Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants Michael Miskell and Anthony Sinibaldi sought review of a Court of Appeals decision affirming their convictions for aggravated first-degree theft and second-degree burglary. The Supreme Court allowed their petition for review to consider one of the issues defendants raised in their consolidated appeal: whether the trial court erred in denying their motion to suppress an audio recording of a conversation between defendants and a police informant, which the police made without first obtaining a court order. Upon review, the Court concluded that the police acted unlawfully in failing to seek a court order under ORS 9 133.726 before intercepting and recording the conversation, and that the recording should have been suppressed. The Court further concluded that the error was prejudicial. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

The State appealed, and Defendant Kevin Jarnagin cross-appealed a pretrial order in a murder case suppressing evidence. Neither party challenged the trial court's ruling that the officers violated Defendant's rights under the state constitution when they questioned him at the police station and later at a hospital without advising him of his Miranda rights. The parties focused instead on whether statements that defendant made the next day at his home and before and after a polygraph examination should be suppressed on the ground that those statements were a product of the Miranda violations the day before. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the statements Defendant made at his home were a product of the Miranda violations the day before but that the statements he made before and after the polygraph examination were not. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order in part and reverse it in part.

The Supreme Court previously affirmed Defendant Robert Langley, Jr.'s aggravated murder convictions, but twice vacated his death sentences and remanded the case for further penalty-phase proceedings. On this third review, Defendant raised 27 assignments of error related to the third and most recent penalty-phase proceeding. As his second assignment of error, Defendant contended the trial court erred by requiring him to proceed pro se without first securing valid waiver of his right to counsel. Because the Supreme Court determined that that assignment was well-taken, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further penalty-phase proceedings.

Two petitioners sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition (IP) 28 (2012). Before 2009, Oregon imposed a 6.6 percent tax rate on a corporation's "taxable income." In 2009, the voters approved Ballot Measure 67, which modified the marginal tax rate that corporations pay on their taxable income. Petitioner Patrick Green raised a single challenge to the caption, the "yes" vote result statement, the "no" vote result statement, and the summary. He contended that each part of the ballot title was defective because it referred to a tax on "corporate income" rather than a tax on corporate "profits" or "taxable income." He reasoned that the use of the phrase "corporate income" was misleading because it failed to communicate that the tax would fall only on corporate profits. Petitioner Dan Harmon raised a similar challenge, noting that what the IP would have modified was a corporate excise tax and that the ballot title should have either referred to an excise tax or used the phrase "taxable income." In his view, either phrase would have been more accurate and less misleading than the use of the unmodified term "income." In each instance, the certified ballot title used the term "income," even though that term can refer to more than one type of income and even though those differing types of income may have significantly different tax consequences. The Supreme Court concluded the Attorney General advanced no legitimate reason for not using a more accurate term, which would reduce the potential for misleading the voters that the certified ballot title currently presents. The Court agreed with Petitioners that referring to a tax on corporate "income" was, without more, misleading. Accordingly, the Court referred the caption, the "yes" result statement, the "no" result statement, and the summary to the Attorney General for modification.

Defendant Jose Cabanilla is a native Spanish speaker whose command of English was described as "weak." A witness saw Defendant's vehicle leave the road at a high rate of speed, roll over and come to rest in a nearby field. The responding officer arrested Defendant for driving under the influence of intoxicants. The matter before the Supreme Court concerned whether for purposes of implied consent, the officer "informed" Defendant of the consequences of refusing to take a breath test when those consequences were explained in English. The trial court concluded that Defendant had been adequately informed and declined to suppress evidence of Defendant's refusal to take the test. A jury convicted Defendant of driving while under the influence (DUII), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that evidence of a DUII defendant's refusal to take a breath test is admissible against that defendant even if the state does not establish that the defendant understood the information given about his rights and the consequences of refusing the breath test.

At issue in this dependency case was the lawfulness of a juvenile court order that required a father not to interfere with the ability of a child who is a ward of the court to visit other children who live with the father but are not wards of the court. The Court of Appeals concluded that the juvenile court possessed the authority to enter the order under ORS 419B.337(3). "J.R.F," the Father in this case, contended that the Court of Appeals erred in its holding, because the order at issue did not involve visitation "by the parents or the siblings." The Department of Human Services (DHS) contended that the Court of Appeals was correct, because, although ORS 419B.337(3) did not explicitly authorize the order at issue, the dependency statutes, taken as a whole, authorized the court to "make any order designed to further the best interest of a ward and advance the reunification of the family." Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that even if the state was correct about the scope of the authority that the statutes conferred on the juvenile court, the record in this case was inadequate to support the order at issue. The Court therefore reversed the opinion of the Court of Appeals and vacated the order of the juvenile court.

