and to one count of domestic violence. In exchange, the State requested that the trial court enter a nolle prosequi to the remaining two counts. At the plea hearing, Defendant was advised of the applicable statutory maximum penalties for the charges to which he pled guilty. Before the sentencing hearing, each party submitted a sentencing memorandum. Defendant argued that the two charges against him should be merged as âallied offenses.â Defendant conceded that assault and domestic violence were not the same, but that he could not have committed one offense without the other. A merged offense as Defendant sought, would carry less total jail time. The trial court merged Defendantâs offenses, and sentenced him to eight years for assault, and five years for domestic violenceâwith the sentences to run concurrently. The State appealed, and the appellate court found that âEven if [it] were to conclude that the [trial] courtâs decision to impose concurrent sentences had been based on faulty reasoning, the fact remains that the courtâs order that the sentences be served concurrently resulted in a sentence authorized by the statutes governing sentencing.â The Supreme Court disagreed with both lower courtsâ rulings, holding that the offenses for which Defendant was charged were not âalliedâ but two separate and distinct offenses for which Defendant received separate convictions and separate sentences. The Court vacated the sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing.