Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

At issue before the Oklahoma Supreme Court in this case was a challenge to the legal sufficiency of Initiative Petition No. 409. Respondents-proponents Retail Liquor Association of Oklahoma and Bryan Kerr filed Initiative Petition No. 409 with the Oklahoma Secretary of State, seeking to amend the Oklahoma Constitution by repealing Article 28 and adopting Article 28A. Article 28A as proposed, would have allowed wine to be sold in grocery stores. Also under the proposed article, retail package stores could sell any and all items that were sold in convenience stores and grocery stores. Small brewers could sell their products at a brewery or festival or trade show and could sell alcoholic beverages by the drink at a restaurant co-located on the premises of the brewery. Petitioners-opponents Oklahoma Grocers Association and Ron Edgmon filed an Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction with the Supreme Court to protest: (1) the constitutionality of the petition; and (2) the statutory sufficiency of the gist of the petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the gist of the petition did not fairly describe the proposed constitutional amendment and was invalid. View "In re Initiative Petition No. 409, State Question No. 785" on Justia Law

In 2014, Petitioner Theresa Maxwell suffered an injury to her knee while working for her Employer, Respondent Sprint PCS. She promptly notified her Employer and timely filed a CC-Form-3 with the Workers' Compensation Commission. The Employer admitted Petitioner's injury to her knee was compensable, and she had surgery to repair a tendon in her knee. Petitioner also received temporary total disability benefits from February 6, 2014, until February 24, 2014. After reaching maximum medical improvement on July 2, 2014, she returned to her pre-injury position with her employer earning her pre-injury wages. Later that year, Petitioner filed a request for a contested hearing on the issue of permanent partial disability. The ALJ concluded that Petitioner sustained 2% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole as a result of the injury to her knee and that the rate of compensation was $323.00 for a total award of $2,261.00. However, because she returned to her pre-injury position and pay, the ALJ ordered the award of benefits be deferred at a rate of $323.00 beginning July 2, 2014, for every week Petitioner worked in her pre-injury or equivalent job. Petitioner appealed the order, and the Workers' Compensation Commission sitting en banc affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that scheduled members are exempt from the AMA Guides under the AWCA. The Court also held that the permanent partial disability deferral provision of 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 sec. 45(C)(5) was an unconstitutional violation of due process under Art. 2, section 7.51 Sections 45(C)(5)(a-e) were invalid and stricken. The deferral of permanent partial disability benefits to a subclass of injured workers under 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 sec. 46(C) was an unconstitutional special law under Art. 5, sec. 59.52. Only that portion of Section 46(C) that made the deferral provision applicable to injuries to the body as a whole or "other cases" was invalid. Any definitional provisions found in 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 section 2, as were deemed invalid to the extent they were inconsistent with the Court's opinion with regard to this matter. On remand, the Commission, through its ALJs, were mandated to take all action necessary to implement the pronouncement made by this case. View "Maxwell v. Sprint PCS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant and Oklahoma taxpayer Robert Dani claimed certain property, which had previously been handed over to the State Treasurer pursuant to the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (UUPA), because it was presumed abandoned. This property consisted of $19.56, received in 2004 and submitted by Chevron/Texaco, as well as $150.00, received in 2013 and submitted by Office Depot, Inc. Appellant filed a claim for this property on or about January 16, 2014. His claim was approved, and a check