Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant David Skillicorn, III was charged with first-degree criminal mischief, among other crimes. The state’s theory regarding the charge was that, after a disagreement with his girlfriend, defendant intentionally drove a truck into her car. Defendant admitted he hit the car, but claimed he had done so accidentally. Specifically, he claimed the truck had malfunctioned and that he lost control of it. To rebut that claim, the state sought to introduce evidence that, after a prior disagreement with his girlfriend, defendant had driven recklessly. Over defendant’s objection, the trial court admitted the evidence. The state used the evidence to argue that, when defendant “gets angry, he acts out,” and that, therefore, the jury should find that, on the night of the charged crimes, defendant had acted out by intentionally damaging his girlfriend’s car. The jury convicted defendant of first-degree criminal mischief and other crimes. Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court's admission of the evidence of his prior driving was not admissible "to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith." The state argued that the evidence was admissible under the “doctrine of chances,” as applied in Oregon v. Johns, 725 P2d 312 (1986). The Court of Appeals observed that the evidence appeared to be propensity evidence, which was prohibited by OEC 404(3), but concluded that it was admissible under Johns. The Oregon Supreme Court concurred with the appeals court that the evidence was propensity evidence, but that it was inadmissible. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Skillicorn" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review in this case was whether ordinary first-class mail is, or can be, a “class of delivery calculated to achieve delivery within three calendar days.” Defendant was convicted on driving while suspended and for failing to register her vehicle. Wishing to appeal that judgment and acting without legal representation, defendant sent a notice of appeal to the Appellate Court Administrator by first-class mail. Defendant certified that the “method of filing” she had used for her notice was “United States Postal Service, ordinary first class mail.” A postage validation imprint (PVI) label on the envelope showed that petitioner had submitted her notice of appeal to the United States Post Office (USPS) for mailing on Monday, July 9, 2018, the last day of the applicable appeals period. The Appellate Court Administrator received defendant’s notice of appeal two days later, on Wednesday, July 11, 2018. The notice was forwarded to the Appellate Commissioner, who concluded that it was untimely and issued an order dismissing defendant’s appeal on that ground. The Court of Appeals majority concluded that first-class mail could, in no circumstances, be such a class of delivery and therefore, a notice of appeal that had been dispatched by first-class mail on the last day of the appeals period and received by the court two days later was untimely - requiring dismissal of the underlying appeal. The Supreme Court rejected the appellate majority’s analysis and conclusion, and also rejected an alternative theory for dismissing the appeal that was raised in a concurring opinion - a supposed failure to comply with proof-of-mailing-date requirements in ORS 19.260(1)(a)(B) and (1)(b). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the appeal was reversed and the matter remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Chapman" on Justia Law

The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant Peter Ciraulo's conviction should be reversed in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), which held that only a unanimous jury can find a defendant guilty of a serious crime. Defendant was charged with first-degree forgery, possession of a forged instrument, and third-degree theft. Defendant was tried before a twelve-person jury, in a trial that occurred before the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos. Before trial, defendant requested that the jury be instructed that it needed to be unanimous in order to return a conviction. The trial court denied defendant’s request, stating: “[U]ntil the Court of Appeals tells me otherwise, I’ll continue to comply with the law that requires the ten-person verdict in felony cases.” After deliberation, the jury found defendant guilty of all three counts. After receiving the verdict form, the trial court asked the presiding juror whether the jury’s decision had been unanimous, and the presiding juror confirmed that it had been. The trial court asked defendant whether there was any need to poll the jury further, and defense counsel responded that there was not. To the Oregon Supreme Court, defendant argued that Ramos required his convictions be reversed: (1) the nonunanimous jury instruction was a structural error, which always required reversal; and (2) even if the error is subject to a harmlessness analysis, the poll of the jury is insufficient to establish that the jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court concluded that, although the jury instruction permitting nonunanimous verdicts was erroneous, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to all of the verdicts in this case. Judgment was affirmed. View "Oregon v. Ciraulo" on Justia Law

