Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner and her friend were crossing a street late at night when defendant, who had been drinking, hit them with his car and seriously injured them. Defendant pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence of intoxicants and two counts of assault in the fourth degree for "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caus[ing] physical injury." The trial court sentenced defendant to a combination of supervised probation, jail time, fines, and suspension of his driver's license. The trial court judgment also granted the state 90 days to submit a "reasonable final restitution amount." The state timely submitted a proposed supplemental judgment requesting that defendant be ordered to pay restitution in an amount that defendant stipulated represented the full amount of petitioner's economic damages. Petitioner filed suit, alleging that the trial court had violated her right to "receive prompt restitution" under Article I, section 42(1)(d) of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied petitioner's claim, and, pursuant to ORS 147.539, petitioner sought direct review of that order with the Supreme Court. Finding no constitutional violation, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Oregon v. Algeo" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested, handcuffed, booked, and lodged in jail along with other 49 other "Occupy Portland" protesters. She was then charged with second-degree criminal trespass. The issue in this mandamus proceeding was whether the state's election under ORS 161.566(1) to "treat" the misdemeanor offense of criminal trespass as a violation effectively decriminalized that offense and thereby deprived defendant of the jury trial right afforded her under Article I, section 11. The Supreme Court concluded defendant was entitled to a jury trial on the violation charge, and accordingly dismissed the state's petition. View "Oregon v. Benoit" on Justia Law

Defendant was accused of shoplifting, was arrested and briefly incarcerated. She was charged with third-degree theft and attempted first-degree theft. At defendant's arraignment, the state elected under ORS 161.566(1) to prosecute the charges as violations rather than misdemeanors. Defendant filed a motion to have the charges tried to a jury and to be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, contending that she was entitled to those protections even though the state was prosecuting the charges as violations. The trial court denied the motion and found defendant guilty on both charges by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant was fined $300 on each conviction. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecutor's election to treat the offenses as violations precluded defendant from asserting her right to a jury trial. Consistently with its decision in "Benoit," the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in rejecting defendant's demand for those protections and that the Court of Appeals correctly reversed defendant's convictions after a trial to the court. View "Oregon v. Fuller" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was whether Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution applied to a restitution determination in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The youth-defendant in this case argued that he was entitled to a jury trial because recent constitutional and statutory amendments transformed the juvenile restitution statute, ORS 419C.450, into a civil device through which victims of crime could recover monetary damages for their injuries. The Supreme Court held that a restitution determination pursuant to ORS 419C.450 was not civil in nature and that Article I, section 17, therefore did not require a jury trial in the defendant's case. View "Oregon v. N. R. L." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was what constituted a "proof of loss" in a claim for UIM benefits and what sufficed to trigger the safe harbor provision. The insured provided notice of an injury automobile accident to her insurer, but did not submit a UIM benefits claim at that time. Nearly two years later, the insurer learned of the possible UIM claim. The insurer agreed in writing that it accepted coverage, that the only remaining issues were liability and damages, and that it was willing to submit to binding arbitration. After recovering on her UIM claim, the insured asked for attorney fees. The insurer claimed the benefit of the safe harbor provision of ORS 19 742.061(3). The Court of Appeals concluded that the insurer did not send its safe harbor letter within six months of the insured's "proof of loss." According to the Court of Appeals, the "proof of loss" was the initial report of injury two years earlier. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the initial report of injury did not provide sufficient information to constitute a proof of loss for a UIM claim and that the insurer's safe harbor letter was sufficient to trigger the statutory exception to an attorney fee award. View "Zimmerman v. Allstate Property and Casualty Ins." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action to recover for injuries that their son sustained during delivery. The issues before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether ORCP 59 H limits an appellate court's ability to review objections to a trial court's instructional rulings and whether a statutory cap on noneconomic damages constitutionally can be applied to actions brought by children injured during birth. The Court of Appeals held that, because defendant had not excepted to the trial court's rulings as ORCP 59 H requires, it could not seek appellate review of those rulings. On appeal and again on review, the parties debated whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury and whether applying a statutory cap to the jury's damages award would violate the Oregon Constitution. The jury returned a general verdict finding that defendant was "negligent in one or more ways alleged by plaintiffs" and, awarded plaintiffs economic damages and noneconomic damages. On appeal, defendant argued that both rulings were incorrect because the informed consent statute had no application to a vaginal delivery. The Supreme Court concluded that because an action for medical malpractice was one for which "the right to jury trial was customary in 1857," Article I, section 17, prohibited the legislature from limiting the jury's determination of noneconomic damages. Having reached that conclusion, the Court did not address plaintiffs' other arguments on constitutional grounds. View "Klutschkowski v. PeaceHealth" on Justia Law

The petitioners in this case sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 9 (2014). They argued the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). Initiative Petition 9, if adopted by the voters, would amend provisions of the Oregon Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act. Upon review of the ballot title, the Supreme Court concluded that the proposed ballot title did not contain a concise and impartial summary of not more than 125 words that summarized the proposed measure and its effects. Furthermore, the Court found that the proposed summary of the initiative did not disclose that employees who were not members of the union but who were members of the bargaining unit would receive representation without cost. Accordingly the title was referred back to the Attorney General's office for modification. View "Towers v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Defendant was accused of embezzling money from her employer in multiple transactions over a period of sixteen months. The prosecutor aggregated those transactions to indict defendant on sixteen counts of theft, one count for each month. The prosecutor's office did not have a "policy" for aggregating theft transactions, but did so to create "a clear organizational outline for the jury." Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that it violated the Supreme Court's mandate in "Oregon v. Freeland," (667 P2dd 509 (1983)). The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the privileges and immunities provision of the state constitution, and whether it applied to prosecutors' charging decisions. If so, then the question remaining in this case was whether the prosecutor must consistently adhere to a coherent, systematic policy in making charging decisions. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed defendant's conviction. By this decision, the Supreme Court overruled "Freeman" and reaffirmed its decision in "Washington v. Clark," (630 P2d 810 (1981)). View "Oregon v. Savastano" on Justia Law

Defendant kidnapped his victim as part of an effort to persuade her not to testify against one of his friends. The friend had terrorized, raped, and sodomized the victim, and the victim feared that the defendant would use a gun to harm her. As a result, a grand jury indicted defendant for, among other things, second-degree kidnapping. He waived his right to a jury, and the trial court convicted him of that crime in addition to several others. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether the state constitution required that the facts necessary to impose a dangerous offender sentence be found by the grand jury and pleaded in the indictment. The trial court held that it did not, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed, and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. View "Oregon v. Reinke" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged his conviction for the crime of felon in possession of a firearm, arguing that when he possessed the firearm in question, he was not a "person who has been convicted of a felony" within the meaning of the felon-in-possession statute. In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had not declared defendant's conviction to be a misdemeanor in the original or a subsequent judgment of conviction by the time that defendant possessed the firearm in question. Accordingly, the Court rejected defendant's claim of error and affirm his conviction on the felon-in-possession charge. View "Oregon v. Stark" on Justia Law