Petitioners sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 26 (2012), arguing that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). Initiative Petition 26 would amend a number of statutory provisions pertaining to the commercial harvest and sale of fish caught in Oregon waters. As the Supreme Court noted in reviewing the ballot title for a different initiative petition concerning commercial fishing, those statutes "exist[ed] as part of a complex web of laws," including an interstate compact between Oregon and Washington, statutes and regulations of both states, federal law, treaties with Native American tribes, and various court orders. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the initiative's caption overstated the effect of the proposed measure by asserting that it would eliminate "non-tribal commercial fishing." Petitioners argued, and the Attorney General did not appear to disagree, that some commercial fishing -- of some species, in some Oregon waters, using some gear -- has occurred or was then occurring and that it would not be prohibited by Initiative Petition 26. Accordingly, the reference in the caption to the "elimination" of non-tribal commercial fishing needed to be changed. The caption also referred to only the Columbia River, thus understating the scope of the proposed measure, which would ban non-tribal commercial gillnetting of all fish in all Oregon "inland waters." That description, too, needed to be changed. The Court did not address petitioners' other challenges to the caption, and remanded the matter back to the Attorney General for modification.

Petitioners, Northeast Coalition of Neighborhoods and Coalition for a Livable Future, sought direct review under Oregon Laws 1996, chapter 12, of a decision by the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) that affirmed in relevant part a land use final order by Respondent METRO. The land use final order at issue concerned the Columbia River Crossing Project, which (among other things) would extend a light rail line from Oregon to Washington. Petitioners contended Metro either exceeded its statutory authority in adopting the order or that its decisions in the order were not supported by substantial evidence. Respondents Metro and Tri-County Metropolitan Transit District of Oregon (TriMet) opposed the petition. Finding that Petitioners failed to show that METRO either exceeded its statutory authority or made a decision about the highway improvements that was not supported by substantial evidence on the whole record, the Supreme Court affirmed.

This matter came to the Supreme Court on a "request" that it enforce, on its own motion, an alternative writ of mandamus that it previously issued in connection with Defendant Gary Haugen's death-warrant proceeding. After that writ issued, the Court determined that it had been complied with, and then sua sponte dismissed it. The request to enforce the dismissed writ was premised on an assertion that the trial court did not comply with the writ. The trial court held a hearing on whether to issue the death warrant. Defendant was represented by two lawyers, but before the hearing, Defendant made clear he wanted to represent himself and waive all future challenges to his conviction and sentence. Defense counsel objected, believing Defendant not competent to be executed. The trial court then asked Defendant a series of questions to evaluate his competency. Finding Defendant competent, his counsel was withdrawn but placed on "standby." After validly waiving his rights, the trial judge issued the death warrant and set a date for Defendant's execution. The Oregon Capital Resource Center (OCRC) attempted to participate by filing a writ of mandamus contending that the trial court discharged Defendant's counsel and issued a death warrant without a sufficient inquiry into Defendant's competence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that OCRC had not made the necessary showing that it had any legal authority to bring the proceeding on Defendant's behalf. Furthermore, however, Defendant's former lawyers had authority to challenge Defendant's competency to discharge them. Finding no error in the trial judge's inquiry as to Defendant's competence to represent himself, the Court denied OCRC's request and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Petitioner Marco Montez sought review of an appellate court decision that denied him post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court had rejected Petitioner's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase retrial proceeding that resulted in him receiving the death penalty. In his petition for reconsideration, Petitioner contended that one of the Justices on the Supreme Court should not have participated in the decision to deny review of the appellate court's decision. Petitioner pointed out that the Justice in question served on the Court of Appeals at the time of his appeal, and that the then-judge recused himself from considering Petitioner's appeal. Though the record in this case provided no explanation for the judge's decision to recuse himself from considering Petitioner's post-conviction appeal at the Court of Appeals, the Judge/Justice recused himself from the Supreme Court's review of Petitioner's appeal. As such, the Court concluded that Petitioner's arguments about the Justice's previous participation in the Court's decision to deny review was made moot. The Court subsequently allowed Petitioner's petition for reconsideration.