The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant Zackery Chorney-Phillips' conviction should be reversed in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), which held that only a unanimous jury can find a defendant guilty of a serious crime. Defendant was charged with first- and second-degree custodial interference and was found guilty on both counts by a twelve-person jury. At trial, which occurred before the Supreme Court’s Ramos decision, the court instructed the jury that “[t]en or more jurors must agree on your verdict,” and defendant did not object to that jury instruction. After the jury returned its verdict, on a form that contained no indication of how individual jurors voted, the trial court polled the jury at defendant’s request. All jurors indicated they concurred with the verdict. For purposes of sentencing, the court merged the jury’s two guilty verdicts into one conviction for first-degree custodial interference, and then entered judgment. Defendant appealed, arguing the nonunanimous jury instruction was a structural error, which always required reversal. In addition, defendant argued the erroneous instruction required reversal under the federal harmless error standard because the poll of the jury was insufficient to establish the jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State did not dispute the instruction was given in error, but it argued the error was harmless because each of defendant’s convictions was based on a unanimous verdict. The State also argued defendant’s acceptance of the jury poll prevented him from challenging the adequacy of the jury poll on appeal. The Oregon Supreme Court ultimately determined it was not appropriate to exercise its discretion to review defendant's unpreserved assignment of error as plain error; judgment was therefore affirmed. View "Oregon v. Chorney-Phillips" on Justia Law

The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant Charles Kincheloe's conviction should be reversed in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), which held that only a unanimous jury can find a defendant guilty of a serious crime. Defendant was charged with several offenses, including first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and fourth-degree assault. Defendant’s case was tried to a twelve-person jury in 2018, prior to Ramos. While formulating jury instructions, the trial court asked defendant whether he wished to object to the instruction that the jury could return a nonunanimous verdict, stating, “All the defense attorneys are doing that now.” Defense counsel responded, “That’s fine.” There was no further discussion of the issue. The jury was instructed that “10 or more jurors must agree on the verdict.” The jury found defendant guilty as charged. Defendant requested that the trial court poll the jury. The poll revealed that the jury had unanimously convicted defendant of the sodomy and assault charges but that it had divided eleven to one on the rape count. Defendant appealed, assigning error to the nonunanimous jury instruction and to the receipt of the nonunanimous verdict. Defendant conceded that he had not preserved that assignment of error, and he asked the Court of Appeals to conduct plain error review. In his briefing to the Oregon Supreme Court, defendant argued that his exchange with the trial court was sufficient to preserve an objection to the nonunanimous jury instruction. The state conceded that defendant’s single conviction based on a nonunanimous verdict had to be reversed, but it argued the instructional error was harmless with respect to the two convictions based on unanimous verdicts. Even assuming that defendant preserved an objection to the jury instruction, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that error was harmless as to the two convictions based on unanimous verdicts. Defendant's convictions were therefore affirmed without the Court addressing whether defendant adequately preserved an objection to the nonunanimous jury instruction. View "Oregon v. Kincheloe" on Justia Law

The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant Michael Dilallo's conviction should be reversed in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), which held that only a unanimous jury can find a defendant guilty of a serious crime. Defendant was charged with delivery of methamphetamine and conspiracy to commit delivery of methamphetamine. He entered a plea of not guilty. Both charges were tried to a twelve-person jury in 2018, before the Ramos decision. At trial, consistent with Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, the jury was instructed that it could convict him without reaching unanimity. Defendant did not object to that jury instruction, and the record did not reveal whether the jury’s guilty verdicts were unanimous. Defendant argued that, although he did not preserve an objection to the erroneous jury instruction, the Oregon Supreme Court should exercise its discretion to review the trial court's error. Because of the absence of a jury poll, the Oregon Court concluded it was not appropriate to consider defendant’s unpreserved assignment of error; therefore defendant’s judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "Oregon v. Dilallo" on Justia Law

