Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This case was remanded from the federal Supreme Court who vacated the Pennsylvania court's prior decision in light of "Michigan v. Bryant" (131 S.Ct. 1143 (2011)). In 2004, Appellant Ricky Lee Allshouse and "M.R." were arguing in the home they shared with their three children. The argument ended with rushing their seven-month old son to the hospital for a spiral fracture to his right humerus caused by a sharp and severe twisting of his arm. The infant's four-year-old sister implicated Appellant in the incident, and he was later arrested and charged with aggravated assault, simple assault, endangering the welfare of a child, reckless endangerment and harassment. Ultimately Appellant was sentenced to one to two years in prison. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court's admission of the daughter's statement to a psychologist violated his constitutional rights. Thereafter, he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The threshold question in this case was whether the daughter's statements were "testimonial;" if they were nontestimonial, "the confrontation clause places no restriction on their introduction except for 'the traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence.'" The Superior Court concluded that the dauther's statement to the psychologist was nontestimonial under because (a) the doctor's intent during his interview with the daughter was not to obtain testimony for the purpose of a criminal proceeding, but to ensure the safety of the infant and his siblings, and (b) the environment and circumstances surrounding her statement were informal and not suggestive of an investigatory interview. The Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision to admit the daughter's statements.

Appellee Antoine Miller brutally murdered Wallace Bivens in his home, then stole his car. Appellee was arrested later that evening after police noticed him driving the car without headlights. Appellee then engaged in a high-speed chase. Appellee was charged with multiple Motor Vehicle Code violations, and police impounded the car. While attempting to serve an eviction notice on the victim, a state constable discovered the victim's decaying body in the living room closet of his apartment. Appellee was later apprehended and charged with first-, second- and third-degree murder, robbery, aggravated and simple assault, theft, and a host of other crimes. Appellee was found guilty of second-degree murder, theft by unlawful taking, and fleeing or attempting to elude an officer, and acquitted of first-degree murder, robbery, aggravated assault and possessing an instrument of crime.Appellant appealed to the Superior Court, contending that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his second-degree murder conviction because he had been acquitted of the predicate offense of robbery. The Superior Court reversed Appellee's second-degree murder conviction and vacated his judgment of sentence. The question presented for the Supreme Court's review implicated the issue of inconsistent verdicts in the context of a second-degree murder conviction. Because the Superior Court erroneously concluded that a jury's verdict of guilt on a second-degree murder charge and its acquittal on the predicate felony of robbery were impermissibly inconsistent and could not stand, the Court vacated the Superior Court's order.

Appellant Ernest Porter appealed a common pleas court order that denied his serial petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Appellant was sentenced to death for the murder of Raymond Fiss in 1985. After his appeal was was briefed on the timeliness merits and submitted, the parties, upon direction of the Supreme Court, filed supplemental briefs addressing the jurisdictional issue of whether the PCRA court's order was final and appealable. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that the common pleas court's order was appealable and that the court's time-bar determination was correct. With this case, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to address: (1) the circumstances creating uncertainty respecting appealability, in an effort to ensure that those circumstances do not arise again; and (2) the circumstances creating the unacceptable delay in this case, so that PCRA courts throughout Pennsylvania will take measures to avoid such delays. Though the Court affirmed the PCRA court's decision with regard to the time-bar determination, the case was remanded to direct the PCRA court to promptly dispose of Appellant's long-pending prior PCRA petition which raised an issue under "Atkins v. Virginia," 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

Appellee Raymond Haun was convicted on multiple sexual offenses for which he received a 27 to 97 year sentence in prison. Approximately one year after he was convicted, Appellee sought relief under the PCRA, arguing his trial attorney failed to contest his sentence despite his explicit request for counsel to do so. After testifying to the court regarding his wish to appeal, on cross-examination, the Commonwealth set out to elicit an admission that Appellee had committed the criminal acts for which he was convicted. The PCRA court overruled an objection to the line of questioning. Appellee then responded that he did, in fact, commit the offenses. Furthermore, he acknowledged that he previously admitted his guilt during the presentence investigation, at sentencing and in the assessment process required under Megan's Law. When asked why he wished to appeal his sentence, Appellee responded that he believed the length of his sentence was unfair. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Appellee's confession of guilt foreclosed his access to judicial review under the Post Conviction Relief Act. The Commonwealth asked the Supreme Court to revisit its holding in "Commonwealth v. Lantzy" (735 A.2d 564 (1999)) and adopt the superior court's decision which "Lantzy" reversed. "In its brief, the Commonwealth has provided [the Court] with nothing to suggest that [the Court] was wrong in Lantzy... [the Court declined] to effectively overrule [its] decision based on a presentation which refuses to come to terms with [its] opinion's governing rationale." The Court held that a concession of guilt did not per se foreclose prisoner access to the PCRA.

Appellant Shawn Walker appealed the dismissal of his motion for a new trial. In 1991, Appellant forcibly entered the home of his former girlfriend, shot and killed a man sleeping on the couch, and shot and permanently disabled the girlfriend. After finding two aggravating factors, the jury convicted Appellant of first degree murder and sentenced him to death. Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition, raising numerous issues on appeal. Among them, Appellant claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel allegedly failed to present specific mitigation evidence. Upon careful review of the trial court and PCRA court records, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellant failed to establish that any of his claims entitled him to a new trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence.

