Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Hezakiah Baker was charged with multiple counts related to the manufacture and possession of marijuana. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized by Medford city police officers who, without a warrant, entered defendant's residence to investigate a 9-1-1 domestic disturbance call. An issue central to the case was the use of a "code word": the 9-1-1 caller stated she had heard the female resident of the house use a prearranged code word indicating to the caller that police assistance was needed. Officers were dispatched with the belief that the situation constituted an emergency because the dispatched officer subjectively believed the use of code amounted to "something important" requiring him to enter without a warrant under the "emergency aid" exception. The trial court denied defendant's motion. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that the warrantless entry of defendant's residence was not authorized as emergency aid, and thus violated Defendantâs rights under the Oregon Constitution. Upon review of the briefs submitted by the parties and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding that from the facts and circumstances of this case, a reasonable inference could have been drawn that emergency aid was needed. The Court affirmed the circuit courtâs decision.

Commissioner of Public Lands Peter Goldmark sought a writ of mandamus to compel Attorney General Robert McKenna to pursue an appeal of a trial court decision in a condemnation action. Although Mr. McKenna provided representation at the trial court, he refused to pursue the appeal based on his evaluation of the merits of the case. The commissioner wished to appeal, which he discussed with his general counsel, an assistant attorney general. The commissioner and the attorney general then exchanged correspondence and met on at least one occasion, but the attorney general refused to file the appeal for the commissioner. The attorney general also refused to appoint a special assistant attorney general (SAAG) to pursue the appeal for the commissioner. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the issue in this case was one of first impression: the Court had never been "squarely presented" with an instance of the attorney general refusing to represent a state officer on an appeal. "Under the statutes, the responsibility is clear." Because the Court found no discretion within the attorney general's statutory duty, the Court issued the writ and directed the attorney general to provide the commissioner with legal representation.

At issue in this case was whether a uniform criminal jury instruction on aiding and abetting correctly stated Oregon law. The charges in this case arose after Defendant Petronilo Lopez-Minjarez and his father drove Defendantâs truck to the home of a man who was having an extra-marital affair with Defendantâs mother. Police arrested Defendant after a neighbor reported seeing the victim abducted and gave police the license plate number of the truck in which he was taken. The State indicted Defendant on multiple charges. In instructing the jury, the trial court identified the elements of each of the substantive crimes with which Defendant was charged by using the pertinent uniform criminal jury instructions at issue in this case. The Supreme Courtâs review found that the uniform instructionsâ statement of the law was incorrect, and that the trial court gave those instructions in error. The Court concluded that the error prejudiced Defendant on his convictions for assault, felony murder, and aggravated murder, and accordingly the Court reversed those convictions.

In this case, the police informed Defendant John Davis that he was the subject of an investigation for sexual abuse. Defendant retained counsel, who sent a letter to the police invoking his right to remain silent and directing the police to discuss the matter with counsel. Months later, the police obtained incriminating statements from defendant without the presence of his counsel by monitoring his communications with the victim. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the police, in obtaining those incriminating statements from defendant, violated his right against self-incrimination and right to counsel under the Oregon Constitution. The trial court concluded that, in light of defendant's earlier invocation of his right to remain silent and right to counsel, the police obtained the incriminating statements in violation of both constitutional provisions. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that the right against self-incrimination under Article I, Section 12, bars police questioning only when a defendant is in custody or otherwise in compelling circumstances. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the right to counsel under Article I, Section 11, bars police questions outside the presence of counsel only once "criminal proceedings" have begun, which, at the earliest, is the time of a suspect's arrest. Therefore the Court reversed the lower court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Trial courts may impose enhanced sentences in criminal cases when an aggravating factor provides a substantial and compelling reason for doing so. The state sentencing guidelines list some aggravating factors that trial courts may consider. Trial courts, however, also may rely on aggravating factors that are not listed (non-enumerated aggravating factors) to impose an enhanced sentence. Defendant Roy Speedis argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that to the extent the sentencing guidelines permit the use of non-enumerated aggravating factors, they either violate the separation of powers provision of the Oregon Constitution or are vague in violation of the Oregon and the United States Constitutions. The trial court disagreed and imposed an enhanced sentence based on non-enumerated aggravating factors. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment without opinion. Upon careful consideration of Defendant's constitutional arguments, the case law and the legislative history of the applicable legal standards, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions.

