Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Francis Bauer Harris was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder, and the Commonwealth sought the death penalty. During the penalty phase of his trial, Appellant sought to establish the statutory mitigating circumstance of extreme mental or emotional disturbance by presenting the testimony of a psychologist. The jury rejected Appellant’s claim of a mitigating circumstance, found one aggravating circumstance, and returned a verdict of death. Appellant filed a petition for post conviction relief asserting that trial counsel had been ineffective for presenting the psychologist's testimony even though counsel was aware that the doctor's evaluation had been deficient. The court of common pleas scheduled a hearing on the PCRA petition, and, to defend against Appellant’s allegations, the Commonwealth subpoenaed the psychologist to testify. The prosecution asked Appellant to waive psychologist-client privilege with respect to the doctor's testimony. When Appellant refused, the Commonwealth asked the PCRA court not only to declare the privilege waived, but also to permit it to hire the doctor as its expert for the PCRA proceedings. The PCRA court granted the motion, and Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court ordered briefing and oral argument on whether the court had jurisdiction over this appeal as a collateral appeal, and the Court concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper. On the merits, the Court held that although the Commonwealth could subpoena the doctor to testify as a fact witness, it could not hire him as its expert for the PCRA proceedings. The case was remanded for a determination of the extent of the waiver of privilege.

Appellant Freeman May appealed his death sentence imposed following his third penalty phase hearing. Appellant was convicted for the 1982 murder of Lynn Fair. After a penalty hearing, the jury found one aggravating circumstance, and one mitigating circumstance. The jury determined the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstance, and Appellant was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, but reversed the sentence, concluding the jury could not properly consider whether appellant committed murder while in the perpetration of the felony (rape) due to an error in instructing the jury. At the second penalty phase, a new jury found one aggravating circumstance, a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person, and no mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, the sentence was death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed both the conviction and death sentence. Appellant initiated PCRA proceedings by filing a pro se petition, motions for stay of execution, and appointment of counsel. The PCRA court denied relief on all of Appellant’s issues, but granted an evidentiary hearing for his contention that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, develop, and present mitigating evidence of Appellant’s allegedly traumatic childhood. On appeal, the Supreme Court determined trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s ruling concerning the introduction of mitigating evidence, and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claim on direct appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated appellant’s sentence and remanded the matter for a third penalty phase. With the Commonwealth’s agreement, appellant was granted permission to appeal his sentence, nunc pro tunc. Appellant raised multiple alleged errors in the subsequent rehearings, the sum of which warranted a fourth penalty phase hearing. After careful consideration of the lengthy appellate record in this case, the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence to support the juries' findings of aggravating circumstances to warrant the death sentence. The Court affirmed Appellant's sentence.

The Supreme Court granted discretionary review of a superior court order that vacated a sentence imposed on Appellee Shawney Perry who was originally indicted for carrying a firearm without a license. The issue before the Court was whether the superior court misapplied the Supreme Court's directive set forth in "Commonwealth v. Walls," 926 A.2d 957 (2007) concerning the appellate review of sentences. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the superior court failed to give sufficient deference to the sentencing court's imposition of sentence. Accordingly, the Court vacated the superior court's order and remanded the case back to that court for a reexamination of Appellee's judgment of sentence.

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether it was possible, as a matter of law, to be convicted as an accomplice to third-degree murder. The Commonwealth presented evidence that the victim was lured to an apartment complex, where he was ambushed, shot, and mortally wounded. Appellant Stanley Roebuck participated with others in orchestrating the events, but he did not shoot the victim. For his role, Appellant was charged with, among other offenses, third degree murder. On appeal, Appellant argued that there is no rational legal theory to support accomplice liability for third-degree murder. The Superior Court affirmed Appellant's sentence. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review, and concluded that a conviction for murder of the third degree is supportable under complicity theory where the Commonwealth proves the accomplice acted with the culpable mental state required of a principal actor, namely, malice. In other words, the Pennsylvania Crimes Code legally, logically, and rationally imposes accomplice liability for depraved heart murder. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision.

