Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This case concerned a driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) conviction following the termination of a diversion agreement. Defendant Rhonda Colgrove pled guilty to misdemeanor DUII and petitioned to enter diversion. Defendant’s diversion petition stated, in part, that she had “read and underst[ood] all of the information in the attached Explanation of Rights and DUII Diversion Agreement” and “agree[d],” among other things, to “[a]ttend a victim impact panel as ordered by the court.” Defendant failed to pay $335 in fees and to attend a victim impact panel within the diversion period. The trial court thereafter terminated the diversion agreement and entered a judgment of conviction, and defendant appealed. As pertinent here, defendant challenged her conviction on the ground that the trial court had erroneously terminated her diversion agreement either because the agreement had not set a deadline to attend the victim impact panel or because the trial court had discretion to waive the attendance requirement. The Court of Appeals assumed that defendant’s challenge was reviewable under ORS 138.105(5), but concluded that it failed on the merits. The Oregon Supreme Court allowed defendant’s petition for review to address the reviewability issue that the Court of Appeals did not: whether ORS 138.105(5) precluded a defendant who pleads guilty or no contest from obtaining appellate review of legal challenges to the conviction in the judgment entered in the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded that such challenges were not reviewable under ORS 138.105(5). Accordingly, it affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals on different grounds. View "Oregon v. Colgrove" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Ralston was arrested, booked, and charged by district attorney’s information with misdemeanor driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) and reckless driving. Five days later, the prosecutor dismissed the misdemeanor charges to investigate whether defendant had predicate convictions that would have elevated the charge to felony DUII. Six weeks later, a grand jury indicted defendant on a charge of felony DUII. By that time, video footage from the jail on the night that defendant was arrested and booked had been overwritten automatically. When defense counsel later learned that the booking video had been overwritten, defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him on the ground that his right to a speedy trial under Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution had been violated, arguing that his inability to use the video of his booking at trial was prejudicial to him. The trial court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which held defendant did not establish prejudice resulting from the delay so as to warrant dismissal of the charges against him. The trial court judgment was affirmed in part and remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Ralston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gregory Chaimov made a public records request in July 2018, seeking copies of completed request forms used by state agencies to propose legislation for the 2019 legislative session. Individual state agencies had completed approved blank forms and then submitted them to the Oregon Department of Legislative Services (DAS) for the Governor to decide whether to request that the Office of Legislative Counsel prepare draft bills. The issue presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was whether completed request forms from the Office of Legislative Counsel were subject to disclosure under Oregon’s Public Records Law. DAS contended the requested forms fell within the attorney-client privilege under OEC 503 and were thus exempted from disclosure under ORS 192.355 (9)(a). The trial court granted summary judgment for plaintiff, holding that the request forms were not exempt and ordering their disclosure. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that they were subject to the attorney-client privilege. On review, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reversed the judgment of the trial court. View "Chaimov v. Dept. of Admin. Services" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Burris was convicted of attempting to commit the misdemeanor unlawful possession of a firearm. The issue his appeal presented for the Oregon Supreme Court was the legal effect, if any, of a cross-reference between two statutes that criminalized the same conduct: possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony. The first statute, ORS 166.270, defined the felony offense of felon in possession of a firearm. The second statute, ORS 166.250, defined the misdemeanor offense of unlawful possession of a firearm. The statute defining the felony offense included an exception for certain persons discharged from imprisonment, parole, or probation at least 15 years earlier. The statute defining the misdemeanor offense did not include a similar exception, but it began with a prefatory clause that cross-referenced other statutes, including the felony offense. The question was whether the 15-year exception to the felony offense also applied to the misdemeanor offense through the latter’s prefatory clause. The state argued the prefatory clause’s reference to ORS 166.270 had no legal effect because, by its terms, the 15-year exception to the felony offense applied only to the felony offense and therefore did not create an exception to the misdemeanor offense. To this, the Oregon Supreme Court concurred and affirmed the trial court. View "Oregon v. Burris" on Justia Law

In a 20-count indictment, defendant Nathan Chitwood was accused of sexually abusing his then-13-year-old stepdaughter. A jury acquitted defendant of all but three counts. Defendant appealed his convictions, contending that the prosecutor made two highly improper statements during the rebuttal closing argument. Defendant did not object to either of those statements, but, on appeal, he argued that the prosecutor’s argument was so prejudicial that the trial court judgment should be overturned on plain error review. The Court of Appeals agreed the prosecutor’s statements were improper, but it declined to conduct plain error review, reasoning the prosecutor’s argument was not so prejudicial as to deny defendant a fair trial and that there was a possibility that defense counsel’s failure to object was strategic. The Oregon Supreme Court found the prosecutor’s argument constituted plain error: the statements were impermissible and, taken together, were so egregious that they deprived defendant of a fair trial. The Supreme Court exercised its discretion to review that error and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Chitwood" on Justia Law

