Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Jacob Barrett committed aggravated murder in Oregon and was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. Pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact (ICC), Oregon transferred petitioner to an institution in the state of Florida. Thereafter, petitioner filed, in Oregon, two separate petitions for writ of habeas corpus alleging, among other things, that the terms of his confinement in Florida violated his rights under the state and federal constitutions. Defendant Colette Peters, Director of the Oregon Department of Corrections moved to “deny” petitioner’s first habeas petition for failure to state a claim. The state argued that the director was not a proper defendant because she did not have physical custody of petitioner and because she did not control the conditions of confinement in Florida. The trial court agreed with the state and dismissed petitioner’s first habeas petition with prejudice. Subsequently, the trial court, acting sua sponte, dismissed petitioner’s second petition for the same reasons that it had dismissed petitioner’s first petition. In reversing both of the trial court's decisions, the Court of Appeal held that an Oregon inmate incarcerated out of state pursuant to the ICC retained the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Oregon to remedy alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement and that petitioner had properly named the Director of ODOC as defendant. The state sought review of both cases, raising three issues: (1) whether Oregon law permits an inmate confined outside of Oregon pursuant to the ICC to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Oregon; (2) whether petitioner alleged cognizable habeas corpus claims in contesting the conditions of his confinement in Florida; and (3) whether petitioner properly named the Director of ODOC as defendant in these cases. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that petitioner’s transfer to and confinement in Florida did not prohibit him from bringing those constitutional claims, and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Barrett v. Peters" on Justia Law

The State charged defendant Denny Ghim and his wife with 17 counts of criminal mistreatment, first-degree theft, and aggravated first-degree theft. Midway through trial, defendant’s wife filed a motion in limine to exclude copies of her bank records, which the Department of Consumer and Business Services (DCBS) had obtained by administrative subpoena, from being admitted into evidence. Defendant joined in that motion and, throughout the trial, adopted his wife’s arguments on that issue. The question in this case was whether the agency’s use of an administrative subpoena to obtain defendant’s wife’s bank records violated Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence that the agency uncovered as a result of its subpoena, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Relying on "Oregon v. Johnson," (131 P3d 173 (2006)), the Court of Appeals held that defendant had no constitutionally protected privacy interest in the bank records. It followed that the agency’s use of an administrative subpoena to obtain those records did not violate Article I, section 9. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, but for slightly different reasoning: "Even if defendant has a protected privacy interest in his wife’s bank records, our decisions lead to the conclusion that the administrative subpoenas issued by DCBS did not violate defendant’s Article I, section 9, rights. We leave for another day the question whether and in what circumstances a defendant will have a protected privacy interest in information that a third party maintains, a question that can arise in differing factual circumstances which can have a bearing on its resolution." View "Oregon v. Ghim" on Justia Law

In 2012, an inter-agency drug interdiction team (comprised of U.S. Postal Service inspectors and local law enforcement) was deployed to examine packages at a USPS air cargo center near Portland International Airport. An officer noticed an Express Mail package addressed to "Maxi-pad Barnt" and addressed with defendant Max Barnthouse's Portland address. Aspects about the package and how it was addressed lead the officer to believe the package contained contraband. Officers went to Barnthouse's residence, and upon opening the package, found a stack of currency wrapped in a t-shirt. Subsequent search of the residence would reveal Barnthouse had large quantities of marijuana, packing materials, boxes and wrappers designed to hold bundles of money. Defendant was ultimately arrested and charged with unlawful possession of marijuana and intent to deliver. At issue in this case was whether the officer who initially handled the package violated Barnthouse's constitutional rights when it singled out the Express Mail package with the wrapped bundle of money in it. The trial court granted Barnthouse's motion to suppress, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court agreed the officers lacked probable cause to seize the package, and affirmed the appellate and trial courts. View "Oregon v. Barnthouse" on Justia Law

Defendant Dennis Davidson was convicted of two counts of public indecency for exposing himself at a public park; because he had two prior felony convictions for public indecency, and the trial court found no ground for downward departure, defendant was sentenced consecutively on each count to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under ORS 137.719(1). The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s convictions but held that the sentences violated Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendant petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for review, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding his convictions. The State also sought review, asserting: (1) that defendant’s sentences were unreviewable because they are “presumptive” sentences; and (2) that the sentences were not unconstitutionally disproportionate in light of the facts of this case and the circumstances of defendant’s previous crimes. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s convictions, but concluded that the sentences were unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied to defendant. The case was remanded for resentencing. View "Oregon v. Davidson" on Justia Law

