Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Registered Voter Delilah Gentges sued the Oklahoma State Election Board in the district court of Tulsa County to prevent implementation of SB 692, commonly known as the Voter ID Act. Gentges alleged she had standing as a taxpayer and as a registered voter in Tulsa County. The State Election Board specially appeared in the district court of Tulsa County and asked the court to dismiss this suit. The State Election Board contended Gentges lacked standing and Tulsa County was not the proper venue for a suit against a State agency. The district court of Tulsa County rejected these challenges and the State Election Board asked the Supreme Court to assume original jurisdiction to prohibit the district court of Tulsa County from proceeding further. The Supreme Court granted partial relief by ordering the district court of Tulsa County to transfer the case to the district court of Oklahoma County. Gentges contended the Legislature violated the Oklahoma Constitution by submitting the Voter ID Act to a popular vote without first presenting it to the Governor for veto consideration. She also contended that requiring voters to present certain forms of identification in order to vote would "interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage." After review of the parties' summary judgment paperwork, the trial court ruled: (1) the Oklahoma Constitution does not require presentment of a legislative referendum to the Governor before the referendum is placed on the ballot for a vote; and (2) Gentges lacked standing. Gentges appealed. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that the trial court was correct in ruling the Voter ID Act was validly enacted, but reversed the trial court on the issue of Gentges' standing. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Gentges v. Oklahoma State Election Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Mark Muratore was arrested for driving under the influence. He submitted to a breathalyzer test, administered using the Intoxilyzer 8000. As a result of the test, the Department of Public Safety revoked plaintiff's driver's license for one year, and he appealed the revocation to the District Court of Oklahoma County on issues of the admissibility of the breathalyzer test. The trial court vacated the revocation of plaintiff's driver's license, finding that the Board of Tests had no rules in place governing maintenance procedures for the Intoxilyzer 8000 and that the manufacturer's certificate of calibration for this particular Intoxliyzer 8000 and the supplier's certificate of analysis for the gas canister used as a reference method for the Intoxilyzer 8000 were inadmissible hearsay. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the manufacturer's certificate of calibration and the supplier's certificate of analysis. Furthermore, the Court found that the Department of Public Safety did not meet its threshold burden of proving all the facts necessary to sustain the revocation of plaintiff's license, and the record supported the trial court's decision to vacate the revocation of plaintiff's license. View "Muratore v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellee, Jerry Butler pled guilty to two counts of "Sexual Abuse of a Minor Child" and received two five-year deferred sentences which ran consecutively. Sometime thereafter, Butler began registration under the Sex Offenders Registration Act. The district court in Sequoyah County issued an order expunging Butler's plea from the record, deleting all references to his name from the docket sheet, deleting the public index of the filing of the charge, and providing no information concerning the file shall (unless ordered by the court). Butler filed a Petition for Injunction to permanently enjoin the Respondent-Appellant, Justin Jones ex rel., State of Oklahoma ex rel., Oklahoma Department of Corrections from requiring him to continue registering under SORA. He argued requiring him to register violated his rights to equal protection of the laws and to due process of law. The Department filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging Butler's deferred sentences and expungement were unlawful. The district court granted a permanent injunction against the Department, finding Butler's case presented an unusual and narrow circumstance and he was indeed denied equal protection of the law. The Supreme Court disagreed with the district court and reversed and remanded its decision for further proceedings. View "Butler v. Jones" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the three-day mailing rule of 12 O.S. sec. 2006(D) applied to defendants'-appellants' post-trial motions for costs and attorney fees filed in the trial court. The District Court granted appellee's motion to strike the appellants' motions for attorney fees and costs because they were not filed within thirty days of filing of the judgment. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Defendants were to be served pursuant to 12 O.S. Sec. 696.2 and service was made by mail pursuant to 12 O.S. Sec. 2005. Section 2006(D) grants them an additional three days to file their applications for costs and attorney fees. Although the three days granted by 12 O.S. Sec. 2006(D) do not apply to time periods in the appellate rules, they will apply in computing the time to file a post-trial motion in district court after having been served with the judgment by mail as prescribed in 12 O.S. Sec. 990.2(C). Similarly, Okla. Sup. Ct. Rule 1.22(c)(1) provides that where the judgment was mailed because taken under advisement pursuant to 12 O.S. 990.2(C), three days are added to the time to file in the district court the post-trial motion pursuant to § 2006(D). Therefore, the Supreme Court found that the three-day rule of 12 O.S. Sec. 2006(D) extended the appellants' time to file their motions. View "Okla. Dept. of Transportation v. Cedars Group, LLC." on Justia Law

