Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In May 2009, State Trooper Mark Pizzuti filed a criminal complaint against Defendant-Appellee Jeanette Garcia charging her with tampering with or fabricating physical evidence and simple assault. Presented with "an aberrant procedural history" involving an attempted appeal to the superior court from an order entered by a magisterial district judge following the entry of Defendant's guilty plea, the Supreme Court reviewed the lower courts' record to conclude that the superior court did not have jurisdiction to review the appeal because there was no final order from the court of common pleas. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the superior court's decision and quashed the appeal.

Appellant Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc., a not-for-profit religious entity related to the Bobov Orthodox Jewish community in Brooklyn, appealed a Commonwealth Court ruling, asking that the Supreme Court find it is an "institution of a purely public charity" under Article VIII, sec. 2(a)(v) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and entitled to exemption from real estate taxes. Appellant operated a summer camp in Pike County, Pennsylvania. Pike County denied Appellant's exemption request, finding that occasional use of Appellant's recreational and dining facilities by Pike County residents was insufficient to prove Appellant was a purely public charity. The Court allowed this appeal to determine if it must defer to the General Assembly's statutory definition of that term. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding its prior jurisprudence set the constitutional minimum for exemption from taxes; the legislation may codify what was intended to be exempted, but it cannot lessen the constitutional minimums by broadening the definition of "purely public charity" in the statute.

In February, 2005, Appellee David Knoble entered an open guilty plea to charges of endangering the welfare of a child, corruption of minors, and criminal conspiracy to commit statutory assault, admitting he conspired with his then-wife for her to engage in sexual intercourse with his 14-year-old son while he observed. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of one to two years imprisonment followed by four years probation and was ordered to comply with any special probation conditions imposed by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. One condition required successful completion of a sex offender outpatient program; Appellee was advised that termination from or unsuccessful completion of the program would constitute a probation violation. Six months into his probationary term, Appellee was terminated from the program for dishonesty during his sexual history therapeutic polygraph tests and was arrested for violating his probation. Following a hearing, the court revoked Appellee's probation and sentenced him on his underlying offenses. The Superior Court reversed, concluding the questions posed during the polygraph tests improperly required Appellee to answer incriminating questions that would result in the divulgence of previously unreported criminal behavior. The Supreme Court granted allocatur to determine "[w]hether the Superior Court erred in concluding a probationer may invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination for an unrelated offense, regardless of whether the information will be used in subsequent criminal proceedings, and whether such invocation must be made at the time of interrogation." The Court concluded that the therapeutic polygraphs did not inherently violate the Fifth Amendment. Participation in a therapeutic polygraph examination does not fall within the exception to the general rule that the Fifth Amendment protection must be raised or waived. Accordingly, a probationer who agrees to submit to such an exam as a condition of his probation may raise his Fifth Amendment privilege prior to submitting to the examination or when answering polygraph questions regarding uncharged criminal actions; however, the probationer waives his right to such protection if he does not invoke it upon questioning. Because Appellee failed to raise his Fifth Amendment privilege, his statements given during his therapy could be used against him.

The Commonwealth appealed a superior court order that affirmed a trial court's dismissal of charges against Appellee William Wilgus for a violation of Megan's Law requirements. Appellee was convicted in 1998 of aggravated indecent assault; he received a sentence of five years to life imprisonment, was found to be a sexually violent predator, and was ordered to comply with Megan’s Law registration requirements. The Superior Court vacated this sentence and remanded for resentencing without application of Megan’s Law registration requirements; appellee was resentenced to five to 10 years imprisonment. He became subject to lifetime registration requirements because he was incarcerated when revisions to Megan’s Law became effective in 2007. The trial court found evidence submitted against him at trial insufficient to support his convictions, granted his motions for post-sentence relief and the court dismissed the charges against him. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed: "Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law clearly requires sexually violent predators to notify Pennsylvania State Police of all current and intended residences, and to notify police of a change of residence. Unlike some other states that have ruled on this issue, Pennsylvania clearly defines 'residence' for registration purposes. Appellee reported an intended residence to prison authorities, and was in violation of registration requirements when he failed to report a change of residence when he no longer intended to live there. There is no exception for homeless offenders, and the Superior Court was incorrect in reading such an exception into the statute."

