Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2002, defendant Gregory Bowen assaulted his ex-girlfriend and, in a different incident the same day, killed a friend and committed theft from that victim. Defendant was charged with two alternative counts of aggravated felony murder and one count of intentional murder, along with 15 other felony and misdemeanor charges. Defendant pled guilty to the several charges that arose from his assault of his ex-girlfriend. The remaining charges, which arose from the murder of the friend, went to a jury trial. The jury found defendant guilty on all those charges. Defendant was ultimately sentenced to death on the two aggravated murder charges. The trial court subsequently imposed a sentence of death on each of the two aggravated murder convictions and also sentenced defendant on the intentional murder conviction, as well as each of the other felony and misdemeanor charges. This case went before the Supreme Court on automatic and direct review for the third time following a remand to the trial court. The principal issue that defendant raised was whether, on remand, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for resentencing on his noncapital felony convictions. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Bowen" on Justia Law

The juvenile court took jurisdiction over A.J.C. for conduct that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted possession of a firearm in a public building, unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful use of a weapon, and menacing. The question this case presented to the Supreme Court for review was whether the school-safety exception to the warrant requirement announced in "State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. M. A. D.," (233 P3d 437 (2010)), permitted a school principal to conduct a warrantless search of the youth’s backpack after the principal had seized the backpack from the youth. The juvenile court concluded that the search was permissible under the school-safety exception, and it denied youth’s pretrial motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court also affirmed. View "Oregon v. A. J. C." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Marion County Circuit Court to issue a protective order with respect to documents and communications subject to the lawyer-client privilege. Petitioner’s proposed protective order sought to prevent the State (the superintendent of the Oregon State Penitentiary) from disclosing such information to third parties unrelated to the underlying post-conviction case. Upon review of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the post-conviction court’s order denying petitioner’s motion for a protective order was erroneous, and the Court mandated the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the post-conviction court to vacate its order and issue a protective order. View "Longo v. Premo" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the owners of real property in Linn County, brought an inverse condemnation action against the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT). Plaintiffs alleged that ODOT, by repeatedly making representations to others about its intention to landlock their property and initiate a condemnation action, created a nuisance that "blighted" plaintiffs' property, resulting in a compensable taking of the property under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution. A jury agreed and awarded plaintiffs more than $3,000,000 in damages. ODOT appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that no taking had occurred. The Supreme Court allowed plaintiffs’ petition for review, and agreed with the Court of Appeals decision. Therefore the Court affirmed the appellate court, reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hall v. Oregon" on Justia Law

Petitioner, the petitioner in the underlying post-conviction case, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Marion County Circuit Court to issue a protective order with respect to documents and communications subject to the lawyer-client privilege. Petitioner’s motion for a proposed protective order sought to prevent the State (who is the superintendent of the Oregon State Penitentiary and the defendant in the underlying post-conviction case) from disclosing such information to third parties unrelated to the post-conviction case. In "Longo v. Premo," (355 Or 525 (2014)), the construed OEC 503(4)(c) to be a limited exception permitting disclosures of confidential information only as necessary for a lawyer to defend against allegations of breach of duty, and the Court directed the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring a post-conviction court to issue a protective order. Similarly, in this case, the Court granted mandamus relief. View "Brumwell v. Premo" on Justia Law

Defendants held an around-the-clock vigil on the steps of the state capitol to protest the deployment of Oregon National Guard troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. During that vigil, the state police cited defendants for second-degree criminal trespass when they remained on the capitol steps after 11:00 p.m., in violation of a Legislative Administration Committee (LAC) guideline. Defendants challenged those citations, arguing that the LAC guideline was unconstitutional under Article I, section 8, and Article I, section 26, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendants also argued that the LAC guideline violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court rejected those arguments and found defendants guilty of second-degree criminal trespass. On appeal, the Court of Appeals similarly rejected defendants' facial challenges to the guideline under the Oregon Constitution, but remanded defendants' as applied challenges to allow defendants to question the legislator co-chairs of the LAC about enforcement of the guideline. Because defendants' state constitutional challenges were unresolved, the Court of Appeals did not reach defendants' First Amendment argument. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: the LAC guideline, on its face, did not violate Article I, section 8, or Article I, section 26, of the Oregon Constitution. However, the Court remanded the case to permit defendants to question the legislator co-chairs of the LAC about their involvement, if any, in enforcement of the guideline against defendants. Likewise, the Supreme Court did not reach defendants' First Amendment argument. View "Oregon v. Babson" on Justia Law

The City of Milwaukie used highly pressurized water to clean sewer lines adjacent to plaintiff's house, causing sewage to back up through toilets and bathroom fixtures. Plaintiff sued the city seeking compensation for the damage to her home on two theories, negligence and inverse condemnation. The trial court dismissed the negligence claim before trial as barred by the statute of limitations. The inverse condemnation claim went to trial before a jury. At the close of plaintiff's case, the city moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the evidence did not establish a compensable taking of property under the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied the city's motion, and the jury found for plaintiff, awarding $58,333 in damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. On the facts before it, the Supreme Court concluded that the city's actions did not give rise to a compensable taking. The Court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Dunn v. City of Milwaukie" on Justia Law

The issue in this mandamus proceeding was whether the trial court correctly denied defendants' motion to change venue. Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, initiated a medical malpractice action against defendants in Multnomah County. Defendants argued that venue was in Clackamas County, because that was where the clinic was located, where the doctor who provided the husband's medical services resided, and where the husband received treatment. Plaintiffs argued that venue is proper in Multnomah County, because defendants solicited patients who lived in that county, referred patients to imaging facilities in that county, used medical education programs in that county, and "identified" the clinic's location in its website as the "Portland area." The trial court denied defendants' motion, explaining that defendants, by soliciting patients in Multnomah County, "purposely availed themselves of the court's jurisdiction" in that county. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court mistakenly conflated personal jurisdiction considerations with the statutory requirements for venue and erred in denying defendants' motion. The Court therefore granted defendants relief and granted the writ. View "Kohring v. Ballard" on Justia Law

This case came before this court on automatic and direct review of defendant's judgment of conviction and sentence of death for multiple counts of aggravated murder. Defendant raised 30 assignments of error. The Supreme Court took each for analysis. Finding no reversible error, the Court affirmed Defendant's death sentence. View "Oregon v. Serrano" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Chester Westfall brought a civil action against the State claiming that the Department of Corrections had kept him in prison longer than his lawful term of incarceration. Specifically, he alleged that the department had unlawfully extended his prison term by having a sentence run consecutively to another sentence imposed the same day, rather than running consecutive to a sentence that had been imposed previously. The State moved for summary judgment, asserting that it was entitled to discretionary immunity because the department's written policies required its employees to treat the sentence as consecutive to other sentences imposed the same day. The trial court agreed and granted the State's motion. The Court of Appeals reversed on appeal, concluding that any discretionary immunity that applied to the department's decision to adopt the written policies did not also apply to those employees who carried out the policies. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis, and the Court rejected plaintiff's alternative argument that the actions of the department and its employees were not the kind protected by discretionary immunity. The case was remanded back to the Court of Appeals, however, for consideration of plaintiff's other arguments that the Court of Appeals did not address. View "Westfall v. Oregon" on Justia Law