Defendant Ivey Barrett was convicted of misdemeanor stalking. The victim in this case is Appellant Linda Barrett, Defendant's estranged wife. Oregon law granted certain crime victims a "meaningful role" with respect to the criminal prosecution of the accused. At the onset of such proceedings, the prosecutor must inform the trial court, among other things, whether the victim is present, and if not, whether the victim requested advance notice of any critical stage of the proceeding. State law allows victims whose rights are violated to inform the trial court and propose a remedy. Mrs. Barrett invoked her right to be notified, and completed a form memorializing that request. A victim advocate told Mrs. Barrett that she did not need to be present for a pretrial appearance by Defendant. That appearance was not scheduled to involve entry of a plea or sentencing. However, the prosecutor negotiated a plea with Defendant prior to that hearing, and Defendant pled before the court. Mrs. Barrett filed a claim for violation of her rights as a crime victim because she was not notified of that hearing. The trial court agreed that Mrs. Barrett's rights had been violated, but held that state law provided no relief for the violation. On appeal, Mrs. Barrett argued to the Supreme Court that state law permitted her to "propose" her relief. She argued that the trial court erred by not vacating its sentencing decision so that she could be present. The Supreme Court found that Mrs. Barrett was entitled to a remedy, and that vacating Defendant's sentence and conducting a resentencing hearing was permissible under state law. The Court vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

Two women brandishing swords robbed the Purple Parrot Lounge in Klamath Falls. As a result of that crime, a grand jury charged Defendant Roberta Gilmore with conspiracy and first-degree robbery. The trial court arraigned Defendant on those charges and appointed counsel to represent her. After her arraignment, Defendant remained in custody pending trial. Approximately two months later, Defendant sent two notes to the Oregon State Police, asking a detective to "come talk to her." Though the notes did not specify what Defendant wanted to talk about, the police noted that Defendant "wanted to see her kids before she went to prison." The Supreme Court characterized this case as one involving questions on what steps police must take to ensure a knowing and intentional waiver of a defendant's constitutional rights. The trial court implicitly found that Defendant had waived her right to counsel and denied her motion to suppress the statements made after she passed those two notes to the police. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court found that the police officer did not advise Defendant of her Miranda rights when he spoke to Defendant at her request. Therefore, the statements to the officer should have been suppressed. The Court reversed the appellate and trial courts' decisions, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Sheriffs of Jackson and Washington Counties withheld concealed handgun licenses from persons who met all of the statutory conditions for the issuance of such licenses, but admitted to being regular users of medical marijuana. When the sheriffsâ actions were challenged in court, the sheriffs responded that the stateâs handgun licensing scheme does not take medical marijuana use into consideration. The reason why the sheriffs denied the handgun licenses was because the state law is preempted by the federal prohibition on the possession of firearms by persons who are âunlawful users of controlled substances.â Both the trial and appellate courts rejected the preemption argument, and held that the concealed handgun licenses were wrongfully withheld. The sheriffs appealed. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Gun Control Act did not preempt the stateâs concealed handgun licensing statute, and accordingly, the Court ordered the sheriffs issue or renew the requested licenses.

Petitioners Gail Rasmussen and Bethanne Darby sought review of a certified ballot title for âInitiative Petition 10 (2012).â The proposed measure, if approved by the voters, would amend the state constitution to set the procedure for how the state sets its legislative districts following the federal census. Petitioners contended that the caption understates the scope of the changes that adoption of the measure would require under state law, and is thus misleading. The Supreme Court agreed with Petitioners that the caption understates the major effects of adopting the Initiative. The Court remanded the ballot title back to the attorney General for modification.

Petitioners Gail Rasmussen and Bethanne Darby sought review of a certified ballot title for âInitiative Petition 12 (2012).â The proposed measure, if approved by the voters, would amend the state constitution to require elections officials to count every qualified voterâs signature on an initiative or referendum petition. Additionally, it would prevent the application of laws intended to prevent forgery or fraud in circulating petitions from being used to count âgoodâ signatures. Petitioners contended that the phrase âcreates enforceable rightâ in the caption printed on the ballot is misleading. The Attorney General responded that it was limited in the number of words it could put in the title, and that the phrase was simply an efficient choice of words. The Supreme Court was ânot persuaded that the applicable word limit compels the use of the phrase,â and remanded the ballot title back to the Attorney Generalâs office for modification.