Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Mark Strawn, the plaintiff in a class action case, petitioned for an award of attorney fees and costs incurred for the appellate work done on review before the Supreme Court in the underlying matter. In addition, Strawn sought two supplemental fee awards: one for the cost of litigating the fee petition, and the other for the cost of defending against a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court after the Oregon court issued its decision. Further, Strawn sought a $5,000 incentive fee for his service on review as class representative. The issues raised by this appeal included: (1) the appropriate method for determining the amount of a reasonable fee award in a case that involved both a statutory fee-shifting award and a common-fund award; (2) the propriety of applying a multiplier to the awards; (3) how fees should be apportioned between the fee-shifting and the common-fund awards; (4) whether this court has authority to award attorney fees for work done in opposing a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court; (5) whether a court has authority to award post-opinion, prejudgment interest on court-awarded attorney fees; and (6) whether an appellate court may award a class representative a class incentive fee on appeal and review. Strawn filed a class action against Farmers raising two contractual claims (breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith) and one common law claim (fraud) in connection with auto insurance policies written by Farmers. The jury found for the class on the contractual claims and the fraud claim, and it made a single award of compensatory damages on those claims. In addition, and for the fraud claim only, the jury awarded punitive damages. The Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to discuss the methodology appropriate to award fees based on the issues raised in the appeal, and made adjustments as deemed necessary in compliance with the limits of Oregon law. View "Strawn v. Farmers Ins. Co.  " on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether plaintiff had standing under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, ORS 28.020, to seek a declaration that defendant Sisters School District #6 and its Board of Directors lacked authority to enter into a particular form of financing arrangement without a vote of the people. Plaintiff alleged that he had standing because his "status as a taxpayer and voter within the district will or may be adversely affected[.]" More specifically, plaintiff alleged that entering into the challenged form of financing arrangement might, in some unspecified way, "jeopardize the district[']s ability to provide for the daily operation of the district" and, if that should come to pass, increase the likelihood that the district will have to seek additional financing to cover its obligations. The trial court concluded that those allegations were insufficient to satisfy the requirement of ORS 28.020 that only persons "whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected" by the challenged ordinance have standing. The Court of Appeals concluded that the harm that plaintiff alleges is too attenuated and speculative to satisfy the standing requirement of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the appellate and trial courts. View "Morgan v. Sisters School District #6" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant Leland Hemenway with possession of methamphetamine. Before trial, he filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by police, arguing that his consent to search was the product of an illegal seizure, and therefore was inadmissible under the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding that the stop was unlawful and the evidence from the search was presumptively obtained through exploitation of the earlier unlawful conduct. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, using the opportunity of this opinion to modify the exploitation analysis announced in the case-law authority the Court of Appeals relied on in its reversal (Oregon v. Hall, 115 P3d 908 (2005)). View "Oregon v. Hemenway" on Justia Law

The Board of Licensed Professional Counselors and Therapists (board) issued a final order suspending petitioner Rachel Weldon's license for two years and assessed costs against her. Petitioner asked the board to stay enforcement of that order pending judicial review. A few months later, the board issued an amended final order of suspension. Concluding that petitioner had not demonstrated irreparable harm and had failed to show a colorable claim of error, and that substantial public harm would result if it entered a stay, the board also entered a final order denying petitioner's request for a stay. Petitioner appealed the board's order assessing the fine and denying the stay. Petitioner also asked the Court of Appeals to enter an emergency stay to permit her to continue to practice until appellate court proceedings were complete. The Appellate Commissioner granted petitioner a temporary stay pending the board's response to petitioner's motion. In its response, the board asserted that ORS 676.210 precluded the Court of Appeals from entering a stay. The commissioner accepted the board's understanding of ORS 676.210 but, sua sponte, decided that, by precluding the exercise of the court's inherent authority to grant a stay, the statute violated the separation of powers provision of Article III, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution. The board appealed the part of the commissioner's order that declared ORS 676.210 unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals ultimately granted review of the matter and determined that petitioner demonstrated a colorable claim of error. It denied petitioner's motion for a stay and vacated that part of the appellate commissioner's order that permitted petitioner to file a supersedeas matter to stay the board's fine. Upon review of the appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that the board erred when it argued, and the Court of Appeals erred when it decided, that the Court of Appeals had no authority to issue a stay pending its decision on the merits of petitioner's appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court stayed the board's order suspending petitioner's license until the Court of Appeals issued its decision on petitioner's request. View "Weldon v. Bd. of Lic. Pro. Counselors and Therapists" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Synectic Ventures I, LLC, Synectic Ventures II, LLC, and Synectic Ventures III, LLC, entered into a loan agreement regarding money that they had loaned to defendant EVI Corporation. The loan agreement provided that the loan, secured by a security interest in essentially all of defendant's property, would be converted to equity ownership in defendant, if defendant obtained additional financing by a certain date. Shortly before that deadline, the managing member of plaintiffs (who was also chairman of the board and treasurer of defendant and financially interested in defendant) entered into an agreement purporting to extend the loan period by an additional year. During the extension period, defendant obtained the additional financing and converted the debt to equity. Plaintiffs filed an action against defendant, asserting that they were not bound by the extension because the managing member had had a conflict of interest and defendant knew of the conflict. The trial court rejected that argument and granted summary judgment for defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting defendant summary judgment, and reversed the court's judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Synectic Ventures I, LLC v. EVI Corp." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the purported conflict between two statutes relating to the issuance of a writ of mandamus: ORS 34.110, which precludes issuance of the writ if the relator has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and ORS 34.130(3), which states that a writ of mandamus "shall be allowed" by a court or judge on the petition for the writ. After plaintiff filed a petition for an alternative writ, the court declined to issue the writ and instead dismissed plaintiff's petition, relying on the existence of an adequate remedy at law. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed without opinion. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court concluded that that the circuit court permissibly dismissed plaintiff's petition. View "Oregon ex rel Portland Habilitation Center v. Portland St. Univ." on Justia Law

