Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

n this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the mere offer of an automobile ride to a child constituted an attempt to âlureâ the child under Section 2910 of Pennsylvaniaâs Criminal Code, entitled âLuring a child into a motor vehicle or structure.â Appellant was charged with four counts of harassment, stalking, and attempted luring of a child into a motor vehicle for offering two neighborhood boys a ride to school in Appellant's own neighborhood. He had seen the children in the neighborhood, and offered them short rides to school or to the store. The children declined, and Appellant made no further attempt to "help." Appellant was acquitted of the charged at a bench trial because the judge "expressly stated she found no evidence that Appellant had any intent to harm the children, and that she believed 'the circumstances show no reason to believe that this defendant had any evil or improper intent in doing what he did.'â However, on the sole basis of Appellantâs offer of the rides, she convicted him on all four counts of attempted luring. The trial court found that â[Appellantâs] offer of a ride to the victims is sufficient to constitute an attempt to âlure.ââ The trial court subsequently sentenced Appellant to 18 monthsâ probation. As an automatic result of his convictions, Appellant was statutorily mandated to register for ten years as a sex offender under Meganâs Law. Appellant filed an appeal to the Superior Court, arguing that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain his conviction, because his offer of a ride to the children, by itself, did not constitute a âlureâ or an attempt to âlure,â given that he did not offer the children any enticement to get into his car, nor did he command or otherwise threaten them. Appellant also argued that he had no ill intent in offering the children a ride, but, rather, was merely acting as a âdisabled Good Samaritan.â After careful review, the Supreme Court concluded that an attempt to âlureâ does not include the action of simply extending an offer of an automobile ride to a child, when it is unaccompanied by any other enticement or inducement for the child to enter the motor vehicle. Consequently, the Court reversed Appellant's conviction for attempted luring.

Appellant Michael Travaglia appealed his death sentence imposed by the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas following a penalty hearing held pursuant to a grant of federal habeas corpus relief. Appellant was convicted in the shooting death of an Apollo police officer in 1980. Prior to the officer's homicide, state police received information indicating that Appellant was involved in a number of armed robberies and killings in Pittsburgh and surrounding counties. Appellant would later give a statement to police implicating himself in the killing of the officer and several others. Following the denial of his post-sentence motions Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court where he raised eighteen alleged errors in his penalty hearing. The Supreme Court took each issue in turn and ultimately affirmed Appellant's death sentence.

Sean Pearce was bicycling along a road when he collided with a construction barrel and fell into the road. At least two vehicles, one driven by Appellee Gregory Wisneski, subsequently fatally struck Pearce. Appellee later admitted driving along the road when, initially thinking he hit a speed bump, he looked in his mirror and saw a body in the road. Appellee did not stop at the scene. The Commonwealth charged Appellee with failing to stop at an accident, failing to comply with a duty to give information and render aid, and failing to immediately notify the police. Appellee filed a habeas petition seeking dismissal of the charges, arguing the Commonwealth could not prove Pearce was alive when Appellee struck him. The trial court concluded that the statutes required the victim to be alive at the time of the accident, reasoning that "once a victim of an accident is dead, the accident concludes that the statutes cannot apply to vehicles that later come upon the scene." A divided Superior Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the information against Appellee. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that "a person does not turn into mere property upon their death, certainly not for purposes of a driver's obligations under the Vehicle Code. We find, therefore, the term 'resulting in injury' must include causing harm or damage to the body of a human, whether deceased or not. To find otherwise would defeat the legislative scheme, and would be offensive to our notions of the value of the person." The Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The issue central to this case was whether Appellee George Banks was competent to be executed. Appellee used a semi-automatic rifle to murder thirteen people and seriously wounded a fourteenth in an early morning shooting spree in 1982. Five of the victims were Appellee's children, and four were Appellee's former or then-current girlfriends. In 2004, the Supreme Court ordered the trial court to determine whether Appellee had the capacity to initiate clemency proceedings or to designate someone to initiate them on his behalf. "To say that [the Court's] direction for expedition went unheeded by [the trial court judge] would be an understatement." Clemency proceedings were delayed by federal counsel seeking to burden the Commonwealth's ability to have its mental health experts examine Appellee in order to prepare a case in rebuttal against counsel's claim that Appellee had become insane. The Court concluded that "the competency question [was] important, but narrow, and it should have been resolved sooner." Following the Court's review of the competency determination rendered by the trial court, the Court concluded that Appellee was incompetent to be executed under the standards set forth in Pennsylvania case law. "It appear[ed] that [Appellee was] in a different place mentally than he was nearly thirty years ago when he committed his crimes and when he was tried."

In 1999, a jury convicted Appellant Steven Hutchinson of first-degree murder and other crimes for the shooting death of one of his girlfriends. Appellant unsuccessfully filed a petition for post-conviction relief raising numerous guilt and penalty phase claims. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant appealed the denial of his guilt phase claims, raising ten issues for the Courtâs review. Taking each in turn, the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence in the trial court and PCRA court records to support his conviction. Accordingly, the Court affirmed his conviction.

In 2008, a Pennsylvania Game Commission Officer found Appellant Mark Clegg in possession of two rifles during a hunting incident. Appellant had a prior conviction of attempted burglary. In addition to various summary violations under the Game and Wildlife Code, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with violation of the Uniform Firearms Act. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether attempted burglary is a "qualifying offense" that prohibits an individual from possessing a firearm under the Act. Upon review of the plain meaning of the Act, the Supreme Court found that attempted burglary is not one of the enumerated offenses under the Act, and as such, was not a "qualifying" offense for which Appellant could be charged in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss Appellant's charge under the Act.