Defendant petitioned for review of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, imposed for a conviction for first-degree sexual abuse. Defendant argued that, as applied to his circumstances, the sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. The Court of Appeals rejected that challenge. As defendant observed, the Supreme Court concurred that his sentence was the second harshest criminal penalty under Oregon law. However, in light of the circumstances of defendant’s current offense and his history of committing similar offenses against other young children, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole that the trial court imposed pursuant to ORS 137.719(1) was not disproportionate under Article I, section 16. View "Oregon v. Sokell" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Boyd's girlfriend was found dead on the street, the victim of a severe beating. Witnesses saw her on the ground and saw defendant running away from the scene. A few minutes later, police arrested defendant, who had the victim's blood on his hands, shoes, and pants. The issue in this case was whether police unlawfully interrogated defendant after he invoked his rights to counsel and against compelled self-incrimination. The State argued that defendant had asked a “confusing” question and that police responded by seeking “clarification,” which did not amount to unconstitutional interrogation. Defendant argued that he had merely asked why he had been taken into custody and whether he could make a phone call, that there was nothing particularly confusing about the requests, and that police responded with questions that were reasonably likely to (and in fact did) elicit incriminating evidence. The trial court agreed with the State and denied defendant’s motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, and concluded that the police unconstitutionally interrogated him. View "Oregon v. Boyd" on Justia Law

Defendant Brian Chandler was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. On appeal of that conviction, defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting a videotaped pretrial interrogation of defendant by Detective Gates. The videotape, which was played for the jury, included statements by Gates indicating her belief that defendant was lying and that the victims were telling the truth. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to redact Gates’s statements, because, under OEC 403, the prejudicial impact of those statements outweighed their probative value. The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant had failed to preserve his argument under OEC 403. The court rejected defendant’s remaining argument that Gates’s statements constituted impermissible vouching testimony. Finding no reversible error after review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Chandler" on Justia Law

The trial court found defendant Robert Makin guilty of first-degree child neglect, as well as other offenses. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s first-degree child neglect convictions without discussion. The question in this case was whether a reasonable trier of fact could find defendant guilty of first-degree child neglect for knowingly allowing his children to stay “[i]n a vehicle where controlled substances are being criminally delivered * * *.” Defendant's three children were in his car when a police officer stopped him for a traffic violation. Also in the car were methamphetamine and implements for selling it. There was no evidence, however, that defendant had sold or was delivering methamphetamine to an identified buyer while his children were with him in the car. Rather, all that the evidence showed was that, while his children were in the car, defendant possessed methamphetamine with the intent to sell in the future. After review, the Supreme Court held that first-degree child neglect, as defined in ORS 163.547, did not include knowingly leaving or allowing a child under 16 years of age to stay in a vehicle where controlled substances are possessed with an intent to deliver. Because the state did not argue that the evidence in this case gave rise to any inference other than possession with intent to deliver, the Court of Appeals' decision to the extent it upheld defendant’s convictions for first-degree child neglect was reversed. On review, defendant did not challenge his convictions for delivery and possession, and the state did not challenge the Court of Appeals decision reversing defendant’s conviction for manufacturing and remanding that charge for further proceedings. Those parts of the Court of Appeals decision were affirmed. View "Oregon v. Makin" on Justia Law

In 2009, plaintiff American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon, Inc. (ACLU), made a request under the Oregon Public Records law to inspect and copy certain documents of the Civilian Review Board of the City of Eugene pertaining to city police officers' use of a Taser against "Mr." Van Ornum. The request was ultimately denied, and the ACLU sued for release of the documents under ORS 192.420 (1). The City of Eugene cited, as grounds for its denial the records request, a conditional exemption in the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the exemption did not apply when “the public interest requires disclosure of the information. . . .[W]hen that exemption applies, a trial court must determine, as a matter of both law and fact, the nature and significance of two competing interests - the public’s interest in disclosure and the public body’s interest in confidentiality. Then, the court must balance those competing interests and determine, as a matter of law, which interest predominates." In this case, after considering the nature and significance of the competing interests, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the public interest in disclosure of the requested records predominates, and the trial court erred in declining to order their disclosure. View "American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Eugene" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Davis threatened and assaulted two people outside of a store, and two uniformed officers were dispatched to the area. When the officers arrived, one of them saw defendant walking away from a group of people. Believing that defendant was the perpetrator, the officer got out of his patrol car and identified himself as a police officer. Defendant ran away. The officer chased him and repeatedly yelled “Stop, police!” The other officer pursued defendant in his patrol car, activating its overhead emergency lights and siren. Defendant kept running and continued to run from the officers until they apprehended him. The state ultimately charged defendant with third-degree escape for fleeing from police after the officer commanded him to stop. The issue in this case was whether, in running from the police, defendant committed the criminal offense of third-degree escape. The statute that defined the offense requires proof that the defendant was in custody at the time of the escape. The trial court concluded that the police, in shouting for defendant to stop, had effectively placed him in “constructive custody.” The Court of Appeals agreed, affirming without a written opinion. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that police merely shouting for another person to stop does not place that person in custody for the purposes of establishing third-degree escape. View "Oregon v. Davis" on Justia Law