Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of several weapons-related charges based on his possession of loaded semiautomatic handguns and a knife in a public place within the city of Portland. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court to review his convictions. The Court concluded that the ordinance enacted by the City of Portland was constitutional, and therefore affirmed. View "Oregon v. Christian" on Justia Law

Defendant Dean MacBale petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to order the trial court in his case to hold a public hearing to determine the admissibility of a rape victim's past sexual conduct, notwithstanding the state Rape Shield law. Defendant claimed that the victim made false allegations against him so that she could later bring a civil action against him for money damages. Defendant wanted to present evidence that the victim had a habit of falsely accusing men for later financial gain. Before his criminal trial, Defendant filed a motion under the Rape Shield law to determine the admissibility of the victim's conduct. The court granted the motion for a hearing, but denied making the hearing public in accordance with the Rape Shield Law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a hearing to determine admissibility of evidence under the Rape Shield Law does not constitute an "administration of justice" for the purposes of Article I, Section 10 of the Oregon Constitution, and therefore, such hearing could be closed to the public. View "Oregon v. MacBale" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the admission of certain evidence following being held in contempt for violating a Family Abuse Prevention Act restraining order. On appeal, defendant argued that the admission of a certificate of service at trial violated his right to confrontation under the state Constitution because the State did not establish the declarant was unable to testify. The trial court concluded the certificate was admissible; the appellate court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the out-of-court declaration made by the deputy sheriff who issued the certificate was not "witness" evidence that triggered defendant's constitutional rights; the certificate was an official record that the deputy was duty-bound to report, and it did not include investigative or gratuitous facts or opinions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial and appellate courts. View "Oregon v. Copeland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant James Watson's motion to suppress evidence. Police stopped defendant to investigate a traffic violation but decided not to issue a citation. Defendant was nevertheless detained, and he argued that that detention was a violation of his constitutional rights. Police would uncover marijuana, cocaine and related paraphernalia inside defendant's car. After review of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court concluded that the detention was for further investigation, and was reasonably related to the traffic stop. View "Oregon v. Watson" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted for the 1989 killing of the Department of Corrections director. At the time, Oregon law provided two sentencing options for aggravated murder: death or life with the possibility of parole (ordinary life). Petitioner contended that he received inadequate assistance of counsel at the time of his criminal trial, specifically that he was not told he had the right to object to a new sentencing law to his case on ex post facto grounds. The post-conviction court found that as a matter of fact, petitioner did not established that the advice would have made a difference. The appellate court and Supreme Courts affirmed that decision. View "Gable v. Oregon" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on what constitutes a reprieve under the Oregon Constitution. After the Court affirmed Plaintiff-Respondent Gary Haugen's aggravated murder conviction and death sentence, he dropped all appeals, and the trial court set an execution date. The Governor subsequently issued a reprieve suspending Defendant's sentence for the duration of the Governor's term. Defendant purported to reject the reprieve, and sought to have it declared ineffective and invalid. The trial court held that a reprieve must be accepted to be effective and ruled the Governor's reprieve ineffective. The Governor appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the reprieve was valid and effective regardless of whether Defendant rejected it, and accordingly reversed the trial court. View "Haugen v. Kitzhaber" on Justia Law

Four certified questions of law from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon went before the Oregon Supreme Court. All centered on the mortgage finance industry's practice of naming the Mortgage Electronic Recording System, Inc. (MERS) rather than the lender, as a security instrument's mortgagee or beneficiary and the Oregon Trust Deed Act (OTDA). The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that under Oregon Law, an entity like MERS cannot be a trust deed's beneficiary; ORS 86.735(1) does not require recordation of "assignments" of a trust deed by operation of law that results from the transfer of the secured property; MERS cannot hold or transfer legal title to the trust deed; and MERS' authority to foreclose must derive from the original beneficiary and successors in interest. View "Brandrup v. ReconTrust Co." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on nonjudicial foreclosure of trust deeds under the Oregon Trust Deed Act (OTDA) and the mortgage finance industry's practice of naming the Mortgage Electronic Recording System, Inc., (MERS), rather than the lender, as a trust deed's "beneficiary." Plaintiff argued that, although the trust deed identified MERS as the beneficiary of the trust deed, neither MERS nor any of the other entities involved in the foreclosure had any legal or beneficial interest in the trust deed that would allow them to foreclose. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether all of the requirements for nonjudicial foreclosure set out in the OTDA had been satisfied. The Supreme Court, after its review, also concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed, but for a different reason than the one the Court of Appeals identified. View "Niday v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether a taxpayer could satisfy its obligation to "pay annually to the state" the $75,000 corporate minimum tax under ORS 3 317.090(2), by claiming on its corporate excise tax return a $75,000 "Business Energy Tax Credit" (BETC) under ORS 315.354. The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer, Con-Way, could satisfy its tax liability under ORS 317.090(2) by claiming a BETC on its return. The Department of Revenue (department) appealed, arguing that the Tax Court's conclusion was inconsistent with ORS 317.090(2), on the ground that a tax credit cannot be used to pay or otherwise satisfy the minimum tax imposed under ORS 2 317.090(2). Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Con-Way Inc. & Affiliates v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Two law enforcement officers, believing that defendant was being assaulted, responded to an incomplete 9-1-1 call that had been traced to defendant's home. One officer took defendant's husband into custody, while the other officer proceeded to interview defendant on the porch of her home. While interviewing defendant, the officer made an observation that caused him to reasonably believe defendant might be in possession of drugs. The officer asked defendant if he could search her, and she agreed. During the search, the officer discovered a glass pipe with drug residue on it. Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was whether the officers' actions, commands, and inquiries in investigating the possible domestic assault resulted in a seizure of defendant within the meaning of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution and, if so, whether that seizure was constitutionally permissible. The Court concluded that defendant was seized for constitutional purposes, but the Court further concluded that the seizure was lawful. The Court accordingly reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Oregon v. Fair" on Justia Law