was issued to Appellant for $169.56 on April 17, 2014. On June 22, 2015, Appellant filed suit against the State, seeking damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief, concerning the constitutionality and administration of the UUPA. He also alleged the UUPA was a "Ponzi scheme," again focusing on the constitutionality of the UUPA. The case was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and Appellant appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dani v. Miller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Michael Reynolds sued the Defendants-appellees, Mary Fallin, Governor of the State of Oklahoma; Ken Miller, Treasurer of the State of Oklahoma; Preston Doerflinger, State Director of the Office of Management and Enterprise Services and various unnamed state attorneys for their alleged involvement with the three general appropriation bills. The state moved to dismiss the case which was later granted by the district court. Reynolds' principle argument on appeal was that three types of sections in the challenged general appropriation bills were substantive laws and did not constitute appropriations and were as a result, unconstitutional. Reynolds challenged the "TRANSFER" sections of the general appropriation bills that transferred money from one fund to the Special Cash Fund of the State Treasury. He also challenged sections of the three general appropriation bills that provided authorization to transfer money from one fund to another and those that provide authorization to expend money. Having found no merit as to any of Reynolds' assertions of unconstitutionality, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the district court's granting of Appellees' motion to dismiss. View "Reynolds v. Fallin" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted H.B. 1970, prohibiting the off-label use of Mifeprex (generally known as "mifepristone" or "RU-486") and misoprostol (brand name Cytotec) for use in abortions. The effect of H.B. 1970 was to ban medication abortions in Oklahoma. In the first pronouncement ("Cline I"), the Oklahoma Supreme Court, following "Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey," (505 U.S. 833 (1992)), affirmed the district court's decision that H.B. 1970 was unconstitutional. Appellees then filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition and certified two questions to the Oklahoma Supreme Court: whether H.B. 1970 prohibited "(1) the use of misoprostol to induce abortions, including the use of misoprostol in conjunction with mifepristone according to a protocol approved by the Food and Drug Administration; and (2) the use of methotrexate to treat ectopic pregnancies." In "Cline II," the Oklahoma Court answered both questions affirmatively. The U.S. Supreme Court then dismissed the petition for certiorari as improvidently granted. In 2014, in response to the Cline II decision, the Oklahoma Legislature passed H.B. 2684, amending Title 63, Section 1-729a of the Oklahoma Statutes. H.B. 2684 was approved by the Governor and became effective on November 1, 2014. The Bill restricted Mifeprex and misoprostol use for abortions to the FDA-approved final Mifeprex label, prohibits methotrexate use for abortions except to terminate ectopic pregnancies, provides for liability of physicians who knowingly or recklessly perform an abortion in violation of H.B. 2684, and makes doctors subject to discipline and liability for violating H.B. 2684. Plaintiffs the Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice and Nova Health Systems filed this challenge to H.B. 2684's restriction of off-label use of Mifeprex in the district court against the Oklahoma Commissioner of Health and the Executive Director of the Oklahoma State Board of Medical Licensure and Supervision (State). While this case was pending before the district court, the Oklahoma Supreme Court enjoined enforcement of H.B. 2684 until its constitutionality "is fully and finally litigated." The dispositive question presented was whether H.B. 2684, violated either of two sections of the Oklahoma Constitution: Article V, Section I or Article V, Section 59. The Court answered in the negative. View "Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Juctice v. Cline" on Justia Law