In his criminal case, defendant unsuccessfully sought an order compelling the victim to produce the hard drive of her laptop computer so that the defense could obtain a forensic examination of the hard drive. After his conviction, defendant requested that the trial court order that an already-existing copy of the hard drive, preserved in a related civil case, be placed under seal in the trial court record of defendant's criminal case, for purposes of appellate review. The trial court granted that motion and rejected the victim's claim that the order violated her right as a crime victim under Article I, section 42, of the Oregon Constitution to refuse a discovery request. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's order did not violate the victim's rights under Article I, section 42. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Bray" on Justia Law

In two criminal cases consolidated for purposes of opinion, each defendant's conviction was based, for the most part, on eyewitness identification evidence. In "Oregon v. Lawson," the Court of Appeals concluded that, despite the state's use of unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedures, under the test first articulated by the Supreme Court in "Oregon v. Classen," (590 P2d 1198 (1979)), the victim's identification of defendant Lawson had been reliable enough to allow the jury to consider it in its deliberations. In "Oregon v. James," (again relying on "Classen") the Court of Appeals similarly concluded that, although the witnesses had been subject to an unduly suggestive police procedure in the course of identifying defendant James, those identifications had nevertheless been sufficiently reliable, and were therefore admissible at trial. The Supreme Court allowed review in each of these cases to determine whether the Classen test was consistent with the current scientific research and understanding of eyewitness identification. In light of the scientific research, the Court revised the test set out in Classen and adopted several additional procedures, based generally on applicable provisions of the Oregon Evidence Code (OEC), for determining the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence. View "Oregon v. Lawson" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a physician's conclusion that defendant physically abused a child met the requirements for admissibility of scientific evidence. The child in this case, C, was approximately 18 months old when he arrived at the emergency room with multiple injuries, including a golf-ball-sized lump on his forehead and a fractured skull. The state accused defendant of causing C's injuries and charged him with two counts of criminal mistreatment and first- and third-degree assault. To prove first-degree assault, the state had to show that defendant had caused C "serious physical injury," defined as injury that "creates a substantial risk of death." The jury convicted defendant of third-degree assault and two counts of criminal mistreatment. The jury acquitted defendant on the charge of first-degree assault, but found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of second-degree assault. Like first-degree assault, second degree assault requires a finding that the inflicted injury created a substantial risk of death. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the expert's diagnosis was not limited to determining the cause of C's injuries, but included a conclusion that C's injuries were the result of child abuse. That aspect of the expert's diagnosis addressed a second disputed issue, whether defendant's actions were intentional or accidental. Because the Court could not conclude that there was little likelihood that the admission of the expert's diagnosis did not affect all of defendant's convictions, the Court also could not conclude that the trial court's error was harmless as to the convictions for first degree mistreatment and third-degree assault. The decision of the Court of Appeals was therefore reversed, and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Sanchez-Alfonso" on Justia Law

This case concerned an employment discrimination dispute between Portland State University (PSU) and Portland State University Chapter of the American Association of University Professors (the Association). Those entities entered into a collective bargaining agreement that included a dispute resolution process for alleged violations of the agreement. That dispute resolution process included a "Resort to Other Procedures" (ROP) provision that permitted PSU to decline or discontinue a grievance proceeding if an Association member brought a claim regarding the same matter in an agency or court outside of PSU. PSU invoked that provision to halt a grievance proceeding after an Association member filed discrimination complaints with two outside agencies. The Association subsequently filed a complaint with the Oregon Employment Relations Board (ERB), alleging in part that PSU had engaged in an unfair labor practice by discontinuing the contractual grievance proceeding. ERB concluded that PSU's invocation of the ROP clause constituted unlawful discrimination. It therefore declined to enforce the ROP clause and ordered PSU to submit to the grievance process. On PSU's appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that ERB erred by applying the wrong legal standard in ordering PSU to submit to the grievance process, and it therefore reversed and remanded the case for ERB's reconsideration. The Association sought review of that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals's decision, concluding that ERB correctly held that the ROP clause at issue in this case imposed a form of employer retaliation for protected conduct that reasonably would impede or deter an employee from pursuing his or her statutory rights. "The resulting harm is neither theoretical nor trivial, but qualifies as a substantive difference in treatment. The ROP provision is therefore facially discriminatory . . . Accordingly, ERB properly declined to enforce that illegal contract provision. " View "Portland St. Univ. Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Portland St. Univ." on Justia Law