Defendant Andre Staton appealed the death sentence he received in 2006 in connection with the stabbing death of Beverly Yohn. Defendant was charged with a single count of criminal homicide, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count each of burglary, criminal trespass, receiving stolen property and theft by unlawful taking. Appellant testified at trial. He admitted that he stabbed Ms. Yohn, and caused her death, but denied that he had gone to the residence with the intent to harm her. On appeal, Defendant raised a single claim of error related to the penalty phase of his trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed Defendant's conviction and judgment of sentence.

In this discretionary appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether 18 Pa.C.S.A. 4914, which prohibits a person from furnishing false identification to law enforcement authorities, requires proof that those law enforcement authorities first identify themselves to the person and advise the person that he was the subject of an official investigation for a violation of law. The record revealed that in 2009, Pittsburgh City Police officers were investigating an armed robbery. According to the victim, a young boy pointed a gun at him as he was standing at an intersection and robbed him of $10. The victim gave police a description of his assailant, and the police developed a list of individuals they knew matched the description. D.S. was one of those individuals. Plain clothes detectives then "went out actively looking for [D.S.] in essence to field contact him." The officers did not identify themselves as police officers, nor did they state their purpose for stopping D.S. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the evidence was insufficient to support D.S.'s adjudication of delinquency. The Court reversed the Superior Court's order that affirmed D.S.'s adjudication of delinquency.

Appellant Andre Jacobs was convicted and sentenced for attempted escape and conspiracy to commit escape. The Supreme Court accepted review to determine whether Appellant's sentences for these two inchoate crimes were illegal under 18 Pa.C.S. 906, which bars multiple "convictions" for inchoate crimes "for conduct designed to . . . culminate in the commission of the same crime." After careful review of the record, the Court concluded that under the facts of this case, the two inchoate crimes were intended to culminate in the commission of two different crimes, and therefore Appellant's sentence did not run afoul of Section 906.1.

In this discretionary appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether under Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Act, a juvenile court is required to enter on the record an adjudication of delinquency once it has determined the juvenile committed the acts alleged in the delinquency petition, or whether the court must make an additional finding that the juvenile is in need of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation, prior to entering an adjudication of delinquency. In 2007, the Commonwealth filed a delinquency petition against M.W. alleging that he and another youth robbed an individual who had just left a local bar. At an adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court found that M.W. committed robbery, conspiracy, and related charges. Later that same day, M.W. was adjudicated delinquent by another juvenile court judge on a separate delinquency theft petition, and M.W. was committed for treatment, rehabilitation, and supervision. After a hearing on the first petition, the trial court discharged the delinquency petition stemming from the robbery offense, noting that M.W. "will be adjudicated on the [theft] petition. He will still receive treatment and supervision." The Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The Commonwealth then appealed to the Superior Court, where it argued that the juvenile court abused its discretion and violated the requirements of the Juvenile Act by failing to adjudicate M.W. delinquent once it found that M.W. had committed the acts alleged in the original delinquency petition. Upon review, the Court held that the Juvenile Act requires a juvenile court to find both: (1) that the juvenile has committed a delinquent act; and (2) that the juvenile is in need of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation, before the juvenile court may enter an adjudication of delinquency. In this case, the Court reversed the decision of the Superior Court.

In twelve separate matters, Commonwealth citizens, acting singly or in groups, filed appeals from the Final Plan for legislative redistricting of the Commonwealth, which was devised by Appellee 2011 Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment Commission (the "LRC"), in response to the U.S. decennial census. Fourteen days after the appeals were filed, seven days after the matters were briefed, and two days after the appeals were argued, the Supreme Court issued its mandate in a per curiam order filed January 25, 2012. That order declared that the Final Plan was contrary to law under Article II, Section 17(d) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and with the directive in that constitutional provision, the Court remanded the matter to the LRC to reapportion the Commonwealth in a manner consistent with this opinion.

Appellant John Koehler appealed a common pleas court order that dismissed his petition for collateral relief filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Appellant was convicted for the murder of Regina Clark and her nine-year old son Austin for which he was sentenced to death. On appeal, Appellant raised nineteen issues that primarily challenged the effectiveness of his trial counsel. The PCRA court denied Appellant relief, finding that while he raised nineteen issues, Appellant pursued only three before the court. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant raised thirteen issues, again pertaining to the effectiveness of his trial counsel. The Court noted that Appellant's trial counsel was the same as it was for his direct appeal. Finding none of Appellant's issues on appeal meritorious, the Court affirmed the PCRA court's order that dismissed Appellant's PCRA petition.