Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Ramona Whitley and Debra Jones, teachers at a preschool day care, questioned three-year-old L.P. about an eye injury and marks on his face upon his arrival at the preschool. Whitley reported suspected child abuse after L.P. identified Defendant as responsible for his injuries. A grand jury subsequently indicted Defendant of several counts of felonious assault, endangering children, and domestic violence. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of all charges except one felonious assault count. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the preschool teachers to testify regarding L.P.'s statements in violation of the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) statements elicited from a child by a teacher in the absence of an ongoing emergency and for the primary purpose of gathering information of criminal conduct and identifying the alleged perpetrator of suspected child abuse are testimonial in nature; and (2) therefore, the admission of L.P.'s statements violated Defendant's right to confrontation. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to various drug and weapons offenses and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. On February 17, the trial court issued an order granting 1,530 days of jail-time credit. On February 18, however, the court set aside the February 17 entry on the grounds that it had been inadvertent. Petitioner was ultimately resentenced to concurrent five-year sentences for the remaining offenses with 964 days of jail-time credit. Petitioner subsequently made the February 17 and February 18 entries the subject of numerous proceedings, including a habeas action, in which he claimed that he was entitled to the jail-time credit awarded him in the February 17 entry. Petitioner then filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, making the same claim advanced in his earlier habeas petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the habeas action, holding (1) Petitioner had alternate remedies in the ordinary course of law to pursue relief on his claim; (2) res judicata barred Petitioner's claim; and (3) Petitioner's claim was invalid on the merits. View "Pruitt v. Cook" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts each of aggravated murder, attempted murder, and aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed capital punishment for aggravated murder an an aggregate term of twenty-six years' imprisonment for the noncapital offenses. The Supreme Court (1) reversed one of Defendant's aggravated murder convictions, the specifications related to that count, and the specification associated with the other aggravated murder charge because each of these counts and specifications required proof that Defendant was under detention at the time of the murder, and the original sentencing entry that placed Defendant under detention was void; and (2) affirmed the remaining convictions, the imposition of capital punishment in the other aggravated murder count, and the imposition of consecutive terms of imprisonment on the noncapital offense convictions. View "State v. Wesson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court vacated the death sentence and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the trial court again sentenced Appellant to death. The Supreme Court against vacated Appellant's sentence of death, holding that, under the unique circumstances of this case, the trial court failed to consider relevant mitigating evidence contained in Appellant's allocution in sentencing her to death, and therefore, the court erred in sentencing Appellant to death. Remanded for consideration of Appellant's allocution when weighing the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating factors during resentencing. View "State v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Between 1987 and 2007, Appellant was convicted six times for different offenses. In 2007, the Governor granted a pardon for four of those convictions. Appellant subsequently sought to seal the records of three of the pardoned convictions. The lower courts denied Appellant's requests. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to have her record of conviction sealed solely by virtue of the pardon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in absence of a statutory provision requiring the sealing of a criminal record based on a pardon, a gubernatorial pardon does not automatically entitle the recipient to have the record of the pardoned conviction sealed. View "State v. Boykin" on Justia Law

Edward Verhovec filed a public-records mandamus action against the City of Marietta after the City failed to respond to Edward's public-records request. After the City provided Edward with the requested records, the trial court dismissed Edward's action. Meanwhile, Dorothy Verhovec also filed a public-records action to compel the City to release requested records. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City after the City provided her with the records. The City sought sanctions against both Edward and Dorothy for frivolous conduct. Before the trial court ruled on the motions, Dorothy and Edward petitioned for a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals. The court of appeals dismissed the prohibition actions. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments, holding that because the Verhovecs each had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to challenge any erroneous ruling in the trial court, the court of appeals was correct to dismiss both actions for a writ of prohibition. View "State ex rel. Verhovec v. Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating Ohio Rev. Code 4301.69(A), which prohibits the sale of beer to an underage person. At Defendant's trial, the State had difficulty proving what Defendant sold to an informant was beer as defined by statute. The court then took judicial notice that Bud Light was, in fact, beer. Defendant was convicted as charged. The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a fact - the alcohol content by volume of Bud Light - that was not something that was "generally known." The Supreme Court reversed and vacated Defendant's conviction, holding that because there was no evidence admitted on the statutory element of the alcohol content of the substance sold by Defendant to the informant, there was insufficient evidence for a conviction, and double jeopardy barred a retrial. View "State v. Kareski" on Justia Law

Harper, a known drug dealer, was robbed and murdered in his Sandusky residence. Police learned that immediately before his murder, Harper was to have participated in a drug deal. Cellphone records led them to Gipson, who was in custody in Canton, Michigan for his alleged involvement in another crime. Steckel, a Canton police officer, later testified that during a driving tour of the neighborhood, Gipson identified Ricks, who he knew as “Peanut,” as the other man involved in the murder. The judge instructed the jury that the hearsay testimony was not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to describe the investigation. Neither Gipson nor Ricks testified. Ricks was convicted. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that admission of the alleged accomplice’s statements through an investigating officer’s testimony violated Ricks’s (the defendant’s) right to confront the witnesses against him under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the Ohio Constitution. Gipson’s out-of-court statements connected Ricks to Gipson and to the crime. The danger of unfair prejudice was amplified by further testimony that Gipson was upset and scared by seeing Ricks, which encouraged the jury to misuse the content of the out-of-court statement for its truth. View "State v. Ricks" on Justia Law

Lowe sought, by writ of procedendo, to compel Judge Callahan, to issue a ruling on his motion in arrest of judgment, alleging that he filed his motion on August 10, 2012, and that Judge Callahan has not ruled on it. The court of appeals dismissed the matter as moot because the judge had ruled on Lowe’s motion on August 22, 2012. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Lowe’s argument was not that the judge failed to rule on his motion but that she addressed the wrong issue in her ruling, an argument that should have been raised in an appeal of the ruling. View "Lowe v. Callahan" on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury convicted Appenzeller on18 felony counts. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 28 years in prison. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded for merging of certain offenses and resentencing. The trial court again imposed a sentence of an aggregate term of 28 years in prison. The appeals court affirmed. Appenzeller unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief based primarily on a claim that he was denied due process and equal protection when there was a break in the chain of custody of the trial transcript in his direct appeal. The alleged break occurred when Appenzeller’s own appellate attorney checked out the transcript to prepare his brief. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no violation of court rules or of constitutional rights. View "Appenzeller v. Miller" on Justia Law