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court in Defendant Omar Johnson's case properly calculated the total weight of heroin for the purpose of imposing a mandatory minimum sentence. Upon review of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in finding that a single purchase of one bundle of packets of heroin from a third person who retrieved the bundle from a parked car, coupled with Defendant's immediate resale of that bundle to an undercover offer, formed an adequate basis for its conclusion that Defendant was in constructive possession of a second bundle stored in the car which was discovered following a police search. Because the amount of heroin seized from the car was erroneously included by the trial court in the calculation of the total amount of heroin Defendant was found to have possessed with the intent to deliver, the Supreme Court concluded Defendant received an improperly-calculated sentence. The Court reversed the trial court's calculation and remanded the case for resentencing.

Appellee United States Organizations for Bankruptcy Alternatives, Inc. (USOBA) and Appellant Department of Banking challenged different aspects of the Commonwealth Court's decision that the Pennsylvania Debt Management Services Act (Act 117) was unconstitutional in part. At the request of the Supreme Court, the parties addressed whether the lower court's disposition was a final order appealable pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure. The General Assembly adopted Act 117 in October 2008 to regulate, in relevant part, providers of debt settlement services (âDSSâ). A DSS provider negotiates with creditors on behalf of a consumer âfor the purpose of the creditor forgiving part or all of the principal of the debt incurred or credit extended to that consumer.â Pursuant to Section 3(b) of Act 117, DSS providers are prohibited from operating in Pennsylvania without a license from the Banking Department, and are required to comply with the Departmentâs regulations. Other sections of Act 117 list licensing fees, describe the initial licensing, license renewal, revocation, and reinstatement processes, and create penalties for violations of the statute. USOBA claimed that Act 117 violates the non-delegation, equal protection, and due process provisions of the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions, and requested a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and compensation for attorneysâ fees and costs. The Department denied the allegations, and filed an Application for Summary Relief, claiming that the contentions in the complaint were insufficient as a matter of law to state a claim. Following a hearing, the Commonwealth Court denied the Departmentâs application in an unpublished opinion. Upon review of the Act, the applicable legal authority and the trial record, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court's order was not appealable and quashed the parties' appeals.

Following a bench trial in October 2001, Appellee Jules Jette was found guilty of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, endangering the welfare of a child and corruption of minors charges. Appellee was sentenced to ten to twenty years' imprisonment, with consecutive terms of probation for seven and five years. The post-conviction-relief court (PCRA) found no merit to Appellee's claims for relief. Appellee's counsel strategically chose not to challenge all issues addressed by the PCRA court in its opinion that dismissed the case. Appellee appeared pro se to appeal to the Superior Court. The Superior Court found that Appellee was entitled to new counsel and remanded the case back to the PCRA court. The Commonwealth appealed the Superior Court's order to the Supreme Court. After a careful review of the Superior Court's opinion, the applicable law and the briefs of the parties, the Supreme Court found that the Superior Court misread the applicable legal standard which was the basis of its opinion. As a result, the Commonwealth found itself in the "unusual position" of advocating in defense of the "honor, independence and professionalism of the criminal defense bar" in its appeal of the Superior Court's order. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's order and remanded the case back to the PCRA for further proceedings.

In 2005, Robert Sample was found face down on a Philadelphia city sidewalk, dead from multiple gunshot wounds to his head and neck. In canvassing the area for witnesses, detectives knocked on the door of a third-floor apartment in a nearby high-rise. Jamilla and Dominique Everett opened the door. After obtaining permission to enter the apartment, detectives found Jamilla's children, Dominique's boyfriend Khalif Alston and Appellee Ernest Cannon asleep inside. Everyone inside the apartment denied any knowledge of the shooting but agreed to accompany the police to the station for further questioning. Later on the day of the murder, the Everetts consented to a search of their apartment. Police recovered a semiautomatic handgun from inside the toilet tank. Everyone inside the apartment that day was questioned again. When detectives interviewed Mr. Alston, he confessed to his role in the crime and implicated Appellee. Following the consolidation of their cases, a jury tried both men. Since Appellee and Mr. Alston were being tried together, the statement that Mr. Alston gave to the police on the day of the murder was redacted by substituting the phrase "the other guy" for any reference to Appellee by name. The prosecution "slipped" and named Appellee in his opening statement as he recounted the events on the date of the murder. At the conclusion of the prosecutor's opening, Appellee objected and moved for a mistrial, claiming that the prosecutor "broke the redaction." The trial court gave the jury an immediate cautionary instruction. The jury returned a verdict against Appellee, convicting him of first-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy and carrying a firearm. The trial court then sentenced Appellee to life in prison for the murder conviction, with concurrent sentences for the other charges. On appeal to the Superior Court, Appellee successfully argued that he was entitled to a new trial because of the prosecutor's slip up during his opening statement. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the trial judge's cautionary instruction was sufficient to support Appellee's conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court gave "direct, unequivocal and strong" cautionary instructions, repeatedly detailing the proper manner of weighing the evidence. "The trial court, which is in the best position to assess whether any prejudice can be cured, determined that the prosecutor's comment did not justify a mistrial." Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Superior Court and reinstated the verdict and sentences of the trial court.