Several Oklahoma taxpayers filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a permanent injunction against Defendants, Joy Hofmeister, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Oklahoma State Department of Education; and the Oklahoma State Board of Education, (the "State") to enjoin the payment of tuition to private sectarian schools alleging the "Lindsey Nicole Henry Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Act" (or "Scholarship Program") violated several articles of the Oklahoma Constitution. Both parties filed for summary judgment. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the parties' motions, finding the Act was constitutional on all challenged grounds except for one. The trial court entered a narrow Order ruling the Act violated the Oklahoma Constitution, Article II, Section 5, only to the extent it authorized public funds to pay the cost for students to attend private sectarian schools. This provision of the Constitution has been referred to as the "no aid" clause, prohibiting public money from being used for the benefit or support of religion. An injunction was issued to prevent payment to private religious schools, with no impact on the payment to private non-sectarian schools. The State appealed, arguing: (1) the payment to a sectarian school was permitted because it was for a valid public purpose and in exchange for consideration; and (2) the district court's construction of the Act created a religiosity distinction violating the U.S. Constitution's freedom of religion clause. After review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision in part and found the Act did not violate the "no aid" clause. The Court did not reach defendants' second issue, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Oliver v. Hofmeister" on Justia Law

The Tulsa County Assessor assessed ad valorem taxes on portions of real property owned by the respondent-appellees (and taxpayers) William Warren Medical Research Center and Montereau, Inc. The taxpayers challenged the assessment and the County Board of Equalization determined that the properties were not taxable. The Assessor appealed to the Tulsa County District Court which found in favor of the taxpayers. The Assessor again appealed but the Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal because the Assessor was not represented by the district attorney, nor the State Attorney General. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that county assessors may employ counsel to represent them in court proceedings including appeals from the Board of Equalization. Accordingly, the Court remanded the matter to the Court of Civil Appeals to address the merits of the appeal. View "Yazel v. William K. Warren Medical Research Center" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma certified three questions of Oklahoma law to the state Supreme Court. Plaintiff, a probationary police trainee, filed suit in the federal court pertaining his status as a probationary trainee under the terms of the municipality's collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Supreme Court reformulated the first question, and answered questions one and two in the negative. Question three was not answered because it was dependent on an affirmative answer to question two. The questions certified to the Court were: (1) whether a probationary police officer in a municipality that has entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") with a recognized bargaining agent under the Fire and Police Arbitration Act,who is excluded by the terms of the CBA from having access to the grievance/arbitration process contained in the CBA in connection with the termination of his/her employment due to his/her probationary status, but who was also a member of the Police Pension and Retirement Systems, at the time of the termination of his employment, has a right to be terminated only for cause by OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, sec. 50-123(B) and, thus, was entitled to due process in connection with the termination of his/her employment; (2) whether the probationary police officer under that scenario had a statutory right to a hearing before a Police Pension Review Board as provided for by statute; and (3) if a probationary police officer had a statutory right to a hearing before a Police Pension Board of Review, must the officer request a hearing and when must the officer request a hearing, or must the municipality offer a hearing and when must the municipality offer a hearing? View "Brewer v. City of Seminole" on Justia Law

Glenhurst Homeowners Association ("HOA") filed an action against Xi Family Trust and Xiang Yu Ren ("homeowner"), for breach of real property covenants. The HOA's Petition argued that the covenant for the Glenhurst Addition required all houses built in the neighborhood to have roofs that were a particular weathered wood color. After a hail storm in 2010, the homeowner hired a contractor to replace his roof and told the contractor to put the most energy efficient shingles on the house. The contractor did not put weathered wood colored shingles on the house. The HOA asked the trial court for an injunction, requiring homeowner to remove the nonconforming shingles and install shingles of weathered wood color. After denying a continuance request from homeowner, the trial court granted summary judgment to the homeowners association. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's denial of the continuance deprived the homeowner of a reasonable opportunity to properly respond to the homeowners association's motion for summary judgment, and that summary judgment should not have been granted. View "Glenhurst Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Xi Family Trust" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether a delay of approximately twenty months in scheduling a driver's license revocation hearing was a violation of the driver's constitutional right to a speedy trial (as guaranteed by the State Constitution). Plaintiff-driver Phillip Pierce appealed the suspension of his driver's license in an administrative proceeding for driving under the influence (DUI). The trial court agreed that plaintiff's constitutional right was violated and set aside the revocation order and reinstated Pierce's driving privileges. A divided Court of Civil Appeals reversed. Although expressing its concern related to the inordinate delay in the proceedings, the appellate court determined that Pierce had not asserted his right to a speedy resolution of his cause, was not prejudiced by the postponement, and that the Department did not abuse its discretion in waiting almost two years to finalize the charges in the cause. Knowing that its complaining witness was scheduled to be deployed to serve his country, the Department of Public Safety intentionally postponed the proceeding and did not schedule a hearing to allow the driver to be heard either on the merits or on the delay. These delays occurred despite the driver's timely request for a hearing. Under those unique facts, the Supreme Court held that the driver's right to a speedy hearing was violated and ordered reinstatement of his driving privileges. View "Pierce v. Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law