Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2019, Appellant Vickie McBee ("McBee") filed separate lawsuits against multiple parties involved in the design and construction of her personal residence. McBee filed her suit against Shanahan Home Design, LLC ("Shanahan Home") and Biggs Backhoe, Inc. ("Biggs Backhoe"); McBee's counsel did not immediately have summonses issued for service on the defendants. On May 18, 2020, the Canadian County court clerk's office issued summonses for both Biggs Backhoe and Shanahan Home. McBee served Biggs Backhoe on July 8, 2020, and Shanahan Home on July 16, 2020. Service was accomplished by certified mail, return receipt requested, delivery restricted to the addressee. Shanahan Home and Biggs Backhoe each filed special appearances, reserving additional time to answer McBee's petition. Each defendant moved to dismiss McBee's lawsuit. Biggs Backhoe's motion raised several arguments, including that McBee failed to serve her petition and summons within 180 days, and therefore should have been deemed dismissed as of May 19, 2020. Shanahan Home also raised several arguments, but noted that it would defer to the trial court's judgment on whether the Covid-19 related administrative orders affected the time limit in section 2004(I). In response, McBee maintained that the joint SCAD orders suspended the period for service of process, and therefore dismissal was improper. On October 7, 2020, the trial court issued and filed an order sustaining the motion to dismiss. The trial judge concluded, "because the Summons had not been issued prior to the Covid-19 issues that were addressed by the Supreme Court Directives (SCAD 2020-24; SCAD 2020-29; SCAD 2020-36), the directives do not apply." The trial judge further held that the 180-day period for service of summons was not stayed by the joint emergency orders. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, finding the trial judge erroneously sustained the motion to dismiss based on untimely service. "This Court's emergency orders acted to suspend or toll the period under section 2004(I); therefore, plaintiff timely accomplished service of process when the period between March 16, 2020, and May 15, 2020, is excluded from computing the deadline." View "McBee v. Shanahan Home Design" on Justia Law

An opioid manufacturer appealed a $465 million verdict following a bench trial in a public nuisance lawsuit. The district court held the opioid manufacturer liable under Oklahoma's public nuisance statute for its prescription opioid marketing campaign. The State of Oklahoma counter-appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court retained the appeal and held that the opioid manufacturer's actions did not create a public nuisance. The district court erred in extending the public nuisance statute to the manufacturing, marketing, and selling of prescription opioids. View "Oklahoma ex rel. Attorney General of Oklahoma v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari review for a second time in this case. Appellant Richard Dopp, appealed the trial court's dismissal of the refiling of his petition pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011, section 100, and his motion to reconsider the order of dismissal. The Appellant was an inmate, and his name appeared on the Oklahoma Registry of Frivolous or Malicious Appeals three or more times. The trial court dismissed without prejudice his first case because he had not prepaid the required filing fees pursuant to 57 O.S. 2011, section 566.2. Appellant then filed a motion to reconsider within ten days of that order, which the trial court denied. He appealed those orders to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal for failure to pay the required appellate cost deposit after the Court ordered him to pay it. Appellant refiled his petition. The trial court dismissed the petition as being untimely, finding that he did not file it within one year of the date of the order dismissing his first case. The trial court determined that his motion to reconsider was void ab initio pursuant to section 566.2. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, finding that only a validly filed appeal would extend the time to refile a petition pursuant to section 100 and the Appellant's first appeal was not valid. The Supreme Court vacated the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals' opinion, reversed the trial court, and remanded for further proceedings, holding the Appellant's first appeal was valid and the one-year period to refile began to run the day after the first appeal was final. View "Dopp v. Kirkendall" on Justia Law

Appellant Iris Stacy (Mother) sought certiorari review of an unpublished opinion by the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) that affirmed the trial court's judgment terminating her parental rights to I.T.S., I.M.S., and R.E.S. (Children). At issue was the trial court's sua sponte discharge of Mother's court-appointed counsel at the conclusion of the disposition hearing, which left her without representation until State filed its petition to terminate her parental rights over two years later. She argued the trial court's failure to provide her legal representation between the disposition and the filing of the petition to terminate her parental rights (a period of 798 days) was contrary to the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted her petition to address a question of first impression: Upon request by an Indian child's parent for counsel in a deprived child proceeding, and a finding of indigency, whether the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) required court-appointed counsel for the parent at all stages of the deprived child proceeding. The Supreme Court held that section 1912(b) of ICWA required, upon request and a finding of indigency, the appointment of counsel at all stages of the deprived child proceeding. View "In the Matter of I.T.S." on Justia Law

Petitioners the Oklahoma State Medical Association, Oklahoma Dental Association, the Oklahoma Osteopathic Association, the Oklahoma Society of Anesthesiologists, Inc., and Oklahoma Chapter American Academy of Pediatrics, Inc., asked the Oklahoma Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction to declare the actions of Respondents Kevin Corbett, CEO of the Oklahoma Health Care Authority and the State of Oklahoma ex rel. the Oklahoma Health Care Authority (OHCA), to implementing a new managed care program known as SoonerSelect, was not statutorily authorized and that such actions were therefore ultra vires. In the alternative, if the Supreme Court finds statutory authorization existed, Petitioners sought a declaration that Respondents violated the non-delegation doctrine. Petitioners also asked the Supreme Court to invalidate the Respondents' actions, including the request for proposal (RFP) and contract awards, because the Respondents failed to promulgate administrative rules to govern their implementation in violation of 75 O.S. 2011, sections 302(D) and (E). Finally, the Petitioners asserted the SoonerSelect program would require mandatory enrollment in violation of article II, Section 37(B) of the Oklahoma Constitution. The Petitioners requested the Supreme Court issue a writ of prohibition barring the Respondents from implementing SoonerSelect until such time as the Oklahoma Legislature has conferred the necessary authority. In the alternative, if the Court found such authority already existed in statute, then Petitioners requested the Court issue a writ of mandamus requiring the Respondents to promulgate administrative rules governing the SoonerSelect program prior to further implementation of the program. The Supreme Court agreed with Petitioners' assertion that the Legislature did not authorize the creation of the SoonerSelect program. It therefore did not find it necessary to engage in a thorough examination of the statutes to determine if there was a non-delegation doctrine violation. The OHCA did not promulgate any rules governing SoonerSelect for to review in order to weigh such a determination. To this end, the Court granted Petitioners declaratory relief; the Court deemed writs of mandamus or probation inappropriate. View "Oklahoma State Medical Association et al. v. Corbett" on Justia Law