The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant Isidro Flores Ramos' conviction should be reversed in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), which held that only a unanimous jury can find a defendant guilty of a serious crime. Defendant broke into a home and sexually assaulted a nine-year-old girl. Defendant was charged with first-degree unlawful sexual penetration, first-degree sexual abuse, attempted first-degree rape, first-degree burglary, and coercion. Before trial, he filed a motion requesting that the jury be instructed that it needed to be unanimous to convict. The trial court denied that motion. The jury returned guilty verdicts on each of the five counts. The trial court polled the jury; the poll indicated the jury had reached a unanimous guilty verdict on all counts except for the attempted first-degree rape count. On that count, only ten jurors voted to convict. Defendant did not object to the manner in which the trial court polled the jury, and defense counsel indicated that he was satisfied by the poll. Defendant appealed. As relevant here, he assigned error to both the use of the nonunanimous jury instruction and the receipt of the nonunanimous verdict—assignments of error that he had preserved in the trial court. He argued that those errors required reversal of all his convictions. In a decision before the federal Supreme Court's Ramos decision, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. Because the jury returned four unanimous verdicts, the Oregon Supreme Court determined those convictions could stand; however, pursuant to Ramos, the fifth, nonunanimous conviction was reversed. View "Oregon v. Flores Ramos" on Justia Law

Defendant Micus Ward was convicted of aggravated and felony murder. After being arrested for that crime, and before being appointed counsel, defendant was twice interrogated while in custody. The trial court suppressed the statements that defendant made during the first interrogation, because the court determined that officers conducting that interrogation continued to question defendant after he invoked his right to remain silent. But the trial court refused to suppress defendant’s statements from the second interrogation, because it determined that the officers who conducted that interrogation obtained a valid waiver of defendant’s Article I, section 12, rights. The trial court thus suppressed statements that defendant made during the first interrogation but not those he made during the second interrogation. A jury found defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. On review, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded the State failed to prove that defendant validly waived his rights before the second interrogation. Accordingly, the Court concluded the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, and further concluded the error required a reversal of defendant’s conviction and a remand for a new trial. View "Oregon v. Ward" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case had submitted Initiative Petition 2016-005 (IP 5) to the Oregon Secretary of State so that it could be certified in time for the 2016 ballot. Section (1) of IP 5 provided that the people “call for an Article V Convention by enacting into law this Application, in accordance with Article V of the U.S. Constitution,” for purposes of considering whether to amend the United States Constitution to allow greater regulation of corporations and other artificial legal entities and greater regulation of money used for political purposes. Section (2) added that the call for such a convention was continuing and did not terminate by the passage of time. Section (3) provided for copies of the call to be sent to various persons. And section (4) stated that the call “shall be codified in Title 17 of Oregon Revised Statutes.” In this case, the Secretary refused to certify IP 5 on the ground that it failed to meet the procedural requirements established by the Oregon Constitution. Specifically, the Secretary explained that she “ha[d] been advised that a court review of [IP 5] would probably determine that it does not propose a law within the meaning of Article IV, section 1 of the Oregon Constitution and therefore may not legally be adopted through the initiative process.” Plaintiffs then filed this action in circuit court. Among other things, they sought a declaratory judgment that the Secretary was required to certify IP 5. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the Oregon voters who adopted the initiative power did not intend that power to extend beyond state lawmaking, and that Article IV, section 1(2)(a) did not authorize the people to directly apply for a federal constitutional convention. View "Harisay v. Clarno" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ernie Perez pled guilty in 2005 to two aggravated murders that he had committed at the age of fourteen. In 2016, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief raising constitutional claims premised on the Oregon Supreme Court’s interpretation of ORS 419C.349, a statute governing when a juvenile defendant could be waived into adult court, in Oregon v. J. C. N.-V., 380 P3d 248 (2016). The post-conviction court concluded that petitioner’s claims were barred by the claim preclusion rule in ORS 138.550(3) because petitioner could reasonably have raised those claims in an earlier petition that he had filed in 2008. For similar reasons, the post-conviction court held that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations set out in ORS 138.510(3). The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court granted certiorari review to address petitioner's argument that his claims could not reasonably have been raised prior to J. C. N.-V., thereby allowing him to escape the statute of limitations in ORS 138.510(3). The Supreme Court determined petitioner’s claims were indeed barred by ORS 138.550(3) because he failed to show that he could not reasonably have raised those claims at the time of his 2008 petition. The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the post-conviction court. View "Perez v. Cain" on Justia Law