Defendant Darius Thompson robbed someone with a knife, and the victim shot defendant. Defendant sought treatment in a hospital, where police officers questioned him. An officer seized defendant’s cell phone as likely containing evidence of the shooting and other crimes. The officer did so without a warrant, fearing that, if he did not seize the phone, defendant could otherwise destroy the phone or its contents. Police kept the phone for five days before applying for a warrant to seize and search the phone. Once they had the warrant, police searched the phone and found records of calls and messages related to the robbery and shooting. They then used that information in questioning defendant, eliciting statements that defendant argued were incriminating. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the phone and all derivative evidence, and the trial court denied the motion. A jury found defendant guilty of first-degree robbery, among other crimes, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the resulting conviction. The Oregon Supreme Court's review of this case was limited to issues raised by the motion to suppress, including preservation questions at trial and on appeal. The State conceded, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the Court of Appeals erred in holding it did not need to consider three statements defendant claimed should have been suppressed because he identified them only in his reply brief to the appeals court, and not in his opening brief. The Supreme Court also found defendant adequately raised and preserved his objection to the admission of evidence derived from the seizure of his cell phone, which the Supreme Court found police holding it for five days without a warrant was unreasonable and unlawful. Errors notwithstanding, the Supreme Court determined the evidence that should have been suppressed did not prejudice defendant, and therefore his conviction was affirmed. View "Oregon v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Defendant John Shedrick walked into a bar and sat at a video poker machine near the ATM the bar maintained for customers. The bar’s owner was about to refill the ATM and placed a bundle of currency on top of it. Within two or three seconds, while the owner turned around to greet a patron who had entered the bar, defendant took the bundle of money, placed it in his jacket pocket, and walked toward the door. A bar patron saw defendant take the bundle and stopped him before he could leave. Defendant was ultimately convicted of first-degree theft. As defined in ORS 164.055(1)(a), the offense requires the State to prove, among other things, that the “total value of the property” stolen in the transaction “is $1,000 or more.” The issue on review was whether proof of a culpable mental state concerning the “value of the property” element was required. The trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed with the state that none was required; Defendant argued the jury should have been instructed that the state had to prove his culpable mental state—at least criminal negligence—concerning the value of the money taken. The Oregon Supreme Court held that in order to prove first-degree theft, the state must prove the defendant’s culpable mental state with respect to the value of the property stolen and that the trial court erred in failing to give the requested instructions. However, the Court concluded the error was harmless and, therefore, affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision and the trial court’s judgment of conviction. View "Oregon v. Shedrick" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review stemmed from the dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief filed by a petitioner who was a fugitive from justice while his criminal case was pending in the trial court. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition on the basis that petitioner’s flight from justice, which ultimately delayed his sentencing by 10 years, would impair the State’s ability to present witness testimony in any retrial that the post-conviction court might order. Specifically, the Supreme Court was asked whether the common-law “fugitive dismissal rule” should have been extended to post-conviction cases filed by former fugitives. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "even if a petitioner’s former fugitive status might sometimes justify a post-conviction court refusing to carry out the statutorily prescribed post-conviction relief process, we conclude that the court’s concerns in this case—about delay-based prejudice to the state in any retrial—did not justify dismissal of petitioner’s claim for post-conviction relief." View "Sills v. Oregon" on Justia Law

In September 2017, Klamath County Animal Control impounded 22 dogs, three horses, and seven chickens from Petitioner Kenneth Hershey’s property. The state subsequently charged Hershey with three counts of second-degree animal neglect, one count for each type of animal. under ORS 167.347. As relevant here, that statute provides that, when an animal is being held by an animal care agency pending the outcome of a criminal action for mistreatment of the animal, a district attorney, acting on behalf of the animal care agency, may file a petition in the criminal action asking the circuit court to order the forfeiture of the animal unless the defendant in the criminal action (or another person with a claim to the animal) pays a security deposit or bond to cover the agency’s costs of caring for the animal. The question presented for the Oregon Supreme Court by this case was whether, under Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution, a party has a right to a jury trial in a proceeding brought under ORS 167.347. The circuit court ruled that a party did not have such a right. The Court of Appeals affirmed, in a divided opinion. The Supreme Court concurred with the lower court decisions and affirmed. View "Oregon v. Hershey" on Justia Law

Defendant Zachary Carlisle challenged his conviction for misdemeanor third-degree sexual abuse, which required the state to prove that he “subject[ed] another person to sexual contact” and that “[t]he victim d[id] not consent to the sexual contact.” The question this case raised for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was which culpable mental state applied to the “victim does not consent” element of the offense. The trial court instructed the jury that the State needed to prove that defendant “knowingly” subjected the victim to sexual contact and that defendant was “criminally negligent” with respect to the fact that the victim did not consent to the sexual contact. According to defendant, the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that both elements required proof of a “knowing” mental state. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the legislature did not intend that a conviction under ORS 163.415 would require proof that the defendant knew that the victim did not consent to the sexual contact. Accordingly, the trial court did not err, and defendant's convictions were affirmed. View "Oregon v. Carlisle" on Justia Law