Appellants Dawn Pyeritz sued the Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania State police and several of its police officers for the destruction of her personal property, speficially "a black nylon tree stand safety harness, or belt, that allegedly was crucial evidence in a separate civil action." The police seized this item during a criminal investigation of a suspicious death. A trooper agreed to retain the belt in the custody of the police, apparently for a longer time than permitted by internal police regulations. The belt was destroyed before Appellants' counsel asked for its return. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Appellees, which the Commonwealth Court affirmed. The Commonwealth Court held that no cause of action exists against a third party – someone other than the original alleged tortfeasor – for negligent spoliation of evidence. The Supreme Court granted review, and now holds that Pennsylvania law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether acceptance into an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program following a second charge of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) constituted a DUI violation and thus triggers the requirement for installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of restoring a revoked driver's license. In 1998, Appellee John Whalen was convicted of DUI in Florida. Nine years later, Appellee was again arrested for DUI, this time in Pennsylvania. The trial court admitted Appellee into an ARD program after expressly making a determination that Appellee’s 1998 Florida DUI conviction did not present a bar to his entry into this program. Appellee successfully completed his ARD program. Pursuant to one provision of the ARD program, Appellee’s driver’s license was suspended for a period of sixty days, with the added condition that the ignition interlock be installed on his vehicle. Appellee appealed the ignition interlock requirement to the court of common pleas, arguing that the Department had no authority to impose this requirement in his case because ARD was not an adjudication of guilt. The Commonweath Court affirmed the DOT's decision. Upon reivew, the Supreme Court determined that the Commonwealth Court erred in its interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions when it concluded that acceptance into ARD did not establish a DUI violation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant David Chmiel challenged the dismissal of his petition for post conviction relief (pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 'PCRA'). Appellant was convicted on three counts of first-degree murder in 2002 and sentenced to death. Following his unsuccessful post-sentence motion that asserted forty alleged errors and eight claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court denied Appellant’s request for PCRA relief in a detailed and extensive memorandum opinion and order filed in early 2009. This appeal followed, wherein Appellant stated twelve issues for review. In its own extensive opinion, the Supreme Court found that none of Appellant's assertions had any "arguable merit." The Court affirmed the PCRA court's order dismissing his claims.

The Commonwealth appealed a portion of a superior court order that reversed Appellee Daniel Sinnott's conviction for ethnic intimidation baed in insufficient evidence. Appellee got into a heated argument with his landlord/employer, hurling epithets and throwing things at the landlord and members of his family. Appellee was charged with simple assault, terroristic threats, ethnic intimidation, and possession of instruments of crime. He waived his right to a jury, and the trial court convicted him of all offenses, sentencing him to four to 23 months imprisonment for simple assault and a consecutive four years probation for terroristic threats; no further penalty was imposed. Appellee appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his terroristic threats and ethnic intimidation convictions. The superior court affirmed the terroristic threats conviction, but reversed the conviction for ethnic intimidation, concluding the record failed to establish the landlord's ethnicity was the "primary basis" for appellee's behavior. In crediting appellee's contention that his conduct was solely motivated by anger with the landlord, the Supreme Court found that the superior court not only imposed a non-existing requirement that racial animus be the sole or primary motivator, but also failed to view the evidence of Appellee's repeated derogatory ethnic slurs in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the portion of the superior court's order reversing appellee's ethnic intimidation conviction, and reinstate the judgment of sentence for that offense. In all other aspects, the order was affirmed.

Appellant Terry Chamberlain appealed the death sentence imposed on him after a jury convicted him of two counts of first-degree murder, burglary and possessing "an instrument of crime" in 1994. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a pretrial motion for a continuance to allow Appellant to obtain DNA testing of certain blood evidence. The case was remanded for the trial court to allow Appellant to do the testing. The trial court completed proceedings on remand, and the case went back to the Supreme Court for its consideration on the remaining claims in Appellant's appeal. Upon review of those claims, the Court affirmed Appellant's death sentence.

The Supreme Court considered the effect of a pro se notice of appeal which was forwarded to the superior court by a counseled criminal defendant, where counsel, who was not made aware of the pro se notice, subsequently filed a timely post-sentence motion which was denied by the trial court, and then a second timely notice of appeal. In this case, the superior court administratively quashed the counseled-appeal as duplicative, then quashed Appellee Michael Cooper's pro se appeal as premature and void. Yet the court also remanded the case to the trial court for additional review of the counseled post-sentence motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the superior court erred in quashing the appeal and remanding the counseled post-sentencing motion. Therefore, the Court vacated the order and remanded the case back to the superior court for consideration of the merits of Appellee's direct appeal.