Defendant Orlando Masionet was charged with the 1982 stabbing death of Jorge Figueroa. A local gang member testified against other members, including Defendant. One member received the death penalty; two others received life sentences. Defendant eluded capture for approximately ten years following the stabbing. Authorities sought help from the television show "America's Most Wanted" to help locate Defendant. He was eventually found in Puerto Rico and extradited to Pennsylvania to stand trial. The Commonwealth's theory of the case was that Mr. Figueroa was killed to prevent him from cooperating with police regarding a robbery-homicide perpetrated two weeks earlier, and Defendant played a part in both the robbery-homicide and death of Mr. Figueroa. Defendant was ultimately convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses. The jury found four aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances for which he was sentenced to death. Defendant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction in both matters. Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to support Defendant's conviction, and affirmed his death sentence.

The issue before the Supreme Court was a court order that directed Appellant the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) to select and pay for the services of a qualified professional to provide counseling to an incarcerated parent who sough visitation with his child. Resolution of the case was dependent upon the intended scope of section 5303 of Chapter 53 of the Domestic Relations Code relating to custody. "D.R.C, Sr." was serving time for first-degree murder. "J.A.Z.," the mother and custodial guardian "steadfastly opposed" prison visits for her son. Instead, she requested that visits be postponed until the son reached a sufficiently mature age and could make his own informed decision about visiting his father. A trial court denied D.R.C.'s request for visitation, which was timely appealed. On remand, the trial court ordered D.R.C. to present evidence that he was no longer a "grave threat of harm" to his son. This hearing was followed with a telephonic hearing in which the mother, D.R.C. and a licensed psychologist from the DOC testified. The court dismissed D.R.C.'s petition premised on language of the applicable legal standard precluded it from awarding visitation because D.R.C. never received the statutory-mandated counseling. On appeal, the Superior Court found that the trial court erred by not appointing a qualified professional to perform the counseling. The DOC intervened to challenge the trial court's directive to appoint the counselor. The court ultimately denied D.R.C.'s and the DOC's motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the legal authority relied on by the trial court was misplaced: "we find the counseling required by [statute] is not a prerequisite to a court's engaging in its evaluation of a child's best interest in the context of a request for prison visits." Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court to conduct a hearing on D.R.C.'s request for prison visitation in an "expeditious manner" without resort to the application of the statute.

In the 1990s, Appellee Stephen Rambler mailed letters in an attempt to extort money from approximately thirty individuals by threatening to reveal certain sexually explicit correspondence if they did not pay him. Based on this conduct, Appellee was charged with violating federal law by mailing "threatening communications." Nearly ten years later, in November 2005, Appellee was elected mayor of Wrightsville, York County. He assumed office in January 2006. Two months later, the Commonwealth filed a complaint in quo warranto seeking to remove Appellee from office pursuant to Article II, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Commonwealth alleged that the federal offense constituted an "infamous crime" in Pennsylvania, and requested an order declaring Appellee unqualified for his mayoral office. The common pleas court ultimately issued an opinion and order in favor of the Commonwealth, removing Appellee from office, and disqualifying him from holding any office of trust or profit in Pennsylvania. Appellee appealed, claiming that his federal extortion conviction did not qualify as an infamous crime because his conviction only carried a maximum sentence of two years which is comparable to a misdemeanor sentence in state court. The Superior Court reversed. The Supreme Court found in its review that "Appellee sought to reap dishonest gain… This type of behavior is, quite obviously, 'inconsistent with commonly accepted principles of honesty and decency,' and is, moreover, akin to 'swindling, cheating, and other crimes of a kindred nature.'" The Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Father "C.S." is the biological father of two minor children, R.I.S. and A.I.S. He was incarcerated in a state correctional facility with a minimum release date of June 2012. He appealed a superior court's reversal of a trial court order that ordered the involuntary termination of his parental rights and for changes in the placement goals for the children from reunification to adoption. Upon review of the facts presented at trial, the court reversed the superior court and took the opportunity to reiterate the principle that: "a parent’s incarceration, standing alone, cannot constitute proper grounds for the termination of his or her parental rights."

Cromwell Township appealed a Commonwealth Court's order that sentenced its supervisors to three to six months' imprisonment for contempt. The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) had approved the Township's comprehensive plan for sewage services, but the Township decided the Plan was too expensive to implement. Despite requesting several extensions of time, the Township failed to implement its plan. At the time, the Orbisonia Rockhill Joint Municipal Authority (ORJMA) which operated public sewage systems including those within the Township, was experiencing an overload in its wastewater treatment plant. The Township Board of Supervisors approached ORJMA and proposed a joint venture that would increase the capacity of ORJMA's plant and simultaneously decrease the anticipated cost to the Township for sewage treatment. The Township submitted an amended Plan which was accepted by the DEP. But prior to implementing the Plan, the Township Board elected new members. New members who openly opposed the Plan repealed the ordinances required under the amended Plan. The Township then stopped cooperating. The DEP filed suit to enforce the Plan asking that fines be levied against Board members and to set a timeline to purge the contempt. The court, unsatisfied with the Township's efforts to purge the contempt sentenced its members to jail time. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Township's failing to timely appeal the Plan and its amendment when new supervisors took office meant that the DEP's act was final, and the Township was foreclosed from challenging the Plan. However, the Court found that the Commonwealth Court's failing to use less restrictive means prior to imposing prison sentences on Board members compelled reversal: "the Commonwealth Court had lesser alternatives available to it in its attempt to compel Township's compliance with the court's prior order… but the Commonwealth Court inexplicably refused." The Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's order sentencing Township Board members to imprisonment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.