The Department of Public Safety (DPS) revoked Plaintiff-Appellant Kevin Hedrick's driver's license for 180 days following his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or other intoxicants. He filed an appeal with the District Court and attached a photocopy of the order which DPS mailed to him when it revoked his license. DPS objected to the trial court's jurisdiction, arguing that Hedrick had not provided the trial court with a certified copy of its revocation order. DPS refused to provide a certified copy, insisting that it was under no obligation to do so. The trial court dismissed the appeal, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether a certified copy of a DPS order was required to perfect an appeal of a DPS revocation to the district court; and whether the appeal was timely. Upon review, the Court held that that 47 O.S. Supp. 2007 section 2-111 expressly deems photocopies of DPS records to be considered originals for all purposes and to be admissible as evidence in all courts. Also, pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 section 3004(3), a certified copy of the DPS order was not required. Furthermore, the appeal was timely. View "Hedrick v. Commissioner of Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Christopher Luster filed a Petition for Temporary and Permanent Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order, and Declaratory Relief to enjoin the State of Oklahoma ex rel., Department of Corrections, from enforcing the Sex Offenders Registration Act against him. The trial court consolidated this case with those of other plaintiffs filing similar actions and granted a permanent injunction to all the consolidated plaintiffs. On appeal the Department asserted the Legislature's intent was clear in applying the provisions of SORA retroactively. For the same reasons the Oklahoma Supreme Court held the provisions of SORA in effect upon a person being convicted in Oklahoma or entering Oklahoma were the only SORA provisions that should apply to the sex offender, the Court held the frequency of SORA verification in effect at that time was also the applicable provision. The correct registration requirements to apply are those in effect when the sex offender was either convicted in Oklahoma or when a sex offender convicted in another jurisdiction enters Oklahoma and becomes subject to those registration requirements. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's Order applying a blanket one-year registration frequency to the consolidated plaintiffs who must continue registering. View "Luster v. Oklahoma ex rel Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Mastercraft Floor Covering, filed a lawsuit against Charlotte Flooring (CFI), a North Carolina corporation, in Oklahoma. Mastercraft alleged that CFI had hired it to install carpet in a North Carolina casino, but that after the work was completed, CFI failed to pay for the labor, services, and materials. CFI entered a special entry of appearance to object to Oklahoma having jurisdiction to decide the cause because CFI lacked the requisite minimum contacts to be sued in the State of Oklahoma. The trial judge, determined that Mastercraft failed to prove that CFI had sufficient minimum contacts to permit Oklahoma to exercise jurisdiction over CFI without offending conventional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Mastercraft appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because of the totality of contacts with the Oklahoma-based corporation, the trial court had personal jurisdiction. View "Mastercraft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Charlotte Flooring, Inc." on Justia Law

An Oklahoma worker was killed at Employer's jobsite in Texas. The employer's insurer paid the worker's Widow death benefits provided by Texas workers' compensation law. The widow also recovered damages in a wrongful death tort action in Texas. When the Insurer sought subrogation from the widow's wrongful death damages as allowed by Texas law, she filed suit in Oklahoma to prevent subrogation. She sought a declaratory judgment that the rights of Oklahoma workers and their dependents were governed by Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act, notwithstanding the worker's injury or death in another state, and any benefits that may be paid under another state's workers' compensation law. In particular, Widow asked the Oklahoma court to enforce the provision in Oklahoma law that forbids subrogation in cases of death benefits. The trial court granted the declaratory relief sought by the widow. On appeal by the Insurer, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the widow had to commence a proceeding by filing a claim with Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Court before Oklahoma could exercise jurisdiction over the benefits due the widow, including enforcement of the anti-subrogation provision in death benefit cases. Because she never filed a claim with Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Court, the Court of Civil Appeals held subrogation was proper. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and vacated the appellate court in this case. View "Holley v. ACE American Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this case was whether the district court erred in proceeding in the underlying foreclosure suit after the defendant filed a motion giving notice of the plaintiff corporation's suspension in June of 2000 for failure to pay corporate franchise taxes; for the eleven months that the plaintiff was on notice that its suspension was an issue in the suit, the corporation failed to be reinstated; and title 68, section 1212(C) of the Oklahoma Statutes denies a suspended corporation the right to sue or defend. Upon careful consideration, the Supreme Court held that the district court did err in proceeding; the Court therefore issued a writ of mandamus to direct the district court to vacate all orders previously entered. View "Moncrieff-Yeates v. Kane" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a Motion to Override Risk Level Classification under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). The trial court ruled it did not have jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. The trial court record did not reflect when appellant was first required to register, but he began actual registration in the summer of 2007. Following appellant's initial registration, the State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Department of Corrections, notified appellant that he had been assigned a numeric risk level of three and would thereafter have to register for life. Appellant claimed that prior to this determination of a level assignment he was only required to register for ten years. Appellant filed a Motion to Override Risk Level Classification and Brief in Support in 2009. Less than two weeks after appellant filed his motion, new amendments to SORA took effect. In light of the amendments, the trial court ruled it lacked jurisdiction to grant appellant relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Department could not retroactively increase his registration period. As such the trial court had jurisdiction over appellant's case. The matter was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Burk v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law