Voters in the City of Enid presented a recall petition to City of Enid officials. The petition sought to recall plaintiff-appellant, City Commissioner Ben Ezzell for his support of a city wide mask mandate to combat the COVID epidemic. Ezzell objected to the recall petition, alleging that because the recall petition did not comply with the requirements of 34 O.S. 2011 section 3 and 34 O.S. Supp. 2015 section 6, which related to signature collection, the recall petition was insufficient. After a hearing, the trial court denied Ezzell's protest and determined that the petition was sufficient under the City Charter of Enid recall process. Ezzell appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held there was no conflict between the City Charter recall process, and the additional state requirements of 34 O.S. 2011 sec. 3 and 34 O.S. Supp. 2015 sec. 6, the state statutes governed, but were not properly followed. The recall petition was therefore insufficient on its face pursuant to Clapsaddle v. Blevins, 66 P.3d 352, and its predecessors. View "Ezzell v. Lack" on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Supreme Court previously declared that certain tribal gaming compacts the Oklahoma Executive branch entered into with the Comanche and Otoe-Missouria Tribes were invalid under Oklahoma law because the gaming compacts authorized certain forms of Class III gaming prohibited by state law. While "Treat I" was pending before the Supreme Court, the Executive branch entered into two additional compacts with the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians and the Kialegee Tribal Town. The parties to the compacts submitted the tribal gaming compacts to the United States Department of the Interior, and the Department of the Interior deemed them approved by inaction, only to the extent they are consistent with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined these new compacts were also not valid: for the new compacts to be valid under Oklahoma law, the Executive branch must have negotiated the new compacts within the statutory bounds of the Model Tribal Gaming Compact (Model Compact) or obtained the approval of the Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations. Without proper approval by the Joint Committee, the new tribal gaming compacts were invalid under Oklahoma law. View "Treat v. Stitt" on Justia Law

Defendant the City of Tulsa (City), passed an ordinance creating a tourism improvement district that encompassed all properties within City which had hotels or motels with 110 or more rooms available for occupancy. Plaintiff-appellee Toch, LLC owned Aloft Downtown Tulsa (Aloft) with 180 rooms. Toch petitioned for a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was invalid for a variety of reasons, including that the district did not include all hotels with at least 50 rooms available. The court granted summary judgment to Toch based on its determination that City exceeded the authority granted in title 11, section 39-103.1. The question before Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether section 39-103.1 granted authority to municipalities to limit a tourism improvement district to a minimum room-count of a number larger than 50. To this, the Court answered in the affirmative, reversed the trial court, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Toch, LLC v. City of Tulsa" on Justia Law

Through mediation efforts in connection with a federal lawsuit pending in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, Respondent, the Honorable J. Kevin Stitt, Governor of Oklahoma, negotiated and entered into new tribal gaming compacts with the Comanche Nation and Otoe-Missouria Tribes to increase state gaming revenues. The tribal gaming compacts were submitted to the United States Department of the Interior, and the Department of the Interior deemed them approved by inaction, only to the extent they were consistent with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The Comanche Nation and Otoe-Missouria Tribes were not parties to this matter; these tribes were sovereign nations and have not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The limited question presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether Governor Stitt had the authority to bind the State with respect to the new tribal gaming compacts with the Comanche Nation and Otoe-Missouria Tribes. To this, the Supreme Court held he did not. The tribal gaming compacts Governor Stitt entered into with the Comanche Nation and Otoe-Missouria Tribes authorized certain forms of Class III gaming, including house-banked card and table games and event wagering. Any gaming compact to authorize Class III gaming had to be validly entered into under state law, and it was Oklahoma law that determined whether the compact was consistent with the IGRA. The tribal gaming compacts Governor Stitt entered into with the Comanche Nation and Otoe-Missouria Tribes were invalid under Oklahoma law. The State of Oklahoma was not and could not be legally bound by those compacts until such time as the Legislature enacted laws to allow the specific Class III gaming at issue, and in turn, allowing the Governor to negotiate additional revenue. View "Treat v. Stitt" on Justia Law

In 2019, Respondents Ryan Kiesel and Michelle Tilley filed State Question No. 807, Initiative Petition No. 423 (SQ 807) with the Secretary of State of Oklahoma. SQ 807 proposes for submission to the voters the creation of a new constitutional article, Article 31, which would legalize, regulate, and tax the use of marijuana by adults under Oklahoma law. Petitioner Paul Tay filed this protest alleging the petition was unconstitutional because it violated the federal supremacy provisions of Article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Petitioner alleged the proposed measure was preempted by existing federal statutes including the Controlled Substances Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code. Because the United States Supreme Court did not address this question, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found the Supremacy Clause permitted it to perform its own analysis of federal law. Upon review, the Court held Petitioner did not meet his burden to show clear or manifest facial constitutional infirmities because he did not show State Question No. 807 was preempted by federal law. On the grounds alleged, the petition was deemed legally sufficient for submission to the people of Oklahoma. View "In re: State Question No. 807, Initiative Petition No. 423" on Justia Law